NPP FAILED TO SHOW UP: At conference of African Political Parties

Logo of Ghana Opposition NPP

By Ekow Mensah

Ghana’s New Patriotic Party (NPP) was conspicuously absent at conference of African Political Parties convened in the Sudanese capital Khartoum.

Conference sources said the NPP was invited alongside the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC).

They however could not explain the absence of Ghana’s largest opposition at this important event which brought together political parties from 35 countries across the continent.

The absence of the NPP gave the NDC a field day as its Director of International Relations, Kofi Attor was elected to the 30 member Executive Committee of the Council of African Political Parties.

Kofi Attor was also elected to read the final communique of the conference which was christened the “Khartoum declaration”.

Ghana was represented by a three member delegation which included Baba Jamal, Deputy Minister of Local Government.

Sudan’s President Field Marshal Omar Al Bashir, urged political parties in Africa to strengthen cooperation amongst them to enable them tackle continental problems.

He said Africa has vast resources which could be exploited for the benefit  of its peoples.

Dr Ali Nafei who chaired the conference said the conference represented the decisions of the African summit which dedicated 2013 as a year of African Unity.

The conference was attended by about 70 political parties in Africa, Representatives of the Union of Political Parties in Latin America, the African Union and the Chinese Communist  Party.

Editorial

SALUTE FOR SUDAN

Last week, Sudan played host to about 70 political parties in Africa and provided them with a platform to discuss the economic, social and political problems confronting the continent.

At the end of the two-day conference, the parties agreed to set up a Council of African Political Parties to help speed up the process of African unity and to protect the interest of the peoples of the continent in global fora.

Sudan has agreed to host the sectariat  of the council and to pick up the bills.

The Insight salutes the Government and people of Sudan for the tremendous sacrifice  they are making to promote the interest of the African peoples.

It is our hope that the Council of African Political Parties will work hard to ensure that Africa is freed from the struglehold of neo colonialism.

African resources must be exploited for the benefit of the peoples of Africa.

Khartoum Declaration

On the Establishment of the Council of African Political Parties

Sudan President Omar Al-Bashir

- Inspired by the African values of solidarity and togetherness;

- Cognizant of the imperative of mobilizing the continent's resources to confront the challenges of the 21 st century;

-    Mindful of the efforts by the African peoples to build a peaceful and prosperous Continent and the need to reinforce these efforts;

-    In furtherance of Africa's civilizational role and its contribution to humanity;

-    Recognizing the objectives set by the Founding Fathers whose establishment of the first Pan-African body, the OAU, is celebrated this year;

Reaffirming the need to translate into deeds the African Union summit decision declaring 2013 as the year of Pan-Africanism and African
Renaissance;

-    Reaffirming further and in particular the central role of the African Political Parties in the advancement of the African Continent and the achievement of its goals and aspirations; WE, The African Political Parties Representatives gathered together in a
Constitutive Conference held in Khartoum, Republic of the Sudan during 27- 28 April 2013 at the kind invitation and initiative of the National Congress Party in order to deliberate on the challenges and preoccupations of Africa, with emphasis on the role of its political parties in the fulfillment of desired objectives through creating a new political space with relevant mechanisms to that effect.

a- The Conference was unprecedentedly attended by diverse and large numbers of African Political Parties, reflecting the importance they attach to their historic and expanding role in the service of Africa and its objectives. The attendance in the Conference by various non-African Political Parties from various regions further reflected their commitment to forging beneficial partnerships with the Continent of Africa at these turbulent times of international relations. The Conference deliberations were rich and

productive, asserting the imperative of enhanced coordination and cooperation among African Political Parties and its promising impact on the entire Continent. The holding of the Conference while Africa celebrates the 50th anniversary of the OAU was an opportunity for participants to reaffirm their unflinching commitment to achieve the economic liberation and integration of Africa following realization of the political liberation and bearing in mind the Continent's huge and abundant resources in the economic, social, cultural and human resources domains.

b- The Conference expressed gratitude to H.E. President Orner Hassan Ahmad
Albashir, President of the National Congress Party for his visionary
statement before the conference on the role of African Political Parties in
Africa's renaissance.

c-       The Conference deliberated in depth on four working papers namely (1) A

Conceptual Paper outlining the nature and objectives of the Conference (2)
the Role of African Political Parties in Enhancing Democracy Development
and Integration (3) Africa and the Information and Technological Revolution
(4) Statute of the Council of African Political Parties. In the ensuing debate,
interventions and contributions by participants largely reflected wider representational nature of the various regions of Africa.

d - At the conclusion of its deliberations, and following comprehensive
discussions and debates at the level of the various Committees characterized
by genuine spirit and utter enthusiasm, the Conference took the following decisions :-

1.      Participants reaffirmed the importance of the holding, timing and objective of the Conference.

2.        Participants reaffirmed in no uncertain terms the central and vital role of the African Political Parties in translating the motto of 2013 as the year of Pan- Africanism and African Renaissance.

