 |
| Kweku Agyemang Manu, Minister of Health |
Doctors at the Korle-bu Teaching Hospital have made a
startling revelation that 75 percent of epilepsy sufferers in Ghana do not have
access to treatment.
Head of the Neurology Department at the Hospital Dr
Albert Akpalu says not much attention has been given to epilepsy in Ghana.
Epilepsy is a neurological disorder marked by sudden
recurrent episodes of sensory disturbance, loss of consciousness or convulsions
is one disease that makes carriers lonely in society.
It is a chronic disorder, the hallmark of which is
recurrent, unprovoked seizures. Many people with epilepsy have more than one
type of seizure and may have other symptoms of neurological problems as well.
Speaking on the AM Show on JOYNEWS on the Multi TV
channel, Dr Akpalu disclosed that only seven active neurologists are specially
trained to handle this disease.
"Because of access to care, a lot of people with
epilepsy do not get treatment as the access points are concentrated where they
are hard to reach and people cannot afford treatment," he said.
He added that "there are also not enough trained
personnel so we technically we cannot attend to all the persons with the
disease. We have the mental health authorities - psychiatrists - who also help
in taking care of the patients but even that is not enough."
According to him, they have gone further to train
community psychiatric nurses who go into the community in Ghana's fight against
epilepsy programme to help reduce the treatment gap and as well as the burden
of the disease.
Some facts about the disease;
- Epilepsy is the fourth most common neurological
disorder and affects people of all ages
- Epilepsy means the same thing as "seizure disorders"
- Epilepsy is characterized by unpredictable seizures
and can cause other health problems
- Epilepsy is a spectrum condition with a wide range of
seizure types and control varying from person-to-person
- Public perception and misunderstanding of epilepsy
causes challenges often worse than the seizures.
Editorial
A NEW FRIEND
Since Morocco re-joined the African Union (AU) it has
become more aggressive on the continent, sending its diplomats all over the
place with a view to compromising African leaders to abandon their principled
stand against colonialism.
African countries must forget their own struggles for
national liberation and abandon one of the cardinal principles underpinning the
formation of the African Union and break –off relations with the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic.
They are asking African countries to lick back their own
spittle.
The Insight is firmly opposed to all forms of
colonialism and recognises that the abandonment of the principle of
self-determination for all peoples would render the African Union completely
useless.
It is our hope that the Akufo-Addo administration would
continue to stand by the Saharawi people in their bold confrontation with
colonial occupation in Western Sahara.
The new friend is certainly coming with a huge baggage
of colonialism and Nkrumah’s Ghana cannot ignore that.
Government
urged to implement Ghana AIDS Commission Act
By Iddi Yire
Mr Victor Attah Ntumi, President of the Ghana HIV and
AIDS Network (GHANET) has called on government to implement the Ghana AIDS
Commission Act, to protect the privileges of persons living with HIV and AIDS.
He said the Act also establishes the National HIV and
AIDS Fund which would provide the Management body the required funding to
formulate policies and coordinate activities in the fight against HIV and AIDS.
Mr Attah Ntumi made this call in an interview with the
Ghana News Agency (GNA) during a Civil Society Organisation (CSO) engagement
meeting, hosted by GHANET in collaboration with PEPFAR Ghana.
The meeting aimed at building synergies among CSOs and
to form a pressure group after gathering ideas from members at the grassroots
to engage government particularly in the supply chain management of drugs.
The group would also engage government to ensure that
the right data and information was provided to achieve sustained epidemic
control.
Mr Attah Ntumi told GNA that the absence of government’s
commitment with regards to counterpart funding of programmes had always been a
challenge and as a result its donor partners were unwilling to release funds to
achieve the sustained epidemic control.
He cited an example where there was Global Funds to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, but Ghana had been charged for not
spending the money Global Funds provided and once Ghana commits to Global
Funds, government must pay their part.
He said currently the HIV prevalence rate in Ghana was
around 1.2 per cent, however, stakeholders should not be complacent, adding
that “we don’t want any life to be lost; and if we are talking about one per
cent of a population of 25-26 million, then we are talking about huge figures”.
The President of GHANET noted that the group had opted
for option B± which means they were adopting the ‘treat all policy’ which
implied that anybody infected with HIV should be rolled on immediate treatment.
He further explained that they had resource gaps and
considering the numbers involved, the available funds could not sustain that
policy therefore would need government to show its commitment to push for more
support from its donor partners.
Mr Attah Ntumi said government should be able to give them
a minimum budget.
He again noted as part of the resource mobilization
team, they suggested that government could consider a percentage on import
levy, talk tax, just to mention but few.
In her presentation on the role of civil society in
driving HIV Response, Madam Dzifa Awunyo-Akaba, PEPFAR Coordinator noted that
they would not have a global HIV response but for demands from the CSOs.
She said people living with HIV should play a meaningful
role in shaping HIV programmes and as such have powerful voices within their
countries.
Madam Awunyo-Akaba said there would be an estimated
262,606 persons living with HIV (PLHIV) in 2020.
She said the achievement of 90-90-90 among the
population in Ghana requires that 236,345 (PLHIV) know their status and that 212,710
of them were receiving treatment services by 2020.
According to PEPFAR Ghana there would be increased
engagement with civil society to strengthen community systems to increase
Kaiser Permanente (KP) case finding and linkage to care, and to reduce stigma
and discrimination of KP living with HIV.
PEPFAR Ghana is committed to working with the Government
and other stakeholders including the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria (GF), UNAIDS, and CSOs to achieve sustained epidemic control.
GNA
Ȼ4.6bn saga: I don't
know who owns Sibtons Switch- BoG spokesperson
 |
| Bernard Otabil |
But the Director of Communications at the Bank Bernard
Otabil does not know the owners of Sibton Switch Systems Limited.
He stated however that the BoG, as the regulator of the
financial sector, conducted enough due diligence before awarding the contract to
Sibton Switch Systems Limited.
The award of the contract to Sibton has raised serious
questions with critics raising issues about the cost, to which the contract was
awarded and whether the company has the experience to able to implement the
system effectively.
Out of three companies that bided to execute the policy
Sibton Switch System is reported to have the highest cost for the
implementation of the policy.
