WHY THE PRESIDENT IS WRONG

By Kwesi Pratt, Jnr.

President John Dramani Mahama

In this state of the nation address to Parliament President John Dramani Mahama dropped hints of Ghana’s intention to sign the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union and indicated that it would beneficial.

He could not have been further away from the reality.

The signing of the EPA can only spell doom for the Ghanaian economy and thwart the President’s own efforts at promoting made in Ghana goods as a means of reducing the country’s reliance on imports.

Studies carried out by the Third World Network (TWN) reveal that the EPA will directly result in an increase in imports from the European Union, leading to increased competition for non-protected sectors.

Additionally, Ghana’s revenue from duties on imports will be substantially reduced.

The studies show that if Ghana were to sign the interim EPA, she would lose revenue of about GHȻ 17 million in the first year.

This loss would amount to 0.53 per cent of total revenue from taxes on imports, which is equivalent to 0.13 per cent of total government revenue of 0.12 per cent of total government revenue plus grants.

Ghana would not be able to use any prohibitions or restrictions on imports or exports, such as quotas and import or export licenses.

The Interim EPA insists on phased elimination of Ghana’s tariffs on approximately 80 per cent of all imports from the European Union over a period of 15 years.

In addition, the EPA would impose a stand still on all of Ghana’s tariffs, which would prevent the nation from raising any of its tariff rates, even for goods on the exclusion list.

From all indication, the President was not adequately briefed on the full implication of Ghana signing the Economic Partnership Agreement.

It may be prudent as a matter of urgency to convene a consultative forum of Ghana industry movers, organisations such as the Third World Network and Government to re-examine Ghana’s commitments.

Editorial

NPP CONTEST

The contest for leadership in the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is getting dirtier by the day and perhaps destroying any hope of the party wining political in the near future.

Only recent Mr P.C Appiah- Ofori, a leading member of the party said that Nana Akufo-Ado is the only person in the Kufuor administration who is clean enough to contest for the presidency in 2016.

 Another leading member of the party has described all the leaders of the NPP as thieves.

And there are other leading members who have unashamedly admitted that the New Patriotic Party is an Akan Vanguard.

What all the these party leaders are busily doing is wrecking the chances of the NPP to win the 2016 elections.

They forget that in a few years, their own statements about their own party can and will be thrown at them.

Indeed, the worse anti-NPP weapon is the strange slogan “No Nana No NPP” which is being shouted  about on party platforms.

 The elected officials who are throwing neutrality to the wind and declaring support for only one presidential candidate do the internal cohesion of the NPP no good.

 The Insight hopes that sooner than later sanity will prevail in the NPP and that Ghana’s democracy can be enriched by a strong opposition political party.

Why Ghana should not sign IEPA

President Mahama

Any decision on the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) will trigger a range of effects on different actors. But the overall effect will be that Ghana will be worse off if it signs the Interim EPA agreement.. This is because the costs of signing the agreement far outweigh the benefits of signing the Trade deal. At the same time, what can be saved from not signing can be used to meet the problem posed by not signing it. The other way round is not possible.

A. Benefits of Signing the IEPAs/Costs of Not signing IEPA

In the absence of the IEPA, 70% of Ghana's current export to the European Union (EU) market will enter duty free. Of the reaming 30% which will face duties, the most important in terms of trade volumes and values are: tuna, (facing 18-20% duties); fruits and vegetables (2-8%) and cocoa butter and paste (4-6%). If Ghana signs the IEPAs, these products will continue to enjoy preferential market access, and not pay the relevant duties.

But if the EPAs are not signed, then, 'based on United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and South Centre's calculations, and based on their current export volumes, these companies will pay a maximum combined import duties to the European Union of a tune of $52 million annually.

In addition, by the account of the companies themselves, a maximum of about 4, 000- 4,5000 jobs will be threatened.

B. Cost of Signing/Benefits of Not signing IEPA.
By contrast to the above, signing of the EPAs will trigger the following range of costs.

a) Imports effects on Domestic and Regional Market
The signing of the agreement will open up the market to about 80% to imported goods from European Union. Since most of these European goods enjoy better conditions of production, they will out-compete domestic products, which are either similar or substitutable. Even though there is an attempt to protect some domestic sectors through a sensitive list, this list is neither coherent or rigorous. So most of the sectors supposedly protected will suffer anyway.

According to MOTI's own figures, these sectors that will be most likely affected are the most dynamic and innovative future industries, like pharmaceuticals; high-value added, like plywood, veneer etc; as compared to lumber; which combined to be the most job-creating sectors.

These are also sectors that don't export to Europe, but rely on the domestic and regional market. Signing the IEPAs will destroy their domestic market. In addition, since the IEPA is bilateral, it will have the effect of blocking them out of the most important regional markets like Nigeria, which don't have the IEPA. And the full EPA, will open the regional market to competition, affecting them. These include pharmaceutical companies, wood products, wire weavers, plastic, pasta etc.

Jobs: From MOTI's analysis, the job losses in this already beleaguered manufacturing sector be a minimum of 43,000 direct jobs, with related indirect jobs across the economy escalating even further. This excludes means of livelihood in agriculture, etc.
b) Tariff Revenue

Signing the IEPA will cost government tariff revenue to the tune of $150million (according to MOTI) and $374 million (according to the United Nations and the South Centre) annually forgone on European imports. Thus, not signing the IEPAs will save the country this amount.
c) Policy Space

The signing of the IEPAs will take away the use of tariff as a policy tool. Due to World Trade Organisation rules, performance and domestic content requirements related to goods have become strictly circumscribed, (in key instances prohibited outright) leaving tariffs and the price mechanism as the tool of choice for promoting domestic content and local procurement objectives (outside investment rules).