3.      Participants endorsed and adopted in this connection the Statute of the Council of African Political Parties, and accordingly agreed to establish a Council for African Political Parties, with Sudan as its permanent Headquarters and Secretariat.

4.      The Conference further elected its necessary organs pursuant to the relevant Articles of the Statute

5.      The Conference recommended that the Council of African Political Parties
plays its role in the formation of and support to the Continent's strategies for
conflict resolution; peace-building; deepening of culture of peace and democracy; good governance; eradication of poverty, diseases and illiteracy;
women empowerment; food security through a green revolution; industrialization; sea, land and air connectivity; human resources
development; education. Participants called for the settlement of African
conflicts by the Africans and condemned use of violence and force in the settlement of disputes.

6.      Participants attached equal importance to the need for reforming
international systems of governance as current decision- making structures
and processes fall below the expectations of Africa and developing world.
Participants stressed the imperative of the Security Council reform in light of
the African Common Position represented by the Ezulwini Consensus.
Africa should make its voice loudly heard in the international decision -
making institutions.

7.      Participants rejected phenomenon of politicizing justice and human rights
issues as a pretext to meddle in the internal affairs of African nations.

8.      Participants reaffirmed that unilateral sanctions and measures against states
and the debt problems constitute serious impediments and burden to the
developmental efforts by African countries particularly countries emerging
from conflicts. The Conference called for the end of sanctions and unilateral
measures and the solution of the debt burden without selectivity, while
taking necessary measures to avail necessary and additional resources for
the socioeconomic development of the Continent. The Conference further
called for easing the accession to WTO by countries particularly the LDCs.

9.      Participants underscored the need for new tools and approaches in
addressing global issues in areas of trade, environment, social and
humanitarian through constructive and transparent dialogue without pressure or conditionality,

I0. Participants expressed appreciation and gratitude to Africa's partners in
development and valued the presence in their midst of friendly political
parties from these countries at this historical meeting. The Conference
directed its Executive Committee and Secretariat to actively engage with and
participate in the activities and events organized by the councils of political

parties III Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and other friendly
organizations.

11.  The Conference extended at the end of its deliberations warmest thanks and
gratitude to the leadership, people and the National Congress Party of the
Sudan for hosting the historic Constitutive Conference of the Council of
African Political Parties. The Conference greatly valued the brotherly
African reception and hospitality accorded to all delegations throughout their
stay and participations in this landmark Conference.

                             Khartoum: 28 - 4 - 2013

China’s involvement in resource extraction in Africa

 

Chinese President Xi Jinping

By Gerald Flanagan

China’s increasing presence in Africa has received mixed reactions from analysts. The discussion so far has tended towards broad geopolitical concerns and ill-defined speculations about neo-colonialism.(2) A distinct weakness in this ongoing debate is the lack of specific detailed analysis of the cost-benefit scenario that has accompanied Chinese involvement in Africa’s development.

This paper’s position is that the Angolan case provides the best example of the recent Chinese trade strategies for Africa, an example that may provide useful lessons for other African countries in similar positions. Methodologically this can be considered a most typical case study. It is true that China’s involvement with Angola is relatively recent compared with some other African countries, but what it lacks in length it has made up for in depth. 

Angola is currently China’s largest trading partner in Africa. Oil is the defining feature of this relationship, as it is for other African nations, such as Sudan and Nigeria.(3) As China’s primary import from Africa, oil serves as a relevant starting point for in-depth analysis of China’s involvement on the continent. 

However, the lessons learned and the methods used in the oil sector are easily transferable to other commodities imports from African nations. Diamonds, cobalt, metals, timber and other raw materials have all seen a growth in demand in the Chinese market. Similar to oil, these sectors of African economies have been targeted by China and have enjoyed reciprocity with China, although to a smaller degree. 