Whilst the tender amount for Sibton Switch was
GH¢4,667,414,340.82 two other entities with bids for the same contract- Vas
Intel Limited and Mericom Solutions Limited – submitted tender amounts and
packages worth GH¢14,094,795.00 and GH¢5,465,396.06 respectively.
Apart from the huge tender amount disparity, Sibton
Switch System is also reported to be the company with the least experience.
It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sibton Communications
incorporated in August 2015 to run a system to make banks, mobile money
platforms and other payment systems interoperable.
With a project that is expected to provide a seamless,
secured, interoperability of mobile money systems, critics believe a more
experienced company with a proven track record of delivery was expected to have
won the contract.
But speaking on the Super Morning Show, Monday, the
Director of Communications at BoG insists due diligence was done.
"As a regulator you are no supposed to chase after
the market. You are to lead the market. So in terms of establishing an
effective and efficient payment system in your economy there are a number of
issues that are to be taken into consideration. That is not only led on price.
There are certain technical provisions. That is why in the tender process you
want to technically evaluate the proposal that have been submitted to ensure
that is a going to full proof, fit for purpose and to ensure the payment system
is protected.
He said the Bank is only facilitating the process.
The award of the contract to Sibton Switch comes as a
surprise to many, given that the telecommunication networks have been asked to
put a system in place to ensure a smooth interoperability.
Some of the critics do not understand why Sibton was
selected when indeed the companies have already invested monies to ensure an
effective interoperability system but Bernard Otabil his outfit had a
responsibility to select an effective and efficient payment system and they did
just that.
When he was asked who owned Sibton Switch, he said:
"I can never tell you who the owner of Sibton Switch really is. In honest
truth, I don't know. I have not done any shareholder evaluation to know who is
behind it."
Checks on the website of the company
http://www.sibtonswitch.com did not show names or faces of the management or
ownership structure of the company except the services the company render.
JOHN BOADU WARNS
The governing New Patriotic Party (NPP) has issued a
stern warning to supporters that it would not be blackmailed over the
appointment of the various Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief
Executives (MMDCEs) across the country.
Acting NPP General Secretary, John Boadu at a news
conference in Accra Monday said the decision of who to appoint rests with
President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and should be given the space to exercise
that.
“All that is being done is consultation with the party
people and consultation with other stakeholders,” he said.
Barely two months in office, the President has come
under intense pressure from party supporters over the choice of persons to fill
the various MMDCE positions.
On January 22 some party youth in Bole-Bamboi
Constituency warned the party over the purported endorsement of NPP
Communication Director for the constituency, Abdulai Ibrahim as the DCE. They
hinted of dire consequences for the party if the decision is carried through.
This was followed by skirmishes in Accra at Odododiodoo
constituency and Sawla-Tuna-Kalba district in the Northern Region over
a similar decision.
Mr Boadu said that although NPP supporters have been
directed to apply for the various positions, some arrangements had been made
prior to the December 7, 2016, elections.
“The broad arrangement has been done and I think that it
goes beyond shortlisting at the constituency or national levels,” he said,
adding this was reached with some of the party supporters who had wanted to go
as an independent parliamentary candidate.
Nonetheless, he said the party would work at
scrutinising the few shortlisted people who have expressed interest in those
positions.
Mr Boadu noted that their attention was drawn to the
number of women who applied for the position, saying they were disappointed to
know they have been outnumbered by the men.
"What may be the reason?" he asked, adding the
women perhaps "weren’t aware or are being intimidated."
Descending the democratic ladder in contemporary Ghanaian elections
 |
| Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah |
Is it possible that the electorate of all African
societies would shun ethnic considerations and concentrate on leaders who are
competent and dedicated to the wellbeing of the people?
The ethnic and cultural divisions of Africa are numerous
and varied. These are often expressed in various forms including folktales,
clothing and cuisine.
It is fair to say the total mindset of the individual in
an African society is developed, formed and shaped by the socio-cultural
traditions of where he or she was raised, hence the need for emphasis to be
placed on cultural dynamics in all development efforts.
This is quite important as it would help correct certain
inherent anomalies in many African democratic processes, and help to ensure
that the progressive path of the continent is sustained.
Over the years, various researches have revealed that in
sub Saharan Africa the ethnicity of a candidate is a determinant to the extent
of the votes one accrues in an election.
IMANI- Ghana, a think tank conducted a survey before the
2016 general election, whether Ghanaians vote on ethnocentrism or not.
Dennis Laumann a Historian and Professor of University
of Memphis said ethnicity still played too big a role in Ghana’s elections.
However this assertion may not be applicable to the 2016
December 7 general election, which gave Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the New
Patriotic Party (NPP), clear majority victory with 5,594,360 votes over the
closed contender of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), John Dramani Mahama
who pulled 4,550,116 votes.
It is, however, also fair to conclude that over a fairly
long period, the voting pattern in the Volta and Ashanti regions, is fairly
predictable unlike the other eight regions.
Again, it is quite reasonable to say that many of the
electorate are aware that the success of our democracy and the development of
the nation are not hinged on ethnic considerations but the extent to which the
policies of a party are meaningful to the individual and the society where he
or she resides.
Thus, the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE)
and other governance institutions, have sought to highlight in their various
educational campaigns the need for Ghanaians not to be influenced to make
political choices based on ethnicity.
 |
| Nana Akufo Addo |
This gives the parties equal access to the State-owned
media, as contained in Article 55 (11) of the constitution: “The State shall
provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes
to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media.”
Article 55(12) also goes on to say that: “All
presidential candidates shall be given the same amount of time and space on the
State-owned media to present their programmes to the people.”
It is also arguable that in many African societies, the
more educated the person is, the more likely the fellow would vote based on
policies, ideologies and ideals of a preferred political party.
Often when votes are cast and governments are sworn into
office based on ethnic considerations, what results range from intolerance of
divergent opinions, corruption to misappropriation of funds, leading to a
downward spiral of the national economy.
Although Ghana prides herself as a beacon of democracy,
since the return to Constitutional in 1992, the country has been ruled only two
political parties- the NDC and the NPP.
But it is quite possible though that in the not too
distant future, a third party with the needed resources and funds can relegate
the two dominant parties to opposition and take the reins of government.
Prophet Saint Koranteng, the Head of Wordplus Chapel
International, told the Ghana News Agency (GNA) in Accra that there was an
illusory conception of democracy blinding many Ghanaians.