In addition, under the IEPA, export taxes, which are also prohibited under the EPA. This could be used to make raw materials available for domestic use. A key example is the policy of scrap metal, which is used to make the material available for local use.

Also, funding of the EDIF and other similar initiatives from import duties will also be proscribed.

Furthermore, there is the issue of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) which basically bars Ghana from entering into any trade agreement with a third party. The rationale of this clause in the agreement is to secure the interest of the EU and deprives Ghana the opportunity to enter any trade agreement with other developing countries such as China, India or Brazil.

d) Regional mechanisms and economic and political space.

ECOWAS region is an economic space. Most of the domestic job-creating industries export mainly or even to the regional market. Going it alone and signing the IEPA will attract retaliation from players which want to protect their market, e.g. Nigeria. There is also the budding regional financial, services and infrastructure market that Ghanaian companies can tap into. It will also undermine common political solutions to common economic problems.

C. RECOMMENDATION

1. Ghana should not sign the IEPA.

2. To meet the challenges of the three export sectors which will face the combined duty of $52million, Government can raise the money out of its saving of $372 in tariff revenue to support such industries while they diversify their market. A significant number of countries are doing this, as confidential acts, including Namibia which is helping its beef sector diversify while holding signature of the IEPA at bay.

In any case, the preferences which the exporters currently enjoy, and which will be protected with the IEPA are being eroded and will be very little by the end of the Doha round negotiations in WTO. So most Ghanaian exporters have to diversify in the long-term, and become competitive outside preferences.

3. What is more, not signing the IEPAs, the government will also save the domestic sector, jobs, future policy space etc, which are practically priceless.

TWN’S POLICY BRIEF ON IEPA

Countries of the EU

INTRODUCTION

Negotiations between the European Union and different regional groupings in Africa (as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific) on Economic Partnership Agreements to replace the preferential trade regime under the Cotonou Agreement were meant to be concluded in December, 2007.  As a result of severe differences between all the African regional groupings (ECOWAS, SADC, CEMAC, ESA) and the EU, the deadline could not be met, and a decision was agreed  by all sides to extend the negotiations further into 2008.

However, in order to ensure that the exports of African countries continued to enjoy the duty-free access to the European market that they had under the Cotonou Agreement, African countries requested that the EU apply for an extension of the WTO waiver.  For ECOWAS, this decision was a collective regional position adopted at the highest levels of political leadership in the negotiations.

Civil society organisations and individual experts put forward an alternative proposals in case the EU found the waiver route unacceptable.  For the developing country members of Africa, the groups recommended that the EU extend to the African countries a scheme that the EU had in place in for many other economies in Latin America, the so-called GSP+; and for the Least developed country members, a scheme which the EU has already bound itself to provide, the Everything But Arms (EBA).

The EU refused both options, and (contrary to the accepted understanding that EPAs were to be negotiated regionally) proceeded to negotiate Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPAs) with individual countries.  Of the three developing country members of West Africa, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire negotiated these agreements; Nigeria refused. 

On December, 13 2007 Ghana and the EU INITIALLED what they called a “stepping stone” Economic Partnership Agreement, which they expected to SIGN by 30^th June, 2008.  The deadline was not met in 2008, and the EU is now putting pressure for this to be done as soon as possible this year.  At the same time, the full comprehensive EPA negotiations with the whole of ECOWAS is on-going, and the parties hope to finish by June this year.  Most people believe this expectation is not realistic.   Thus the pressure by the EU on Ghana to SIGN AND RATIFY soon is immense.

However, all the analyses carried out by a range of sources – from civil society to trade professionals and academics – strongly converge on the view that the interim agreement is not in Ghana’s overall interests, and in some cases, the terms are even worse than similar agreements between the EU and other countries like Kenya which share Ghana’s economic developmental challenges.

The agreement not only commits Ghana to liberalise an overwhelming proportion of its imports from the EU --  in the absence of a clear basis for deciding how and which sectors of the economy will perform under this situation; without clarity as to how even the  stated objectives of the IEPAs can be met by Ghana; and with provisions which go way beyond the proclaimed objectives of the IEPAs.

In addition, on the issues that remain to be negotiated at ECOWAS level, the agreement commits the Government to an approach which is biased towards the European Union. These are issues of negotiation which are still controversial, and which do not lie in the hands of Ghana alone, but with the entire West Africa region. 

Thus, signature of the agreement will commit Government to an overall trade and development policy which is negative to the overall interest of Ghana, both nationally and within the West African region. 

II. LIBERALISATION OF TRADE IN GOODS

Elimination of Customs Duties [Article 13 and annexes]

With regards to trade in goods, the interim agreement commits Ghana to eliminate tariffs on 80% of goods imported from European Union. Bearing in mind that 40% of all Ghana’s world-wide imports has come from Europe, the implications of this level of liberalisation are staggering. This will substantially reduce the revenue that government earns from duty charged on imports from the EU, resulting potentially in budget deficit and thus affecting resource allocation to social sectors such as education and health.

In addition, the elimination of duty will lead to the collapse domestic infant industry which compete with cheap and heavily subsidized imports from the EU.  Many authoritative studies, including by the World Bank have concluded the highest level of liberalisation of trade with the EU that countries like Ghana withstand without collapsing their industries and local production is 60%.

The Agreement contains a schedule of liberalisation by which tariffs are eliminated on some products by 2013, others by 2017, and still others by 2022.  A final set of product will only be liberalised after 25 years.  This schedule can be more damaging that appears on the surface, especially because the agreement makes no provision for future modification of the tariffs.

Indicative but respectable studies have calculated the revenue loss to Ghana at $97 million by 2022.  About 29% of this amount will be lost in the first six years of implementation of the agreement.  As one study has found out, countries like Ghana may find it difficult, if not impossible to compensate for this tariff-related revenue loss by other means. 