Angolan oil makes up almost 15% of China’s oil imports,(4) making this relationship significant not only for Angola, but for China too. This significance makes the China-Angola case the natural choice for analysis. This relationship has been so defining in the methods used by China in Africa that this approach taken by China on the continent has come to be known as the “Angola model.”(5)

This paper seeks to provide a more in-depth analysis, such as the constraints on space will allow, of the economic relationship that has developed between China and Angola, with the emphasis on verifiable economic concerns and possibilities. This shall encompass a short background piece depicting the Angolan position at the beginning of the last decade, a consideration of the trade situation, the details of the various funding opportunities made available by China and the opportunities and benefits that these have brought. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the main criticisms of the relationship.

Background

In order to situate this discussion within the reality of the economic position of Angola at the end of its civil war, it is necessary to include a short background. Incumbent president, José Eduardo dos Santos, has been in power since 1979, and since the adoption of the 2010 constitution he is both head of state and of the government.(6) 

With close ties between the executive and the military and widespread acknowledgement that the elections held since the end of the civil war (2008, 2012) were deeply fraudulent, Angola is considered more or less a one party state.(7) Combined with this is relatively widespread corruption in public administration. Angola ranks 157th out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.(8)

With an economy that had been ravaged first by a war of independence and then by a protracted civil war and a political system deemed unsavoury by the international community, Angola’s position on the international financial markets was very poor. This dated back to 1989 when its inability to service its national debt resulted in referral to the Paris Club.(9) As well as being frozen out of international financial markets due to its debt to the Paris Club, Angola also had a very poor relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions. Originally stemming from cold war ideology, the disjoint between Angola and the Bretton Woods institutions was only put to rest in 2004 when Angola formally began participating in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) general data dissemination system.(10) In 2002, the Angolan Government did try to access funding through bilateral agreements with countries such as South Korea and Japan, but it was rebuffed.

Thus, the position that Angola was in at the end of its civil war was dire. Being isolated from international financial markets and having an economy that was in need of wholesale reconstruction, Angola was between a rock and a hard place.  It was onto this scene that China stepped in 2002.

Resource extraction and trade figures

There is little doubt about the boom in Angola’s oil trade and extraction capabilities over the past decade. That China is the predominant trade partner is also clear from the figures. The value of Angolan oil exports has risen from US$ 7.6 billion in 2002 to US$ 68.5 billion in 2012.(11) Between 2002 and 2012 Angola’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average of 12.3%; this would have been considerably higher if it had not been for the global financial crisis which dropped the price of oil.(12) 

Bilateral trade between China and Angola reached US$ 120 billion in 2010, with Angola possessing a very favourable current account balance.(13) The terms of trade between the two nations has also been in Angola’s favour with a downward trend in the price of China’s manufacturing exports and, apart from the drop in oil prices due to the crisis, a promising trend in oil prices.(14)

The question remains as to what degree China has played a proactive part in this growth and the success of Angola’s oil industry. Furthermore, it is often the case that figures in isolation can be misleading as to the benefits the economy as a whole is receiving from resource exports. In the next section the specific details of key components of China’s role are explored.

Credit lines

The main aspect of Sino-Angolan relations is the credit lines that China has made available. These loans are closely tied to the bilateral trade in oil as the funds were made available on the condition that they are guaranteed by a specific long term trade agreement on oil. 

According to a report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA),(15) the first batch of credit was made available to Angola in 2002 when the Chinese Government provided US$ 150 million for infrastructure projects. The loan was granted by the China Construction Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim bank). However, the main credit lines operate through the Exim bank alone. 

The first large loan was signed in 2004 and was worth US$ 2 billion. The loan was agreed at a libor rate +1.5% interest rate; this very low interest rate is directly due to the subsidies coming from the Chinese Government. The loan was guaranteed by an agreement to supply 10,000 barrels of oil a day to China. This deal was secured at the concessional price of US$ 60 a barrel; it is generally understood that the volume of barrels increased during the very low points of the oil price dip during the global economic crisis. The loan is to be repaid over 17 years with a grace period of five years. Second and third loans worth US$ 2.5 billion were signed in July and September of 2007.