He said democracy was experienced only during elections
where the people went to the polls to exercise their franchise.
Prophet Koranteng said the will of the people was thus
reflected only on the arrival of a new government till the next elections were
held.
 |
| John Dramani Mahama |
Government accountability reflects the transparency and
trustworthiness of government machinery and institutions to its people.
One thing is certain that before Africans can experience
the true meaning of democracy, its parliamentary bodies should setup
appropriate government bodies that would conduct the behaviour of individuals
in institutions of authority.
Since 2006, corruption in Ghana has reached a breaking
point where government appointees, businessmen and women, government
contractors are involved in corruption one way or the other.
It is therefore an issue of great concern when
government officials are allowed to go scot-free without allowing appropriate
measures against them.
It should be mandatory to allow government officials to
answer the way they have spent money, exercise power and control vested by law
in the public interest.
A student at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and
Technology, who gave his name as Mr Ofosuhene, also told the GNA that it seemed
as though the 1992 Constitution had been relegated to the background where laws
did not work effectively.
He observed that in other to see Africa thrive within
its socio-economic challenges, sanctions should be meted out to officials whose
unlawful conducts had led to the collapse of State institutions and the loss of
funds.
Parliamentary structures such as the Select Committee
System and the power of the purse entrusted to the legislature must be made to
work.
Article 218(a) of the Constitution says an instrument of
the government that could ensure proper accountability of government is the
Commission on Human Right and Administrative Justice.
It investigates complaints of fundamental rights and
freedoms, injustice, corruption, abuse of power and takes appropriate actions.
Ghanaians are now seeking for the Right to Information
Bill to be passed to facilitate access to data.
 |
| Jerry John Rawlings |
The former Upper East Deputy Regional Minister; Mr
Daniel Syme once said “the public procurement law passed in January 2004 aimed
at improving accountability, value for money, transparency and efficiency in
the use of public resources”.
According to him, this initiative is a dual purpose activity
which will build the capacity of civil society organisations and citizens to
demand accountability and transparency from the government and also ensure
equitable distribution of financial resources particularly in deprived
communities.
“We have elected a new government with distinguished and
competent individuals and we need to support them in all their endeavours,” he
added.
Like the bible says, to whom much is given, much is
expected and in this vein, any ruling party has an onerous responsibility and
needs the support of the populace to unite Ghana for the needed development.
GNA
Hybrid Wars in
sub-Saharan Africa: The Strategic Position of Malawi and Zambia
By Andrew Korybko
The landlocked countries of Malawi and Zambia are
little-known to the rest of the world, yet they occupy very strategic positions
in the continental interconnectivity projects and Hybrid War projections.
Zambia is situated smack dab in the center of
north-south and east-west corridors, while Malawi – for all of its poverty and
underdevelopment – is still located in a strategic space between the future gas
giants of Tanzania and Mozambique and the forthcoming logistical powerhouse of
Zambia. Due to Malawi and Zambia’s shared history as separate British colonies
and even part of the same one under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
as well as their neighborly and landlocked status, it’s appropriate to discuss
both of them in the same chapter about Hybrid War.
The
research will kick off by discussing Malawi’s position between Tanzania,
Zambia, and Mozambique, before describing some of its domestic and historical
factors that could one day be exploited to undermine its stability. Afterwards,
the work will progress to talking about Zambia and the critical interconnector
role it plays in bringing together north-south and east-west mobility projects
in Africa. As with Malawi, Zambia is also vulnerable to a major destabilization
scenario, though one which could deal even more damage than its neighbor’s and
seriously curtail the transcontinental integration projects that are expected
to pass through its bottleneck territory.
Giving
Meaning To Malawi’s Geography
Regional
Discrepancies:
Malawi
might seem to many to just be a strip on the west coast of Lake Malawi/Nyasa
(if they even knew where the country was to begin with), but it actually
occupies an advantageous position at the crossroads of three very important
states. Like was explained in the chapter introduction, Tanzania and Mozambique
are two of the world’s most promising energy giants, while Zambia is the
location of planned cross-continental logistics networks. Even though Malawi is
not directly linked up with any of them, it’s still within close enough
proximity that any humanitarian destabilization within the country could prompt
a debilitating outflow of Weapons of Mass Migration that interfere with these
said projects’ viability through the disruption of each host state’s domestic
equilibrium.
Socio-economic
challenges are expected to noticeably increase in this densely populated nation
as it explodes from 16 million
people to 43 million by 2050 and then 87 million by the turn of the next
century. Its present southern-concentrated Muslim minority of an
estimated 13% of the
population will obviously grow in proportion to this and might even gain
relative ground during the country’s demographic acceleration, which might
encourage irresponsible rabble-rousing rhetoric about an impending “Clash of
Civilizations” and all of the resultant conflict scenarios that go with it.
Focusing more on this point at Malawi’s oncoming population boom, it’s
absolutely uncertain how the country will remain sustainable even in its
already deeply impoverished state, and it can’t be discounted that naturally
occurring humanitarian problems might develop where famine or natural disasters
lead to a massive exodus of Malawians to their neighbors. Depending upon the
scenarios that unfold in the future, there might even be internal migrations
between the Northern, Central, and Southern Regions if the population doesn’t
outright leave the country in droves (or is unable to because the borders are
blocked).
This
might upset the balance between the three regions, which currently sees the
capital of Lilongwe in the central one as the largest city, the southern hub of
Blantyre as the country’s second-largest city, and the northern capital of
Mzuzu as the third-largest in Malawi. It should be qualified at this point that
the Central and Southern Regions are the most populous, and that in some ways
the Northern one sits at the distant periphery of the nation’s importance.
Furthermore, Blantyre is connected to Mozambique’s ports of Beira and Nacala
(as will be described below), while the national capital of Lilongwe is thus
dependent on its southern regional counterpart for accessing the trade that
runs through these routes. This state of affairs makes Blantyre the country’s
economic capital and Lilongwe its political-administrative one, and the rivalry
between the two regions and their city centers might become a primary point of
discord in the event of future humanitarian or political crises.