Comparison of Ghana’s commitments with other countries is instructive.  For instance, Ghana will liberalise over 70% of all imports from the EU within 10 years, and this will reach 80% of trade by 2022.  This is an adjustment period of 15 years.  This contrasts to the 25 year adjustment period in the case of Kenya (and other regions) where the liberalisation will not be completed until 2033.  Moreover, the tariffs on the first tranche of Kenyan products are all zero.  This means that real cuts in  tariff will only start from 2015. 

In effect, Ghana will have liberalised 71% of its imports from Europe at a point when Kenya is only just three years into making real tariff cuts. After a further six years, Kenya will only have liberalised 39% of imports. Furthermore, the nominal rate of protection for excluded products is significantly higher in Kenya than Ghana, with average (trade-weighted) tariffs set at 26.6% in Kenya and only 16% in Ghana.

Sensitive Products

By demanding the liberalisation of 80% of European imports to Ghana, the EU has argued, and Ghana seems to have accepted, that the 20% of the trade that is not liberalised will be sufficient to protect vulnerable sectors – i.e. the so-called sensitive list.  However, the adequacy of this protection is severely in doubt.  Preliminary studies for the agricultural sector has indicated that about 60% of that sector alone need to be protected from liberalisation.  Thus the 20% may not be sufficient for the entire domestic sector, agricultural and industrial .

Looking at the initial list[1][*] of sensitive products submitted by Ghana, the very concept of ‘sensitive products’ is severely undermined by the inclusion in the list of a large number of goods (about 40%) on which the current tariff is set at zero or at rates below 10 percent.  From revenue perspectives, it is not clear why these are included in the sensitive list.  It is even more unjustifiable because the Ghana IEPA includes a standstill clause which, unlike IEPAs signed by other countries, covers the sensitive list.  That is to say  Ghana has committed itself not to raise tariffs on the sensitive products.  Thus, those products on the list for which tariff is set at zero will never enjoy any tariff protection in the future since tariffs cannot be raised on them.  In which case is in unclear what benefit these products enjoy by being put on the sensitive list.

This goes to confirm the concern raised by civil society and many trade experts that the definition and selection of the sensitive products seems to have been done in haste, so that what emerged as a result is not well co-related with the economic imperatives of Ghana or its developmental policy objectives.

Taking as a further instance the composition of the products on the list. While some products on the list -- such as cotton, textiles, and apparel, as well as plastics and by products of the petroleum industry -- make sense from the point of view of Ghana’s industrialisation policy objectives, others do not.   In particular there are some items that are not exported by the European Union in significant quantities to Ghana.  Examples of this include: ‘edible fruits and nuts’ (which account for 2.5% of tariff lines on the exclusion list even though they only accounted for 0.006% of imports from the EU in 2007; ‘raw skins and hides’ account for 1.6% of tariff lines on the exclusion list even though they comprised only 0.008% of imports from the EU in 2007.

The intention may be to protect vulnerable agricultural sectors.  But in actual fact, the inclusion of such products where European competition does not pose a threat to existing or potential sectors only serves to use up space that could have been used to protect other products subject to real competition.

Standstill Clause [Article 15, IEPA]

Like all the interim agreements, Ghana’s IEPA agreement includes a standstill clause, by reason of which no new custom duty on imports from the EU can be introduced and those currently applied can not be increased. But Ghana’s clause is draconian in its restrictiveness.  Unlike say the SADC or the Pacific IEPAs where the clause applies only that portion of the trade meant to be liberalised, Ghana’s standstill clause extends to the so-called sensitive list, the category of goods not meant to be liberalised.  As argued above, this undermines the very use of the sensitive product.

Moreover, by agreeing to such a restrictive standstill clause, Ghana has unnecessarily given up its rights under the WTO (GATT article XXIV) which expects commitments in relation to only that (substantially all) portion of trade that is liberalised.

Elimination of export taxes [Article 18, IEPA]

Another unnecessary but damaging concession made by Ghana in the IEPA is the commitment to give up its right to charge duties on exports.  According to the agreement, the Government will not introduce new export duties, nor will it raise the current ones to a higher level.  This can only be varied in emergency conditions, after consulting the EC.  Thus the Government has given up a policy which governments all over the developing world, including Ghana, use when necessary to discourage the excessive export of locally produced materials in their raw form, so as to encourage value-added processing and export. 

For instance, at the moment Ghana has export duty on scrap metal, to discourage export of this, and make it available to the local capital goods sector, especially technology produced in the informal sector for the poor in agriculture.

The wide-ranging beneficial use to which a policy on export taxes can be put is demonstrated by such examples as that of South Africa, where it is crucial to value addition in mining (through beneficiation); in Kenya where it is important for the shoe industry. Ghana’s own contemplation of value addition in areas of mining, the timber industry and other areas stand to suffer from the loss of this policy tool.

And yet elimination of export taxes was never part of the EPA agenda.  Nor is it called for under WTO – where the EC has failed in its demands to change the rules.

Rules of Origin [Article 14, IEPA]

Rules of Origin (RoO) are critical to how much of the access to the European market promised to the Ghanaian exporters can actually be realised, since they determines which goods can qualify as originating from Ghana. The EU’s RoO have been stringent under the generalized system of preferences (GSP) and the EU has been promising flexible ones under the EPA.  Some of this promised flexibility has materialised such as the single transformation provisions in relation to textiles. 

At the same time, however, the IEPA has introduced new difficulties.  For instance, new rules allow cumulation with only countries that have also signed IEPAs.  Thus in the West African region, Ghana can only cumulate with Cote d’Ivoire.  This means that Ghanaian exporters of products which were made using inputs from other West African countries like Togo or Nigeria will have more difficulty enjoying the benefits of market access under the IEPAs. Ghanaians may not for instance use tuna caught from Togo to produce canned tuna for export to the EU.