What is of particular interest is the manner in which the funding was made available. Instead of paying the US$ 2 billion to the Angolan Government, the funds were paid directly to the companies performing the infrastructure construction work. According to the original agreement, only 30% of these companies had to be Angolan, and as a result Chinese construction firms have become heavily involved in the reconstruction effort.(16) 

The Exim bank’s method of directly paying companies that are, generally speaking, Chinese, from a capital loan backed by resource trade agreements, is what has come to be known as the ‘Angolan Model’, even though the Chinese employ this approach throughout Africa.(17)

A second credit line, from the China International Fund (CIF), was made available in 2004/5. Although insinuations of ties between the CIF and the Chinese Government have been made, Beijing has been insistent that the fund is backed solely by the private Hong Kong tycoons who founded it.(18) 

The fund released US$ 2.9 billion in the first batch of the loan in 2007 in a method similar to the Exim bank loans. The only difference was that the projects being funded were undertaken through the Angolan National Reconstruction Office (ANRO), rather than the public infrastructure programme. Due to concerns about the various ministries’ abilities to manage the work load, the ANRO was created with the sole purpose of administering to the national reconstruction. It has also served as a means for dos Santos to position one of his close allies, General Manuel Hélder Vierira Dias Jr., in direct control of the direction of the funds.(19) 

Although the CIF has credit amounting to US$ 9.8 billion according to the IMF, most of its projects came to a halt in late 2007 due to logistic and significant financial disbursement problems. The foul up caused considerable concern for both governments and the Chinese restated their position that the fund was private, while the Angolans ventured into non-oil backed funding in the form of short term debt titles. Angola raised the US$ 3.5 billion necessary to complete the projects. Since then, the CIF has been striving to meet all of its financial and infrastructural commitments. (20)

According to the SAIIA report,(21) a third credit line is the China Development Bank, which signed its first agreement with Angola in August 2008. This new credit line shows some signs of increased negotiation abilities on the part of the Angolan Government, as the local content provisions were tightened. As well as stricter adherence to the 30% local content figure, the spread on the libor rate was reduced from 1.5% to 1.25%. Figures vary as to the total value of these loans, but they are somewhere between US$ 1.5 billion and US$ 4.5 billion.

A fourth credit line, on which there is very limited information, comes from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.(22) Estimates vary as to the total value of the funds made available to Angola by China, but by 2012 it was considered to be between US$ 12.5 billion and US$ 14.5 billion.(23)

 Development projects

Due to the civil war and the state of the infrastructure, there is no shortage of reconstruction priorities and there seems to be little political dispute about the prioritisation of funding.(24) To date, both the CIF and the Exim bank funded an array of massive infrastructure and development projects in Angola, overseen by the Angolan multi-sectoral technical group, GAT (Gabinete de apoio technico de gestao da linha de credito da China). CIF projects include the rehabilitation of the 1,547.2 kilometre (km) Benguela Railway and the 1,003.1 km Moçâmedes Railway, the rehabilitation of more than 1,500 km of highways, drainage and improvement work to the city of Luanda, the construction of 215,500 residential units in 24 different cities across Angola’s 18 provinces and the construction of a new Luanda International Airport at Bom Jesus.(25) Between 2004 and 2010, the Exim bank has funded projects in diverse sectors including those of health, education, energy and water, agriculture, transport, social communication and public works, to the approximate value of US$ 2.7 billion.(26) 

According to information published by the Angolan ministry of finance, only 30% of the available Exim bank credit had been utilised by June 2008.(27) By 2010 the data from the ministry of finance showed a debt of about US$ 3 billion owed to China, or 66% of the Exim loan.(28) However, there are two indicators that, in general, the funds are reaching their intended destination and the projects are being completed. 

Firstly, it was noted by the SAIIA that a significant number of the projects were completed on time and on budget, a notable achievement even for a first world economy. Secondly, the prestigious construction projects undertaken, such as the ministry of finance building, hospitals, schools and stadiums, provide ample visible proof of the effective completion of the identified projects.(29) In fact, there is very little criticism of the effectiveness of the Chinese construction firms, or of the vast majority of the funds reaching the intended beneficiaries. 

That the funds that have been extended to the Angolan Government are being directed, at least generally, towards their appropriate destination is further supported by the African Economic Outlook 2012 report, which noted that Angola has made “steady progress in improving social conditions since 2002.”(30) The only criticism that seems to arise in this regard is the appropriateness of some of the housing projects,(31) as satellite cities that have been built to provide quality housing, for example, are overpriced and out of the reach of the vast majority of Angolans. As a result, some have scathingly referred to them as ghost towns.