Mozambican
Dependency:
Malawi
isn’t strategic only because of its very real potential for a domestic
meltdown, though that’s certainly a large part of why it’s of interest to
foreign actors, whether to reinforce the stability of their regional projects
by assisting the state or to gain an influencing upper hand in potentially
destabilizing it and tangentially taking down the rest of its neighbors in the
process. Approached from a positive and multipolar forward-looking angle,
Malawi could also actively contribute to regional connectivity because of its
advantageous location between these countries, but provided of course that this
opportunity is identified and pursued by its partners.
The
Shire River in the southern part of Malawi connects to the Zambezi and further
along to Mozambique’s second-largest port of Beira, while international roads
run adjacent to this path. Malawi’s other vector for international trade and
general interaction with the outside world comes through the northeastern
Mozambican port of Nacala, which is also linked with the country via roads.
Both routes could also serve rail freight, but Mozambique’s domestic network
was destroyed during the Civil War and is thus incapable of connecting to
Malawi’s Central East African Railway system.
Nowadays
Malawi is totally dependent on Mozambique’s transport corridors in every sense
of the word, and its strategic vulnerability has spiked in the face of RENAMO’s
recent offensives against the government there. Recalling the previous chapter
about that country and the map that was included in the research, RENAMO lays
claim to all of the territory through which Malawian goods must transit on
their way to the rest of the world. This means that the non-state actor
essentially has the opportunity to hold an entire state hostage if they decided
to target their truckers or if the military situation in these provinces became
so critical that most Malawian trade was halted as a result. In any case,
Malawi’s dependence on trans-Mozambican infrastructure networks indirectly
makes the country a member of the enlarged Indian Ocean economic community and
thus gives these high seas paramount importance for Lilongwe in conducting
its agriculturally dominated international trade.
Trouble
With Tanzania:
Although
its northern border is located very close to TAZARA, Malawi either doesn’t want
to or is unable to take advantage of this because of the territorial trouble
that it has with Tanzania. The two countries are engaged in a dispute over
their international boundary on Lake Malawi/Nyasa. Lilongwe claims the entirety
of the northeastern part of the body of water all the way up to the Tanzanian
shoreline, while Dodoma says that the international boundary should be split
evenly in the middle. This disagreement has become increasingly significant in
recent years after oil deposits were prospected under the waterbed, meaning
that whoever has control over its surface territory will reap the windfall of
revenue that this results in. Malawi is much poorer than Tanzania and has a
smaller population at only 16 million people, so forthcoming energy profits
could possibly be put to more concentrated and effective use by Lilongwe than
by Dodoma, though that’s not to say that Tanzania shouldn’t automatically be
disentitled from some of the proceeds, too.
The
issue is still being negotiated, though for the reason explained above, it’s
difficult to see why Malawi would cede any of its claims or agree to respect
any international arbitration that deprives it of its absolutist share over
this potential cash cow. From the reverse perspective, much mightier Tanzania
has every reason to continue pressing its claims, especially since the
Chinese-financed Mtwara Development Corridor will turn Dodoma’s Lake
Malawi/Nyasa shores into a new hub of business and thus heighten the
periphery’s attractiveness to the national center. As both sides remain
stubborn in their claims and international maritime tensions boil, there
remains a distinct possibility that they could explode into armed conflict if
one side or another engages in a provocation, which in this context, might most
likely be staged by the Tanzanians since they have everything to gain and the
Malawians have everything to lose if the two clash. It’s probably because of
their simmering tensions that Malawi doesn’t see Tanzania as a reliable transit
partner for diversifying its international trade routes from the Mozambican
RENAMO-influenced ports of Beira and Nacala, so Lilongwe will likely continue
to remain dependent on its eastern neighbor for the foreseeable future so long
as the Tanzanian dispute remains unresolved.
The
Zambian Detour Or Zambia’s Detour?:
The
most hopeful opportunity that Malawi has for relieving its dependency on
Mozambique is to expand its rail network to Zambia and onwards to one of the
several crisscrossing infrastructure projects cutting through the country. The
first step in this direction was already taken in 2010 with the commissioning
of the Chipata-Mchinji railway between both states. It has thus far
underperformed in its potential and most of Malawi’s trade is still conducted
with Mozambique or by means of its territory through Beira and Nacala ports.
Instead of the railway serving to diversify Malawi’s international trade away
from Mozambique, it might reversely have the effect of deepening its dependency
due to Zambia’s own grand strategy of infrastructural diversification.
Lusaka
wants to position itself as the central crossroads of South-Central African
trade, and in doing so, it has a vision to extend its own rail networks through
Malawi and onwards to Nacala. The existing problem is that Mozambique’s
relevant rail line to that port hasn’t been operational for decades, though
this is why the African Development Bank approved a long-term $300
million loan in February for restoring the route. If the route is completed and
RENAMO doesn’t behave as an obstructive force in inhibiting the corridor’s
economic viability, then the ZaMM (Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique) railroad could
function as a complementary Silk Road in pairing with the Tanzanian portion to
Zambia and allowing for a secondary Indian Ocean terminal for the Southern
Trans-African Route (STAR). This is because Nacala would link to TAZARA, which
in turn could connect to Angola’s Benguela line via the Northwest Railway that might soon
be constructed in Zambia.
ZaMM
would be a welcome addition to multipolarity’s network of transnational
infrastructure projects if it ever sees the light of day, though it would be
entirely ironic for Malawi given that its plans for a Zambian detour away from
Mozambique ultimately turned into Zambia’s own detour to Mozambique and Malawi’s
double dependency on its neighbor.
Color
Revolutions And Coups Along The Lake Malawi/Nyasa Coast
Demographic,
“civilizational”, and intra-regional pressures present the most ‘organic’
conflict scenarios for Malawi, and like it was mentioned above, these could
predictably lead to an outflow of Weapons of Mass Migration into the three
surrounding states. That being said, there are also two much more artificially
manufactured destabilization scenarios that could burst forth in Malawi at any
moment, and these are Color Revolutions and coups, both of which have a recent
history of attempted deployment in the country. The situational specifics of
any future iteration of these schemes might change, but the general idea of
foreign-supported regime change would remain the same.
Color
Revolution Failure:
Malawi
was rocked by a failed Color Revolution attempt in July 2011, though one which
ultimately claimed a handful of lives and confirmed that the China-orienting
country was on the list of America’s regime change targets. Prior to the
events, President Bingu wa Mutharika had recognized Beijing as China’s official
government in 2008, after which bilateral relations took off and the two
started moving to one another. Chinese investments entered the country and
Beijing’s influence was finally felt
in one of the few corners of the world where it had been absent over the past
several decades.