This could create a difficulty not only for current production, but especially for future economic development, especially industrialisation prospects in which Ghana can rely on the economies of the neighbours. 

There are many areas where the rules of origin could be improved.  For instance in the area of fish (very important for Ghana), the relaxations introduced under the IEPAs have not changed the overly stringent EU provisions, and this could be changed to allow fish caught in the Ghana’s Exclusive Economic Zone to more readily access EU market.

These and other changes depends upon Ghana undertaking detailed study of its needs and potentials, and of the specific rules of origins problems it faces. As such detailed information does not exist, it is difficult to argue for the kind of required changes which will enable Ghanaian exporters take advantage of the kind of benefits touted under the (I)EPAs.  Unless improved, the (I)EPAs benefits will thus remain dreams, which will be dearly paid for with disruptions in the business of domestic producers, most of whom don’t even export to Europe.

Most Favoured Nation Treatment [Article 17, IEPA]

Another difficulty with the interim agreement is that it commits Ghana to extend to the EU any more favourable treatment applicable as Ghana becomes party to any free trade agreement with any major trading partners, defined in such a way as to include China, Brazil, and India. This has the potential of negatively affect whatever south-south co-operation is possible between Ghana and such countries like Brazil and India, since whatever better concessions Ghana makes to such countries must automatically be extended to the EU.  This will undermine Ghana’s urgent need to diversify trading partners, which has become even more crucial in the current global crisis.  All the efforts by past governments and intentions of the current government to develop trading relations with India, China, Brazil thus stand in jeopardy. 

Of course, in the Ghana IEPA, the MFN requirements are extended to Ghana as well, that is to say Ghana will also enjoy other concessions that the EU extends to other parties.  But this is pyrrhic: Ghana already enjoys 100 percent entry to the EU market, and the EU is keen to exclude other areas of potential benefit like rules of origin from MFN benefit.

Again, the MFN clause is not a requirement for WTO compatibility and thus can simply be excluded from both the interim and the final EPA.

Development Support

While the European Commission and EU member states have said they would provide funds towards compensating loses attendant upon the EPAs, there is no certainty that such amount will be sufficient to cover the loss and now even more uncertain in the midst of the global crises.  The EU has not been forthcoming with actual figures.  In 2005, at the World Trade Organization Ministerial the EU promised an increase of €2 billion as Aid for Trade. However, the actual amount of additional money in this figure amounts to only €700 million, and this is to be shared among 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, not simply for EPAs but for other international trade issues.

In the context of the ECOWAS EPA negotiations, and in the IEPA, the EU has also taken a promise to work with ECOWAS and Ghana to raise funds from others to help.  But even the ECOWAS negotiators have been rather doubtful of this eventuality.

It is important to emphasise, however, that the so-called development dimension of the (I)EPAs is not and can never be adequately captured by financial assistance from the EU.  The real issue is one of the space available to Ghana and other countries to pursue the policies that contribute to transforming their economies and eradicate poverty.  Trade policies such as are implicated under the EPAs should to contribute to enhancing this policy space and this economic transformation.  At least they are not supposed to undermine them.  However, as the above analysis shows, the contents of the IEPAs lead precisely in the opposite direction.

III. COMMITMENTS NOT RELATED TO TRADE --  LIBERALISATION OF SERVICES AND INVESTMENT [Article, 44]

The Agreement also has provisions on issues not related to trade in goods at all.  Prominent among these are issues of investment, competition, services, and intellectual property.  Not only are these issues not required by the WTO for an EPA agreement to be valid.  In addition, there is controversy as to whether some of these issues – for instance investment and competition--  should be included in the negotiations at the West Africa level, with Ghana actively among those countries opposed to negotiating the issues.  The decision was taken at the West African level to the effect that West Africa will adopt its own regional policies on these issues, and only after that will it consider  whether these issues should be negotiated as part of the EPA. 

However, the current agreement obliges the Ghana government to co-operate with the EC to “facilitate all the necessary measures leading to a conclusion as soon as possible of a global EPA between the whole of the West Africa region and the EC” on these issues.  The approach envisioned is one in which, after the West Africa region formulates and implements in own policies, the parties will “deepen EC-West Africa trade provisions on these issues”.  Thus the Ghana government has committed itself to promote negotiation of the very issues within West Africa which it has itself rejected. 

It has to be borne in mind that the since the EPA negotiations started in 2000, the EC has brought pressure to bear on its counterparts to include these issues in the EPAs, most of the time against the clearly expressed positions of the counterparts.  Indeed, West Africa’s position that it would consider including the issues after formulating its own regional policies is a shift from an original decision not to include these issues in the EPA under any circumstances.  This shift was achieved under heavy-handed and under-hand pressure by the EU. The provisions in Ghana’s IEPA on these issues are the latest in the line of these shifts in positions engineered by the EC.  In this regard, the clause in the IEPAs to the effect that the provision does not prejudge the position of the regional organisations on this issue is simply an obfuscating formality: the intention is clear.

In the end, therefore, the government has taken a posture which not only jeopardises the role of the country in the region, it also undermines its own future negotiating position on issues which it has itself said are dangerous for its right and ability to define its own policies on investment in accordance with the needs of domestic investors and the economy as a whole.

IV. PREMATURE COMMITMENTS

Another area in which the Government has assumed premature commitments which are prejudicial to whatever agreement will ultimately emerge relates to the rules of dispute settlement.  Not only are commitments not necessary for  the proclaimed purposes of the interim agreement – that is, the need to avoid trade disruption.  More importantly  ACP governments, including Ghana, differ from the EU’s demand for a dispute settlement procedure based on trade sanctions. 