Conclusion

The relationship between China and Angola is a significant case from which other African nations who possess large natural resources can learn a great deal. The depth of Chinese involvement in the reconstruction, development and oil trade has been the defining characteristic of the Angolan economy since 2002. The seriousness of this relationship has caused some to allow their focus to drift towards subjective speculations on Chinese motivations and away from a more grounded view of what has actually been achieved. This paper has attempted to analyse the trade and capital loans between the two nations and, generally speaking, has found the description of the relationship as win-win to be appropriate.

Primarily this paper has been concerned with the benefits that have accrued to Angola from its relationship with China. Given Angola’s position in 2002, the last decade of economic growth is nothing short of extraordinary. The data on trade, growth and reconstruction projects show impressive leaps in development. There is also reason to view the politicians as having achieved some moderate success in learning from the relationship, based on their effective second round negotiations with the Chinese agencies. 

Recent proposals to develop a domestic bond market in 2013 and a stock market within the next two years,(32) combined with moves by the Angolan Government to obtain an increasing percentage of its funding from none commodity backed government debt securities, shows that they have a coherent long term macroeconomic strategy which has prioritised sustainable financing.(33) 

If they manage to maintain this direction and follow up on their indicated desire to consult rating agencies on how to increase their credit rating, and the participation in the IMF’s general data dissemination system continues to spur on increases in transparency, then Angola will surely continue to grow and steadily become a more effective and competitive economy.

There is, however, one significant failing in the economic effectiveness of the Sino-Angolan relationship. The development of the oil extraction industries has not been used to spread employment into the wider economy.(34) 

A coherent government plan to develop upstream and downstream linkages from the oil production process and a more effective and aggressive commitment to their local content policy, would reduce the unemployment rate and diversify the economy in the long run. Attempts were made along these lines, when Sinopec (the Chinese oil drilling and extraction company) and Sonangol (the Angola state owned oil company) attempted to build an oil refinery in Lobito. However, the refinery never materialised due to a dispute over where the destination market would be, and consequently what technical specifications where to be followed.(35)

All that is left for this paper is to cover the main criticism that is launched against Chinese trade policy in Africa. This has been left until the end in an attempt to maintain the focus of the paper on an economic cost/benefit analysis and also as it is a sensitive subject which, because of its moral dimensions, is unavoidably divisive. The opinions expressed here are not intended to be an exhaustive coverage of the debate but merely a preliminary statement to provide some contrast and perspective to the standard position. 

Moral responsibility is the primary criticism raised in Western academic commentary on China’s involvement in Africa. China’s approach to development assistance explicitly rules out the use of conditionality on its loans and trade relations - ‘conditionality’ here referring to moral/political considerations.(36) China either resists the temptation to assume one’s own moral superiority, or it facilitates and perpetuates systems which directly contribute to the suffering of millions of people. As with all complex and sensitive moral questions there is no black-and-white answer. Which of the two descriptions of China’s conduct is deemed more accurate will invariably be influenced by one’s political and ideological perspectives and preconceptions. 

It seems appropriate, in the context of this paper, to focus on how the political elite are perceived. It is around these perceptions that most opinions are formed on the broader question. In the simplest terms, the question can be reduced to the assertion that if the political elite are ‘bad’, then China’s involvement is irresponsible; if not, then China is doing ‘good’. It is worth asking the question, are there any political elites that are viewed as good by those who do not benefit directly from the system upheld by those elite? Or to put it differently, are there political elites anywhere that are immune from corruption?(37) Is power not somehow intrinsically tied into our conception of evil? These questions are endless. 

What we can answer, however, are questions of what has been achieved and what concrete steps have been taken towards broad economic and social development. This paper has shown that as a country weakened by war, Angola has made some very impressive strides over the past decade, and at the heart of this development is its relationship with China.

NOTES:

(1) Contact Gerald Flanagan through Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit ( africa.watch@consultancyafrica.com). This CAI discussion paper was developed with the assistance of Clair Furphy and was edited by Nicky Berg.
(2) This generalisation deserves slight refinement: The literature being referred to is of a primarily Western origin, but as Western journals tend to dominate most academic debates, this can be considered the general tone of the discussion.
(3) Burgos, S. and Ear, S., 2012. China’s oil hunger in Angola: History and perspective. Journal of Contemporary Africa, 21(74), pp. 351-367.
(4) Alden, C. and Alves, A., ‘China and Africa’s natural resources: The challenges and implications for development and governance’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 41, September 2009, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(7) Inhofe, J. and Kingston, J., ‘Case studies of U.S and Chinese engagement in Angola, Ghana and Kenya’, U.S. Government Accountability Office report to congressional requesters, 7 February 2013, http://www.gao.gov.
(8) Transparency International website, http://www.transparency.org.
(9) ‘Angola: Paris club reopens export credit after Angola pays off debt’, Macuhub, 6 December 2007, http://www.macauhub.com.
(10) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(11) ‘Report for selected countries and subjects: Angola’, IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012, http://www.imf.org. 
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Burgos, S. and Ear, S., 2012. China’s oil hunger in Angola: History and perspective. Journal of Contemporary Africa, 21(74), pp. 351-367.
(15) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(16) There seems to be a general consensus that even this 30% mark is generally not reached, although the oversight measures to ensure this were strengthened in the third deal with the Exim bank in September 2007. See Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za; Campos, I. and Vines, A., ‘Angola and China: A pragmatic partnership’, CSIS conference “Prospects for improving U.S.-China-Africa cooperation” working paper, March 2008, http://csis.org.
(17) Alden, C. and Alves, A., ‘China and Africa’s natural resources: The challenges and implications for development and governance’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 41, September 2009, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(18) Inhofe, J. and Kingston, J., ‘Case studies of U.S and Chinese engagement in Angola, Ghana and Kenya’, U.S. Government Accountability Office: Report to congressional requesters, 7 February 2013, http://www.gao.gov.
(19) There is an ongoing argument as to whether the reconstruction office and Dias Jr.’s positioning was as a consequence of complaints that the ministries were subverting funds and extorting Chinese companies or whether it was political manoeuvring by the president. See Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za; Burgos, S. and Ear, S., 2012. China’s oil hunger in Angola: History and perspective. Journal of Contemporary Africa, 21(74), pp. 351-367.
(20) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za; Campos, I. and Vines, A., ‘Angola and China: A pragmatic partnership’, CSIS conference “Prospects for improving U.S.-China-Africa cooperation” working paper, March 2008,  http://csis.org.
(21) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(22) Inhofe, J. and Kingston, J., ‘Case studies of U.S and Chinese engagement in Angola, Ghana and Kenya’, U.S. Government Accountability Office: Report to congressional requesters, 7 February 2013, http://www.gao.gov.
(23) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za; Inhofe, J. and Kingston, J., ‘Case studies of U.S and Chinese engagement in Angola, Ghana and Kenya’, U.S. Government Accountability Office: Report to congressional requesters, 7 February 2013, http://www.gao.gov; Alessi, C. and Hanson, S., ‘Expanding China-Africa oil ties’, Council on Foreign Relations,  February 2012, http://www.cfr.org.
(24) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(25) Campos, I. and Vines, A., ‘Angola and China: A pragmatic partnership’, CSIS conference “Prospects for improving U.S.-China-Africa cooperation” working paper, March 2008, http://csis.org.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Inhofe, J. and Kingston, J., ‘Case studies of U.S and Chinese engagement in Angola, Ghana and Kenya’, U.S. Government Accountability Office: Report to congressional requesters, 7 February 2013, http://www.gao.gov.
(29) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(30) ‘Angola’, African Economic Outlook, 2012, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org.
(31) Smith, D., ‘Flats, cars and oil for China: Angola’s growth tempered by growing inequality’, The Guardian, 30 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(32) ‘Angolan government prepares to issue bonds in Europe’, Macuhub, 13 February 2013, http://www.macauhub.com.mo.
(33) McClelland, C., ‘Angola to start bond market by mid year: Central bank says’, Bloomberg, 14 February 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com.
(34) The oil industry itself employs less than 1% of the population, which as it is the primary area of growth in the economy means job creation has not enjoyed the same rise as GDP growth might suggest.
(35) Alves, A., ‘The oil factor in Sino-Angolan relations at the start of the 21st century’, South African Institute of International Affairs occasional paper 55, February 2010, http://www.saiia.org.za.
(36) Smith, D., ‘Flats, cars and oil for China: Angola’s growth tempered by growing inequality’, The Guardian, 30 August 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk.
(37)If the primary concern of observers is the possibility of political corruption then the Angolan model employed by China compares quite favourably to the aid subsidised loans from the West. Because of the direct payment of the funds to the companies involved, the vast majority of the funds reach their appropriate destination.
   