Mutharika’s
policy reversal towards China was significant because Malawi had previously
been in full lockstep with Western policies ever since its 1964 independence
and Cold War rule under President Hastings Banda. Malawi’s leader
tried so hard to emulate the Western establishment that he sometimes even
outdid his patrons, such as when his country – the only African one with
diplomatic ties to apartheid South Africa – continued trading with Pretoria
despite many of his European and American partners sanctioning it from 1986
until its removal in 1994. This is why Mutharika’s about-face caught so many
off guard, since it totally broke with his predecessors’ stringent policy of
recognizing Taiwan.
In
the run-up to the Color Revolution, the government expelled the UK High
Commissioner in April 2011 after he called the president “autocratic”, “combative”,
and “intolerant of criticism” – smears that are regularly used in ginning up an
information campaign against a foreign leader. It shouldn’t be too unexpected
that a protest movement broke out a few months later in July, and following the
government’s defensive actions in restoring law and order, the UK and the US both suspended
their aid to the donor-dependent country as punishment for its president’s
success in fending off the regime change operation. The suspicious timing
between the UK’s implicit anti-government threats and the unleashing of a Color
Revolution shortly thereafter is enough to make one question whether the entire
mess was managed by Malawi’s former colonial occupier, just as the close
coordination between London and Washington’s aid suspensions lend credence to
the thought that the US might have had something to do with this as well.
Mutharika didn’t directly accuse either of them for being behind the deadly
commotion, but he did point his finger in early 2012 at what he claimed were some
unnamed donor nations that were working with in-country NGOs to organize the
protests against him.
‘Constitutional
Coup’:
Mutharika
suddenly passed away in April 2012 at the age of 78, sparking a brief
constitutional crisis of who his legal successor should be. Per the
constitution, power must be transferred from the President to the
Vice-President during the passing of the former, though the tricky situation
was that Mutharika had disowned his successor a year beforehand. Joyce Banda
entered into problems with Mutharika and was dumped from the ruling party in
2010, just one year after he picked her to run on his winning ticket during the
2009 elections. Banda allegedly didn’t support Bingu’s plans to have his
brother and then-Foreign Minister Peter Mutharika succeed him in the future,
and this dispute is what led to her de-facto dismissal. The problem, however,
was that Banda chose not to resign from her post and stubbornly remained the
legal Vice-President throughout the rest of Bingu’s tenure. The ruling
Democratic Progressive Party was factionalized by the controversy and Bingu did
not have enough influence within his own party to get her impeached. Therefore,
when he abruptly died in early April, she legally became his successor, though
there was a short two-day period where the government met without her and
conspired to pass the baton to Bingu’s brother, Peter. The plot didn’t succeed
because the military wouldn’t stand behind it, and therefore Banda became
Malawi’s first female president.
What’s
interesting about this episode is that Banda didn’t even belong to the ruling
party by that time, having been expelled in 2010. She created her own “People’s Party” in May 2011, just
two months before the Color Revolution. This was obviously done in tactical
coordination with the UK and US, which evidently threw their weight behind her
as they tried to topple Mutharika. It’s telling that just a few months after
Banda’s inauguration, the US rescinded its former aid
suspension and renewed its donations to the country, clearly as a reward for
their proxy’s victory during the ‘constitutional coup’. Even more curiously,
the American-based and globally renowned Forbes magazine included Banda on their list of
the world’s most powerful women from 2012-2014, with the latter year
unbelievably ranking her as the 40th most
powerful despite her never achieving anything of international significance
ever in her career. It doesn’t take much to realize that this was just a more
personal reward for the politician in exchange for returning Western influence
to the country, even though she never ended up going as far as reversing her
predecessor’s recognition of Beijing. In spite of her ‘popularity’ in Forbes
and the ‘power’ that the Western elite said that she had, Banda dismally lost
her first-ever election in 2014 and was replaced by Bingu’s brother, Peter
Mutharika, thus preventing her from fully carrying out her envisioned/ordered
policies.
Coup
Fears:
Peter
Mutharika’s presidency has been marked by a balance between Malawi’s
traditional Western aid partners and China, though even this pragmatic approach
towards Beijing appears to have set off alarm bells in the Western capitals.
The investigation itself is still ongoing, but the government
claims to have foiled a coup plot in February of this year. According to
reports, the American Ambassador met with opposition
leader Lazarus Chakwera during his visit to the US and hatcedh a coup plot, one
which allegedly was also being organized with other conspirators through WhatsApp.
The specific details of how the putschists planned to seize power haven’t been
publicly released (at least to the author’s knowledge), so it’s unclear whether
this was meant to be a military coup, a ‘constitutional coup’, or a Color
Revolution coup. In what might be an unrelated event but which could also
possibly have something to do with this scandal, the president dismissed the head of the
army at the end of July. One media report said that this was
because the country’s intelligence chief linked him to a planned coup, which if
true, would confirm that the original plotters from February (the US and its
on-the-ground network of political and NGO proxies) haven’t given up on their
mission to overthrow Mutharika.
Just
as it was with his brother Bingu, Peter Mutharika is being targeted because of
his government’s decision to continue Lilongwe’s relationship with Beijing.
Banda was unable to cut Malawi’s ties with China because they had simply become
much too advantageous for her country, as was seen when she signed a $667 million electricity deal
with China’s Export-Import Bank in 2013. It’s not known why she would do this
while still being a stereotypical Western stooge, but it could be that she felt
confident enough that the US and UK wouldn’t turn on her just for that,
especially since they had already invested in helping her gain power in the
first place. The fact that Banda would still continue Malawi’s relationship
with China despite she herself being a Western proxy is a strong testimony to
just how important China has become
to the country in the less than a decade since bilateral ties have been
established. Peter, for his part, went even further and recently hosted a China-Malawi Investment Forum where he invited
China to take part in a wide array of projects in the agriculture,
agro-processing, energy, mining, ICT, tourism, infrastructure, and
manufacturing industries, among others. Pretty much, he offered to open the
entire country up to Chinese capital in exchange for the development that it
would bring, and with this in mind, it’s reasonable to predict that the last
two pro-US coup plots certainly won’t be the last to be attempted.