In the interim Agreement, the Ghana government accepted the EU’s view  where the agreement will be ultimately enforced through compensation or “appropriate measures” [article 56, IEPA]– in the context an euphemism for trade sanctions.  The few concessions made here by the EU are: (i) the tautology  that aid (which is never part of trade any way) shall be excluded when EC applies trade sanctions;  combined with the idea (b) that EU shall exercise restraint and try not to jeopardise the development of Ghana in applying the sanctions.

Such an approach to dispute settlement in trade issues is imbalanced. Ghana has limited ability, if any, to apply such sanctions on the European Union.  More importantly, the dispute settlement mechanism has been discussed in the context of its application to the full EPA, including those sections like investment, etc which have not been agreed yet.  The Government has thus put itself in a position of accepting the punishment of the crime even before the crime is defined, thus undermining its future negotiating positions.

This is just one example of many other details contained in the so-called stepping stone agreement where the government would have benefited from more thorough discussions, in particular with its negotiating partners in the region, especially since there have differences of view point, goal, and nuance with the European Commission.

V. INTERIM AGREEMENTS AND GHANA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS

Finally, the processes around the Interim Agreements as well their content threaten Ghana’s interests within the region as well the region’s own integration needs.   While countries like Cote d’Ivoire have signed them, others like Nigeria have rejected the interim agreements, and are still debating other options with the EU. Ghana’s signature and ratification of the IEPA will make it a free trade area with the EC, and a source of duty-free European good into the West African region.  Nigeria is known to have signalled its intention to prevent such European goods from coming into its market by banning goods from Ghana and other West Africa countries with similar agreements.

The last time Nigeria took a similar measure, it affected a range of Ghanaian products for which Nigeria is the main or only market.  Examples include pharmaceutical products, mosquito coils and nets, pasta, etc; corn, and furniture.  In the light of this, and given that Nigeria constitutes close to 60% of the West African regional market, it will be a suicidal folly to ignore these implications, and to argue, as some have done, that Ghana can survive without the Nigerian market, dealing with Cote d’Ivoire in its place.

Furthermore, the resort by the EC to negotiating the Interim Agreements with individual countries undermines the regional approach that has been adopted to the EPA, and which the EU has itself insisted was the aim of the EPAs. 

VI.  WAY FORWARD

The above suggests that, even in terms of its objectives of assuring that trade between Ghana and EU is not disrupted in the absence of the full EPAs, Ghana’s Interim Economic Partnership Agreement leave a lot to be desired. Many actors have developed many frameworks that can guide Ghana in this.  One of the most of authoritative of the latter is the EPA negotiating template developed by the Africa Union. Thus at the very least, Ghana can NOT sign the IEPA as it stands now, without crucial changes. 

At the same time, however, the very nature of the interim agreement has confirmed all the concerns expressed by civil society organisations and producer groups about the fundamentally anti-developmental nature of the EPAs.  The claims of the EPAs as being supportive of regional integration and development have been exposed as inaccurate.  The IEPAs offer a foretaste of the actual intentions of Europe in relation to countries like Ghana; of the political vulnerability of these countries to EU pressure and ability to get its way; and thus of the extent to which an EPA will serve Europe at the expense of the developmental needs of Ghana and other countries in our region.  It is time to turn around.

The Nigerian Elites and the crisis of leadership

The Nigerian Elites And The Crisis Of Leadership By Omano Edigheji, PhD

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By Omano Edigheji, PhD

Chima Ubani, Alao Aka Bashorun, Gani Fawehinmi and Beko Ramsome-Kuti are in my thoughts. They were heroes of the democratic struggles in Nigeria. They were selfless individuals who sacrificed personal comfort for the common good.

They inspired me and we fought together for a democratic order - sadly, the foursome is today not with us.  The civil rule the country have today is not the democracy they envisioned and fought for.  Chima, Aka, Beko and Gani fought for a democracy that will engender qualitative improvement in the lives of all Nigerians, not few, not criminally connected individuals or groups, not one religious or ethnic group. They struggled for a democracy that would guarantee Nigerians access to quality education, healthcare and good physical infrastructure. These heroes struggled for a country where every Nigerian would have legitimate means of livelihood. They fought for a country that would enhance the productive capacities of every Nigeria, both human and natural. They fought for a country where every Nigerian will live in dignity. These democracy icons struggled for a society of “producers” not of “consumers”! These compatriots struggled for a united Nigeria and a society where every vote will count. They struggled for a society where the will of the people, not Godfathers, is the basis of governance. That is the nature of the society they fought and sacrificed their lives for. These giants of our democratic struggle envisioned that democracy will lay the foundation for Nigeria’s progress and prosperity.

Today, the political space has been hijacked by elements best described as criminals, who terrorize the rest of society. They have hijacked key levels of the state, economy and society.  As an example, in the social sphere, our religious bodies, especially the churches are not spared this rot. We have seen the emergence of Godless Churches that worship the “Nigerian God”. Churches that churn heavenly things as piety while being pre-occupied with worldly things. They encourage and condone the looting of our commonwealth by public officials, some of whom are made elders in these churches – the more public official loots, the more prominent he or she becomes in these churches. Similarly, contractors who fail to complete projects (leading to the phenomenon of abandoned projects and the consequent continued underdevelopment of Nigeria) while having collected the funds from the treasury, occupy prominent places in these churches.  Such churches have nothing in common with the teachings of Jesus.  They are places of worship of the “Nigerian God”, to borrow from Elnathan John. Other religions in Nigeria are likely to have variance of these elements among themselves. These tendencies among religious bodies have corrosive effects on Nigerian moral values with adverse consequences on governance.

Nigeria is today a country where poverty, inequality, under- and unemployment are increasing. The majority of our youths and graduates are unemployed and unemployable, the latter because of the poor quality of education in the country.