Boko Haram's Two-State Solution to Nigeria

By Ogaga Ifowodo

Even before the offer of amnesty was made, it was rejected out of hand. In words dripping with scorn and disdain for constitutions and the rule of law, two leaders of the terrorist group Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād (Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad), better known as Boko Haram (Western education is forbidden), spat in Jonathan’s eye. The leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, is “surprised” that Jonathan would consider granting amnesty to him and his followers. Such presumptuousness! Expressing his bemusement in an audio recording, Shekau proclaimed his terrorist organisation as more sinned-against than sinning. They have “not committed any wrong to deserve amnesty,” he said. And then he seized the moral ground together with its prerogative of mercy.   

“Surprisingly, the Nigerian government is talking about granting us amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the contrary, it is we that should grant you pardon,” he said, then listed the government’s “atrocities” against Muslims.  A few days earlier, one Abu Dardam, spokesman of a faction of the sect, told the BBC’s Hausa service just why amnesty was out of the question: they do not recognize democracy as a form of government, nor constitutions. There can be justice only in the Holy Quran and under Sharia law.

Yet, in spite of these declarations of absolute opposition to the basic principles of our existence as a nation, of peaceful co-existence in any polity, I still hear people imploring Jonathan to find a way of imposing amnesty on Boko Haram, whether its members want it or not. He should, they say, ignore not only their unmistakable scorning of the mere prospect of amnesty but also the outrageous claim that they, not the president, are the ones to render that office when Allah instructs them accordingly. 

In the name of peace, apologists for what at best would be a resultant “peace of the graveyard” still find it possible to urge dialogue with individuals whose very mission is the abolition of reason and civil discourse. I have looked for a credible argument in support of this call and found nothing but worn-out platitudes: dialogue, peace. Even from our anti-corruption “hero,” Mr Nuhu Ribadu, whose improvement on the mantra — other than begging Boko Haram to reconsider and accept amnesty — is something about “the feelers and body language” of sworn jihadists. “The feelers and body language of the sect,” he says, are “not encouraging, but that does not mean that we should abandon (amnesty) or give up. We should pursue the direction of peace.”

It is as if the more than 3000 dead, the countless maimed physically and psychologically, many of whom shall never recover from their trauma, and the homes and livelihoods destroyed, have all resulted from “feelers and body language.” Governor Aliyu Babangida of Niger State comes closer to a coherent strategy for ending Boko Haram’s terrorism, but he merely advocates a more comprehensive approach that includes amnesty as a major prong and greater responsibility on the part of his fellow Northern governors. 

No one is asking, But dialogue over what? I ask: what is unclear about the cold contempt for democracy expressed by Shekau and Dardam? Where is the possible meeting place between an Islamic theocracy (any theocracy) and a democracy? What is the proviso to Section 10 of the Constitution — which states curtly, “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion” — that would permit a middle ground in any purported dialogue with men who recognise only the law and government of God and are prepared to kill or die for that obnoxious belief? Isn’t it clear by now that Boko Haram’s goal is an Islamic Republic of the old Northern Region? 

Has the amnesty-and-peace crowd endorsed Boko Haram’s implicit two-state solution to Nigeria? Admittedly, Ribadu wants Boko Haram to “understand” that their goal of a fundamentalist Islamic republic “has not worked anywhere in the world and ... will not work in Nigeria,” so why does he not call for a real solution?

By all means, let there be dialogue, but of a different kind: the sort that progressives have been calling for since 1989. In other words, a sovereign national conference. The unbearable itch for a Sharia republic in the old Northern Region will not be salved by dim-witted, knee-jerk, measures that only treat the symptoms of Nigeria’s “genetic” disease. 

Before Boko Haram there was Othman dan Fodio’s jihad, the Sharia debacle at the 1978 Constituent Assembly that almost aborted the Second Republic, and Maitatsine riots that made the north as bloody and ungovernable in the 1980s and 1990s as now. And although their grievances are well within the ambit of constitutional resolution, it is nevertheless true that every other part of the country feels marginalised and oppressed in one palpable form or another. 

If you add to each geo-political group’s recitations of atrocities — not to mention class, gender and youth-specific injustices — the massive, systemic and life-draining corruption engendered by a warped federalism, there can be no greater urgency than of a sovereign national conference NOW. 

Instead, the air is rife with calls for dialogue with the political variety of deluded men-of-God out to establish his government through murder and mayhem. In the name of peace, we are being goaded into Boko Haram’s two-state solution.
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