Demystifying
Zambia
With
Malawi’s strategic situation and Hybrid War vulnerabilities out of the way,
it’s now time to connect the research to neighboring Zambia, the
mysterious-sounding country in South-Central Africa which the casual observers
knows absolutely nothing about. To give the reader a crash course about the
basics of Zambia’s significance, one should start by speaking about former
President Kenneth Kaunda, the man who is
essentially the ‘father of the nation’. In many ways, he was to Zambia what his
close friend and ally Julius Nyerere was to Tanzania, and that’s a pragmatic,
stable, and decades-long leader who presided over his state throughout all of
the Cold War. Just like Tanzania, Zambia was a frontline state fighting against
apartheid in South Africa and the remaining colonial governments in Angola,
Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and the country was a sanctuary for rebel groups
fighting in these neighboring conflicts. Although there were several high-profile
incursions against its territory – most notably when the Rhodesian government
attacked some of the insurgents there during the late 1970s – Zambia was
never formally involved in any conventional war (not even “Africa’s World War”
in 1990s Congo), and it thus remained largely untouched by the conflicts that
have ravaged Africa over the past half a century.
This
deserves further commentary because – like Tanzania – it’s very unusual that
such an identity-diverse state could evade domestic and international conflict
for so long while its counterparts seemed to inevitably become embroiled in it.
Zambia counts 73 ethnic and linguistic groups within
its borders, making it less diverse than Tanzania, but still relatively
eclectic by any other standard (especially European). The largest groups are the Bemba and the Tonga, comprising 21% and
13.6% of the population and concentrated mostly in the north and south,
respectively.
Interestingly,
former President Kaunda was born in traditionally
Bemba northern Zambia to Tonga parents from Malawi, and this
‘minority-of-a-minority’ status might have played a part in why he didn’t
promote tribalism during his rule. His assimilation and integration as an
‘outsider’ into local society was an integral part of his personal upbringing,
and this formative experience could be attributed with influencing him to
pursue an inclusive national identity that emphasized state patriotism over
tribal affiliation. It also helped to a large degree that Kaunda was a peaceful
anti-imperialist and a stout socialist, two interlinked ideological matrices
which obviously had a strong effect on his views. Although it’s possible for a
supporter of these ideas to also be a parochial tribalist, that wasn’t the case
with Kaunda, who practiced what he preached and put it to the test by forging a
unified Zambian identity.
Zambia’s
commendable stability also owes itself to its alliance with Tanzania and its
close partnership with China. Under the imperial period of British rule, all of
Zambia’s connective infrastructure projects were built according to a
‘north-south’ logic, thus making the country completely dependent on Rhodesia
(later Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa for its connection to the rest of
the international marketplace. This became a major vulnerability after the
country’s 1964 independence when Kaunda took to actively practicing his
anti-imperialist policies and started training and hosting rebel groups from
all around the region. In order to retain strategic flexibility and prevent
Zambia from blackmail by its neighbors, it looked eastward to ideologically
identical Tanzania for a desperately needed alternative outlet to the world. As
such, the TAZAMA oil pipeline linking the two countries
was completed in 1968, followed by the Chinese-financed TAZARA railroad along mostly the same route in
1975. Taken together, the Tanzanian-linked infrastructure projects gave Zambia
the opportunity to more independently practice its anti-imperialist policy, and
the railroad was especially pivotal in the export of the country’s copious copper deposits after Angola’s
Benguela railroad became inoperable during the country’s post-independence
civil war in 1975 and Lusaka opted to diversify its prior export dependency
away from Rhodesia. Had it not been for the backup options that Tanzania
provided it for energy and commodity market access, then Zambia would have
remained fully reliant on the imperialist and apartheid states and thus would
have eventually been subsumed by their influence and control with time.
Zigzagging
Through The South-Central African Pivot Space
In
relation to the infrastructure projects zigzagging through Zambia, it’s
apparent that the country serves as the connectivity juncture for the entire
sub-equatorial transport network running throughout the region. For this
reason, Zambia can be described as the pivot state over this vast space and an
object of priceless envy in the New Cold War:
* Green: TAZARA-Katanga-Benguela/TAZARA-North West Railroad-Benguela
* Pink: Walvis Bay Corridor
* Blue: Zambia-Zimbabwe-South Africa railroad network
* Purple: ZaMM (Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique)
The
above map visually depicts Zambia’s geostrategic importance in Africa through
the perspective of New Silk Road connectivity. It lies at the center of
multiple intersecting infrastructure projects and has the potential for linking
them all together to forge an integrated sub-equatorial coast-to-coast transit
system in this part of Africa. Furthermore, if an interconnecting route was to
be made between Tanzania’s TAZARA and Kenya’s LAPSSET Corridor (i.e. bridging
Dar es Salaam and Lamu via Mombasa), then it would be conceptually possible to
join Ethiopia’s nearly 100-million-strong marketplace and the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti railroad to this transcontinental mainland transportation line.
Even barring the expansion of this network past the equator and into the Horn
of Africa, the Zambia-intersecting sub-equatorial rail matrix makes the
South-Central country one of the continent’s most influential pivot spaces, and
accordingly, a very likely victim for Hybrid War.
Cutting
The Zambian Knot
Zambia
is the key component to the larger transcontinental New Silk Road
interconnectivity project that’s taking shape in sub-equatorial Africa, and it
accordingly ties all of the projects together into an integrated whole. If
Zambia were to be destabilized in any significant way, then it would immediately
throw this multipolar vision into jeopardy, either disrupting it partially or
wholly, or allowing a third-party state (i.e. the US) to acquire influence or
control over the entire structure. For this reason, it’s integral for Zambia to
strictly adhere to its traditional complementary policies of independence and
stability, as any major deviation from either of these could create problems
for the rest of the international network that transits through the country. In
evaluating the Hybrid War threats facing Zambia, four in particular stand out,
including both general and ‘conventional’ scenarios and those which are more
specific and asymmetrical.