There is a general acknowledgement of the decline of the Nigerian education system. Pass rate of WAEC attest to this point. But this decline is partly due to the neglect of the education sector by successive governments at all levels.  As an illustration, two months ago I visited my Alma mater, Iluelogbo Grammar School, Iluelogbo (now Owologbo, which I attended between 1977 – 1983) in Isoko North Local Government Area, Delta State. To my surprise, I found the buildings dilapidated; the library and science laboratories closed; and some students sitting on the floor. During my time, as student of the school, the second republic’ s administration of Governor Ambrose Alli, ensured that the school library was well equipped with books and all classrooms were well furnished.  I and others, including the current Secretary to the Government of Delta State, Ovuozourie Samuel Macaulay and a current board member of the Niger Delta Development Corporation, Solomon Ogba, attended the school under those conditions. I was surprised to find my Alma mater in such a dire state.  I am sure most schools, including higher education institutions, in the country are in such a dreadful state.  Everywhere in the education sector, there is a general decline partly due to the neglect of the sector by public officials, most of whom were beneficiaries of better quality education in past years.

Why are the elites, both economic and political elites, neglecting and destroying, a system that they benefited from?  Their predecessors, in my case, the second republic political leaders invested in my secondary school education. Why are current political leaders not investing in the education system today?

How can our past education system be better than that of today and tomorrow?  Any society that progresses should ensure that its today and tomorrow is better than its past.  That today’s political elite is not investing in the education sector destroys our tomorrow.  Sending their children to study overseas might have immediate personal benefit, but in the long turn if the education system is not fixed, it might be shortsighted for the elite and society. This is because tomorrow, it is those that attend the poor education system today that will be in charge of key state institutions as well as key positions in the social and private sector.. The likely results will include further erosion of morality, poor institutions that will be unable to provide public goods and protect citizens and their properties; and a private sector that is unable to compete globally.

Insecurity, including the emergence of religious and ethnic militias, is currently on the rise because of poor governance.  Our people are dying because of poor governance. At the same time, highly political connected individuals are getting richer. With the slightest illness they go abroad for medical treatment and send their children to schools in Europe and North America. Ghana and South Africa have been added to their list of countries where they send their wards to school.

The political and economic elites however, have become victims of the rot they created in the country (not God’s wish), and if unaddressed will destroy them. Insecurity in the country has claimed the lives of some of them. Some others have been victims of kidnapping. Especially in the South East and most parts of the North, the elites cannot go back to their home towns and villages because of fear of being kidnapped and because of the general insecurity, including armed robbery. As a consequence, they are holed up in major cities such as Abuja and Lagos. What this mean: insecurity has stripped the elites of freedom of movement in their own country.   

The elites underestimated the impacts poor governance will have on their lives – they mistakenly thought that money is everything. Because they have access to medical treatments abroad, they thought that the poor health system in the country will not affect them. Because they could send their children to school overseas, the political elite neglect the Nigerian education system. That they could buy generators for electricity, public officials did not develop the power sector. And because the elites could afford to sink boreholes in their homes, they failed to build the required water facilities in the country.

Furthermore, because the political, administrative and economic elites could hire private security guards, they failed to equip the police to become a force that can prevent and combat crime. And because the political and leaderships thought they above the law, they destroy the judicial system.  And because they can afford SUVs, the elites refuse to develop our public transport and the road and rail networks.

As noted above, the Nigerian elites have become victims of their own creation – poor governance. In their shortsightedness, they forget that not all illnesses will give them sufficient notice to secure visas and flight tickets before they strike. Heart attacks do not give anyone the privilege to acquire visas and flight tickets before it hits you.  The result is that some among the Nigerian elites have died unnecessary deaths. Save for the dysfunctional healthcare system, such people will have been attended to in local healthcare facilities and would have been saved. That the Nigerian elite do not realise this reflects their narrow mindedness. Their recourse to foreign hospitals also shows their lack of self-worth and awareness. There is no society where an elite with self-respect resorts to overseas medical care as the first port of call. An elite with a sense of the self will ensure that its national healthcare is able to cater for their needs.

This is one area that the new black elites in South Africa have done really well. As a result, no one among the South African political and economic elites go overseas for medical treatment. The well publicized President Nelson’s treatments in South African hospitals attest to this fact. No ex-Nigerian leader will have opted to be treated at home! Some will argued that South Africa inherited its good healthcare facilities from the apartheid era. The point though is that the ANC government since 1994 has not only expanded but also improved the healthcare facilities it inherited. To buttress this point, I want to recount a personal experience. Last week, I went to Germiston Hospital in Johannesburg, which I used to visit regularly because my wife worked there in the past. Going back there last week, I saw that the hospital has been expanded - with new structures and facilities. I doubt if there has been any such major expansion of any hospital in Nigeria since 1999!  Today, South Africa has become a medical Mecca for the Nigerian elites. The excellent South African health sector is a product of political and economic elites that recognize that a good national health system is essential for their own survival and for the general populace.

What the Nigerian elites failed to realise is that there are certain goods that have to be provided for society at large because of their nature. These include roads – roads cannot be provided for individuals. The Nigerian elites and ordinary citizens use the same roads, even if the former drive their SUVs. Unfortunately because of our poor roads, the elites are equally adversely affected. Some prominent Nigerians have died from road accidents, using SUVs notwithstanding and others have been seriously injured from road accidents.

Of course, the elites have resorted to air travel. Unfortunately for them, the Nigerian aviation sector is one of the worst in the world. Not all members of the elite can afford private jets. As a result, some political and economic leaders use commercial airlines. All Nigerians know the problems with the aviation sector; including poor safety records, delays of flights, and so on. Majority of passengers who tragically lost their lives in the Dana Air that crashed about 2 years ago as an example could be classified as members of the elites. Also, flights’ delays not only affect the poor, but also the elites – ministers and governors; former ministers and governors; senior servants and ex-civil servants; CEOs and other senior officials of private companies. In these flight delays, a trip of one hour is delayed for three or more hours, which adversely affect both professional and personal times.  Therefore if problems facing the Nigerian aviation sector are solved the elites have more to benefit than any other group of Nigerians.  