It
should be kept in mind at all times that the US is known for its phased and
adaptive approach to destabilizing targeted countries, and that it doesn’t
always aim for regime change per say. Sometimes it’s only hoping that certain
events (regardless of the amount of control that the US directly exercises over
them) can result in enough pressure that the intended government tweaks their
policies in conformity with the US’ interests. Other times, it wants to do more
than overthrow the government and actually aims for a ‘regime reboot’, or in
this case, a complete domestic reformatting of the country from a unitary
republic to a divided federation. Regardless of what the physical result
ultimately ends up being, the guiding motivation is always to either disrupt,
control, or influence the multipolar transnational connective infrastructure
projects in question, which in this case are the five such ones that transit
through Zambia.
Color
Revolution:
It
was evident that Zambia was at risk of an incipient Color Revolution even
before the summer 2016 election resulted in a narrow margin of victory for the
ruling party. The government was forced to shut down the
main ‘opposition’ newspaper after it accumulated millions of dollars in overdue
tax arrears, with the owner obviously flouting the law with the expectation
that the government wouldn’t dare to move against it out of fear of being
accused of an “anti-democratic crackdown”. “The Post” completely misjudged the
authorities and was shut down a little over one month before the 11 August
election. Shortly after that, ‘opposition’-led clashes killed one person and
injured several others, after which the government temporarily suspended campaigning so
as to allow both sides to cool down and deescalate the tensions between them.
This
worked in the sense of preventing another outbreak of pre-electoral violence,
but it didn’t mitigate the ‘opposition’s’ pent-up anti-government energy that
eventually burst out in the aftermath of the vote. United Party for National
Development (UPND) candidate Hakainde Hichilema alleged that the ruling Patriotic Front led by
incumbent President Edgar Lungu defrauded the ballot and illegally pulled off
his victory, demanding a recount which
he believed would rectify the results and give him the presidency instead. The
government refused to cave into the pressure and insisted that Lungu rightfully won the election
with 50.35% of the vote compared to Hichilema’s 47.67%, which in turn prompted
the UPND to reject the official tabulation. The national situation remains very
tense because of this, and it’s possible that some elements of the ‘opposition’
might be planning a Hybrid War to help them seize power.
Regional-Tribal
Conflict:
Even
if the present drama is resolved, that doesn’t take away from the fact that the
country is almost evenly divided into two separate political camps for the
second time in just as many years. During the extraordinary 2015 vote that was
called in response to incumbent President Sata’s unexpected death, Lungu beat
Hichilema 48.33% to 46.67% by the razor-thin difference of nearly 27,000 votes
and was therefore accorded with the right to serve out the rest of his
predecessor’s term before the next round of elections, which he won by a
slightly more comfortable (though still narrow) margin. The geographic nature
of this division follows the general north-south split between the Bemba and
Tonga’s zones of influence, indicating that tribalism might finally be on the
verge of becoming a palpable political factor.
Even
though it would be utterly destabilizing to the country’s traditional social
and political harmony for this to happen – and likely herald in the sort of
violent conflict that has hitherto been a staple of most African nations’
history – it wouldn’t exactly be surprising, since the ‘opposition’ displayed
its inclination to politicize tribal identity earlier this year when some of
its highest-ranking representations proposed that Zambia
“should choose leaders on tribal rotation basis”, which effectively amounts to
“Bembas and other tribes [being] excluded from seeking the presidency on
grounds of tribe”. The ruling Patriotic Front immediately admonished its rivals
for flirting with such a dangerous ideology and warned that “it is outrageous
and completely away from established democratic principles upon which our
beloved Zambia is built.”
In
hindsight and judging by the results of the latest election, this scandal might
have been effective in reinforcing the incipient regional-tribal politicized
identity that is perniciously creeping to the fore of Zambian politics. Should this
trend continue, then it will almost certainly catalyze a larger centrifugal
process whereby the decay of inclusive socialist-era Zambian patriotism
accelerates to become an all-out rapid post-modern degeneration into
regionalized, tribalized, and then perhaps even localized identities that split
the country into halves and possibly even divide it further into a
multidimensional mix of militantly conflicting variables (“stereotypical
African tribal warfare”). More than likely though, the immediate effect of
Zambia’s descent into domestic violence would see the western and southern
parts of the country teaming up against the northern and eastern ones, though
it might not be the Bembas and Tongas that end up starting a war for political
power, but the Lozi in “Bartoseland” that spark one for independence or Identity Federalism.
“Barotseland”
Separatism And Identity Federalism:
The Lozi account for only
about 5.7% of Zambia’s 15 million people, but they’re sparsely spread
throughout most of the expansive Western Province and have historic kingdom
claims to nearly 44% of the country’s entire territory if one includes
their pre-colonial footprint in the
contemporary Northwestern and Southern Provinces. The Lozi’s homeland of Bartoseland became a protectorate of the UK in the
late 19th century and came to constitute the vast
majority of the then-province of Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia prior to
its merger with its counterpart of North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1911 to form
Northern Rhodesia, which would later become Zambia after its 1964 independence.
It
was right before the country’s freedom from the British that the Barotseland
issue returned to the national spotlight, as all sides agreed to the Barotseland Agreement in that year
which gave the region broad autonomy over its civil affairs. Kaunda, however,
rescinded this in 1969 following a constitutional referendum that equalized
each province’s status and tangentially ended up changing Barotseland’s name to
the Western Province (with its historical territory in the modern-day
Northwestern and Southern Provinces never having been administratively
incorporated into its namesake entity). The topic subsequently remained a
non-issue for decades until the past couple of years ago when activists made a
fuss about it on several occasions and ended up in
jail for their attention-seeking stunts. There were even riots in the regional
capital of Mungu in 2011 and 2013, but these were quickly
quelled by the authorities. Since then, Barotseland has been a slowly simmering
problem that threatens to rise to the surface in the coming future, and it
might just receive foreign encouragement because of the geostrategic
implications that it would have.
Although
Barotseland only encompasses the Western Province, its historical claims
stretch into the Northwestern one and up to the DRC border, which could
theoretically put the separatist-federalist entity right in the middle of the
Northwestern railroad project to Angola’s Benguela, or in other words, cut
right into the middle of the Southern Trans-African Route’s (STAR)
Congo-alternative ‘detour’. The proposed Zambian-Angolan rail connection is
much more geopolitically reliable than the Katanga corridor due to the DRC’s
inherent instability and proneness to large-scale and disruptive conflict, so
the inability to construct the Northwestern railroad due to a possible
Barotseland secessionist campaign would deal a heavy blow to the long-term
strategic security of STAR.