One of the consequences of the usage of generators as a source of power is environmental pollution and the resultant climate change that threatens our collective well-being. The Nigerian elites breathe the same air as every Nigerian. They are therefore equally affected by environmental pollution and climate change. The recent flooding in some parts of Nigeria, which was partly due to climate change, did not spare the properties of the elites in the affected areas.  That the political and economic leaders do not realise this reflects their narrow-mindedness and poor leadership.

The elites have also been victims of the absence of the Rule of Law. Prosecution of political enemies is common in Nigeria. In this context, some among the political and economic elites have suffered from the arbitrariness with regard to the Rule of Law that is pervasive in the country.  

In light of the above, even if the economic and political elites “don’t give a damn” about the Nigerian people, they should give a damn about themselves by expanding and improving the country’s social and physical infrastructure. They should fix the health sector, education system, roads, the railways, and the aviation sector; and ensure that the security forces are well staffed and equipped. Instead of spending money on condolences’ adverts and spending billions on overseas’ medical care yearly, the economic and political elites should invest the necessary resources on our national health sector.  Instead of having elaborate burial ceremonies, the elites should immortalize their loved ones who passed away by making investments in the education sector, including through scholars, sponsorship of research, establishing chairs, and so on. These they should do for self-preservation or what is generally known as enlightened self-interest.  

If they do these things and establish inclusive political and economic institutions it will be a demonstration of purposeful and visionary leaderships.  Unless they do this, the political and economic leaders will be consumed by the rot they have created in the country. In effect, good governance and improved social and physical infrastructure as well as inclusive political and economic institutions are not only needed by the Nigerian people but by the elites. If these are done, we will be moving closer to the democracy that Chima, Gani, Aka and Beko envisioned and fought for.

•    Dr Edigheji is Executive Director of the newly established think-tank, Centre for Africa’s Progress and Prosperity (CAPP), based in Abuja, Nigeria. Follow me on twitter @omanoE
email: Omanoee@gmail.com

Africa and Cuba: An insoluble union of sister peoples

By YAIMA PUIG MENESE

For the Cuban delegation, December 12 was filled with incomparable emotions. The first came early in the morning when President Raúl Castro arrived at the Union Building, the government headquarters in Pretoria, to honor Nelson Mandela.

Four soldiers in gala military uniform guarded the casket placed beneath an arch in the building’s amphitheater. Raúl approached the area solemnly, without haste; facing the casket he halted for a few seconds, slightly inclined his head as a sign of respect and then moved forward to bid farewell to the man who was a close friend of Cuba.

The Cuban President then went to the official residence of South African President Jacob Zuma, with whom he had an amicable meeting lasting more than two hours. They discussed aspects of national events in both countries and those in the two regions, as well as the close bonds of friendship between South Africa and Cuba.

In an official statement to the accredited press, the two leaders described their talks as highly useful and fruitful, while expressing their satisfaction at the way in which relations between the two countries are developing.

President Zuma observed, "We devoted time to talking about Fidel Castro and Nelson Mandela, because we see them as our heroes."

He thanked Raúl for his kindness in accompanying the people of South Africa at this moment of mourning. "If Cuba, our old friend, had not been here, we would have felt that someone very special was missing," he affirmed. Zuma also expressed gratitude to the Cuban people and its leadership for the significant role the country played in Africa. The Cuban President said he was pleased to confirm, once again, that relations between Cuba and South Africa are continuing and being consolidated.

"We are blood brothers and sisters, whatever the color of our skin. Cuba is part of Africa, and Africa is part of Cuba and the Caribbean," he stated.

The day continued to be one of respect and shared history, when the Cuban President moved on to Freedom Park, an impressive site dedicated to those who fought in the struggles for African freedom.

A long spiral walkway leads to the top of the hill where the monument is located. At its entrance, Raúl was received by Regardt Gouws, director of the complex; Mongane Wally Serote, creator of the work; and other directors.

There, in front of the impressive wall on which more than 80,000 names of those who gave up their lives for independence are engraved, personnel from the Cuban embassy and a group of cooperative workers in South Africa were awaiting Raúl. Beside them and in the name of the people of Cuba, he placed a wreath and honored the Cuban and African combatants who died in liberation struggles throughout the African continent.

It is a genuinely moving place. Reading there, carefully engraved on the wall, the names of more than 2,000 Cubans who lost their lives in these lands, brings to mind unforgettable passages of the homeland, passages of honor and glory, but also infinitely sad.

"The monument is a way of emancipating ourselves, of making heard our voice as South Africans. We want everyone who comes to visit this place to feel reflected in the men and women whose names appear here," one of the monumental complex guides, Jane Mufamandi, commented to Raúl. She also explained that for them, one of the most significant aspects of the park is that it is a legacy left by Nelson Mandela, given that he was the person who strongly promoted the idea, achieving its opening during his presidency.

"He wanted us to have a place dedicated to our people, where the heroes and heroines who fought to bring dignity to South Africans, to give a voice to Africa, are represented."

"It is a great work which demonstrates the magnitude of the struggle of this people over centuries," commented Raúl. "In Cuba, we have constructed modest monuments in cemeteries in those municipalities where Cubans who died in African battles lived."

While Raúl signed the monumental complex visitors’ book, Jane Mufamandi stated, "The battle of Cuito Cuanavale is one of the many reasons for which we are always going to honor Cuba." For his part, the President recalled, "We came to have tens of thousands of Cuban soldiers in Cuito Cuanavale, as well as modern aviation, artillery and latest generation tanks."