Moreover,
even if a future Barotseland conflict with the newly formed “Barotseland Liberation Army” or other groups
never directly interferes with STAR, the ensuing domestic political
configuration that might occur through the granting of autonomy to the region
or even federal status might produce an uncontainable contagion effect that
spreads throughout the whole country, possibly leading to its full-on devolution
and the granting of quasi-independent autonomous/federalized status to the
Northwest Province as well. Zambia is already giving more power to the
provincial and local governments as per the 2013 Decentralization Policy, and this initiative
could be exploited by regional-tribal actors such as the Barotse, or even the
Bemba and Tonga in the event of large-scale post-election clashes between them,
in order to promote a nationwide devolution of power which would transition
Zambia from a unitary state into a series of autonomous or federalized
statelets.
Regardless
if it’s sparked by the Barotseland separatists or not, the nationwide
fulfillment of this scenario could lead to a these semi-independent
identity-based statelets controlling disrupting, controlling, and/or
influencing the five separate multipolar transnational connective infrastructure
projects running through Zambia and linking together the whole of Southern
Africa, which could thenceforth create a cartographic checkerboard of
opportunities for out-of-regional states such as the US to divide-and-rule
these vital transit corridors.
ULTIMATE
DISRUPTOR: Weapons Of Mass Migration:
It’s
difficult to predict if, or when, this might happen, but should any form of
significant conflict break out in the DRC, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, or
perhaps even Angola or Tanzania, then the wave of Weapons of Mass Migration
that might crash into the historically stable state of Zambia could totally
upend the domestic harmony that’s pervaded the country for decades and push it
to the brink of civil breakdown. The ‘opposition’-manufactured tension between
the Bemba and Tonga, to say nothing of the separatist desires of a
progressively loud segment of the Lozi in Barotseland, could be inflamed and
each respective identity group might see a valuable window of opportunity for
promoting their agenda amidst the confusion and disorder that a large-scale
migrant influx might bring.
It’s
not to imply that the arrival of thousands of migrants would instantly lead to
a reversal of law and order in the country, but that it would indeed cause a
divisive reaction among the locals and cause unforeseen budgetary,
administrative, and policing pressures which could in turn worsen existing
institutional stresses. Depending on the intensity of the onslaught, it might
either progressively or rapidly overwhelm these said entities and contribute to
the perception of state weakness – one which opportunistic non-state actors and
‘opposition’ parties might be keen to take advantage of. Despite its location
at the crossroads of South-Central Africa, Zambia has yet to experience a
massive inflow of migrant/refugees from its neighbors, and even so, it was much
more politically and socially cohesive under the Cold War presidency of Kaunda
to handle any such contingency. The situation is dramatically different
nowadays, and as the elections clearly exhibit, the country is sharply divided
into two competing political factions, the balance of which might be
disastrously disturbed by the sudden introduction of this rogue and
ultra-unpredictable third-party element.
To
be continued…
Andrew Korybko is the American political commentator currently working for
the Sputnik agency. He is the author of the
monograph “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect
Adaptive Approach To Regime Change” (2015). This text will be included
into his forthcoming book on the theory of Hybrid Warfare.
WHITE SWANS AND
RUSSIA
 |
| TU-160 White Swan |
The units of strategic aviation appeared
in Russia in 1999. However, the first squadron of heavy bombers was created in
1914. The bombers were subsequently used both in the Great Patriotic War and
then in the Cold War, especially at a time when the Soviet army already had
nuclear weapons, but had no technology, other than airplanes, to deliver
nuclear weapons to targets. The USSR developed full-fledged strategic missiles
a while later.
Interestingly, neither Russia nor the United States have
abandoned long-range strategic
aviation. Russia's strategic Tupolev bombers were made several
decades ago, but they still remain in good condition. It is only Russia and the
USA that have an air unit in their nuclear forces. This unit makes the latter a
nuclear triad.
Other nuclear powers prefer ground and sea-based nuclear
missiles. Yet, the nuclear arsenals of the UK, France and other nuclear powers
are rather scarce compared with the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers.
Therefore, it is irrational to create units of strategic aviation for small
nuclear powers.
Indeed, any weapon is valuable not only for its damaging
effect during a war, but also for its ability to prevent a war. Ancient Chinese
strategists said: "The best battle is a battle that has not started."
By and large, nuclear weapons exist to deter potential
enemies. In case of a military conflict between nuclear powers, nuclear weapons
ensure mutual destruction by default.
Washington politicians and their European allies,
especially those who believe in the "omnipotence" of the "NATO
umbrella," dream about a victory over Russia.
Locations of nuclear weapons are strictly classified,
because they can be destroyed even with the use of conventional weapons in case
of a military conflict.
As soon as Russian strategic
Tu-160 White Swan bombers fly over the Atlantic, the
press of the "good old England", together with mass media outlets of
many other NATO countries start trumpeting about the notorious "Russian
threat." At the same time, the Russian strategic aviation does not play
only a demonstrative role. The Tu-160 bomber is a
very formidable weapon. These long-range aircraft can overcome
distances of over 14,000 kilometers. A Tu-160, if refueled, can fly to
Venezuela. The power reserve of NATO fighter aircraft is four times less.
The Russian aircraft is equipped with state-of-the-art
automated defense systems and missile-gun armament. To crown it all, Russia's
electronic warfare systems are most advanced in the world to date.
The flight range of X-101 cruise missile (X-102, a nuclear-capable
version) that Russian long-range bombers carry makes up 5,5 thousand
kilometers. One Tu-160 White Swan bomb carries 12 of such missiles. The older
Tu-95 carries eight missiles. Each of those missiles can carry a 250-kiloton
warhead. For comparison, Hiroshima was completely destroyed by a bomb of
"only" 20 kilotons.
Now let's calculate: 16 "White Swans" carrying
12 X-102, plus a total of about 50 Tu-95 with eight X-102, and we have the
total of nearly 600 carriers. For comparison, Russia's Strategic Missile Forces
currently have about 400 missiles with 950 warheads. As we can see, the
aviation component of the Russian "nuclear triad is far from being just an
"outdated symbol" of military power.
Yuri Nosovsky
No comments:
Post a Comment