In a few, heartfelt words he wrote, "It is moving to visit to this site, which preserves for future generations the memory of the victims of colonialism, slavery and apartheid and the just tribute to African and Cuban combatants who gave offered up their lives in the struggle for the liberation of Africa. I pay tribute to the memory of all of them, in the name of the people of Cuba."

Immediately thereafter, he moved to stand before the eternal flame lighted in honor of those who also lost their lives but have not as yet been identified, as the guide explained to him, assuring him that investigations will continue.

Before the flame, he also conversed with Mongane Wally Serote, the monument artist and a man who has visited and admired Cuba on a number of occasions.

Thus concluded President Raúl Castro’s activities on December 12, leaving the unquestionable certainty that the destiny of the two peoples is entwined for ever.

In the afternoon, the Cuban President and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba received in the Cuban ambassador’s residence Blade Nzimande, general secretary of the South African Communist Party and Minister of Higher Education.

Also present were Solly Mapaila, second deputy secretary of the South African Communist Party; and Sibongile Mncwabe, head of the General Secretary’s Office. The President subsequently met with members of the African National Congress (ANC) leadership.

Participating was Baleka Mbete, ANC national coordinator; and Zweli Mkhizie, general treasurer. In both meetings, Raúl was accompanied by Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla and Fernández de Cossío, the Cuban ambassador in South Africa.

CIA agent Exposed

By Jean-Guy Allard

Kelly Keiderling Franz, the business attaché recently expelled from the U.S. embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, revealed herself as a CIA agent in the relationship she conducted in Havana with the Cuban double agent Raúl Capote.

The Cuban security official, working under the operative name of Daniel, met Keiderling in Cuba, where she worked under the cover of director of the press and culture office in the U.S. Interests Section (USIS).

Their first encounter occurred at a dinner in the USIS at which 12 U.S. officials met with invitees from a number of embassies in Havana, including those of the Czech Republic, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as Capote disclosed after his real identity became known.

"A close relationship with Kelly, who began to exercise an influence on my family, began there. She said that she wanted to make life easier for me, that I was a brilliant writer," recalled Agent Daniel in an interview given later to Pascual Serrano, with the Spanish websiteRebelión.

His friendship with Keiderling continued for years, to the point that the U.S. agent became Capote’s sponsor, as a means of gaining entry into his private life. She had an unlimited budget and went as far as to suggest taking his goddaughter to the United States to study on a scholarship, and also proposed that Daniel create a literary agency, with the idea of having an influence within Cuban artistic circles.

"The Agencia Literaria Cubana Online webpage was created, used by writers to disseminate and sell their work, but the idea began to change into something else, they said they wanted it to bring together not only writers but also artists and musicians, to be coordinated with other embassies, such as the German one, etc… They would receive funding for all of that," affirmed Capote while describing Keiderling’s intelligence work.

"They would hand over three, four of five thousand dollars without even checking to see of we had organized the activity for which the money was requested. They liked themes such as micro-enterprises, how to organize the civil society, leadership courses; they provided us with manuals and things like that," the double agent confirmed, describing a process similar to the one developed by Keiderling in Venezuela.

The CIA spent tens of millions of dollars during 50 years of promoting activities hostile to Cuba, trying to create focal points of dissidence.

The Moscow-based researcher and journalist Nil Nikandrov recently described Keiderling as a key figure in the organization of activities to destabilize Venezuela, in an analysis of the intelligence work undertaken by the U.S. embassy in Caracas.

"After special training, she began to work in the State Department in 1988. She had her first experience abroad in Africa. After studying Russian, Keiderling was sent to Kyrgyzstan. Subsequently, after studying for 12 months at the National Defense University in Washington, she served in Moldavia," Nikandrov reports prior to noting her intensive intelligence activities in Cuba.

Keiderling arrived in Venezuela in July 2011. "The temporary business attaché assists officials who, in their majority, have an imperial way of thinking and a condescending attitudes toward the ‘natives’ and their pretensions to sovereignty," observed Nikandrov, noting that the goal of U.S. intelligence agencies is to ‘neutralize’ the government of Maduro by any means. The more blood spilt, the better."

Agent Keiderling-Franz acted in a totally brazen manner. The mediocre representative of U.S. intelligence left trails everywhere.

In April 2013, a confidential document datelined September 2011, signed by Keiderling-Franz and disclosed by Wikileaks, fully revealed the direct contact maintained by U.S. embassy staff with the defeated presidential candidate, Henrique Capriles.

She reported on Point 3 that Capriles said he appreciated the assistance given and received with pleasure the news that, by February 2012, her support for all the opposition candidates with which USAID had previously worked was more than guaranteed. She added that Capriles was sorry to hear of the departure of John Caufield, while at the same time agreeing with her that his leaving did not in any way endanger their objectives.

In Point 4 of the document, the agent notes that Capriles reiterated that if he was to win the upcoming elections, Venezuela’s foreign policy would be reviewed in depth and Caracas would become a trustworthy ally of the U.S. Point 5 reveals how her conspiratorial activities extended beyond Venezuelan borders. She states that additional resources will be channeled to representatives who could be trusted via new entities, principally through NGO’s in Chile, Panama, Colombia and the U.S.

Another recent report, by the researcher Jean Cleaux Duvergel, shows how – in relation to a post-electoral coup plot – meetings had taken place in Keiderling-Franz’ residence, "with representatives of the Capriles media chain, with Miguel Otero (El Nacional), Andrés Mata (owner of El Universal), Carlos Croes (of Televen), and members of Venevisión, Bloque de Armas, Globovisión and Canal I."

Keiderling has returned to the United States where she will doubtless pursue her destabilizing activities against other anti-imperialist countries, as one more element in the U.S. strategy of domination.

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