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| Bertha Sogah, Masloc CEO indicted for fraud |
Published on 5th April, 2013
By Ekow Mensah
There are very strong indications that President
John Mahama’s war on corruption has began in earnest and one of is very first
victims is the Microfinance and small Loans Centre (MASLOC).
MASLOC has been riddled with allegations of
massive corruption including the
diversion of funds, the granting of loans to cronies, abuse of the
organisation’s financial regulations.
As we went to bed, there was information from
usually reliable sources that the security services were pouring over documents
as part of preparations for a full scale investigation.
Last Wednesday, the Daily Graphic” reported that
Mrs Bertha Sogah, The chief Executive has been directed to proceed on leave to
pave the way for the investigations.
The
“Daily Graphic” quoted a source close to te Board of Directors of MASLOC and
said the leave is with immediate effect.
Reliable security sources told “The
Insight” that the presisdent is
determined to endure that public instituions are cleaned of corrupt elements.
This exercise would be extended to other state
instittutions and nobody will be spared”
he said.
Mrs Sogah is a leading member of the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) and her being asked to go on leave may be an
indication that party affiliation may not count in the fight against
corruption
EDITORIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY
Yesterday, Mr Maxwel
Kofi Jumah, former Member of Parliament made disparaging remarks about the
National Security outfit on the morning show on Adom FM.
He described National
security as incompetent and a den of thieves.
We have no quarel with the former Honourable Member of
Parliament and recognise that like all Ghanaians he is entitled to free speech.
The problem however is that baseless
condemnation fo state institutions can limit their effectivness and undermine
public confidence in them.
The old practice of
the security estbalishment which hinged on intimidatory tactics like arrest and
detention without charge or trial cannot be employed today.
Today, National
Security ought to aim at wining hearts and minds and take steps to stop potential
conflicts from developing into fully blown ones.
The Insight is fully
staisfied with the performance of the national security establishment under the
able leadership of Lt.Col Larry Gbevlo-Lartey.
It is indeed a fact
that all secuirty issues have been
professionally handled since 2012 and the indications are that the national
security outfit is capable of dealing with all future threats.
MI6 'Arranged Cold War Killing'
of Congo Prime Minister
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| Late Prime Minister of Congo Patrice Lumumba |
By Ben
Claims over Patrice Lumumba's 1961
assassination made by Labour peer in letter to London Review of Books
Congo's first democratically elected prime minister was abducted and killed in a cold war operation run by British intelligence, according to remarks said to have been made by the woman who was leading the MI6 station in the central African country at the time.
A Labour peer has claimed that Baroness Park of Monmouth admitted to him a few months before she died in March 2010 that she arranged Patrice Lumumba's killing in 1961 because of fears he would ally the newly democratic country with the Soviet Union.
In a letter to the London Review of Books, Lord Lea said the admission was made while he was having a cup of tea with Daphne Park, who had been consul and first secretary from 1959 to 1961 in Leopoldville, as the capital of Belgian Congo was known before it was later renamed as Kinshasa following independence.
He wrote: "I mentioned the uproar surrounding Lumumba's abduction and murder, and recalled the theory that MI6 might have had something to do with it. 'We did,' she replied, 'I organised it'."
Park, who was known by some as the "Queen of Spies" after four decades as one of Britain's top female intelligence agents, is believed to have been sent by MI6 to the Belgian Congo in 1959 under an official diplomatic guise as the Belgians were on the point of being ousted from the country.
"We went on to discuss her contention that Lumumba would have handed over the whole lot to the Russians: the high-value Katangese uranium deposits as well as the diamonds and other important minerals largely located in the secessionist eastern state of Katanga," added Lea, who wrote his letter in response to a review of a book by Calder Walton about British intelligence activities during the twilight of the British empire.
Doubts about the claim have been raised by historians and former officials, including a former senior British intelligence official who knew Park and told the Times: "It doesn't sound like the sort of remark Daphne Park would make. She was never indiscreet. Also MI6 never had a licence to kill."
Mystery has continued to surround the death of Lumumba, who was shot on 17 January 1961, although Belgian troops were known to have been involved.
Park met Lumumba, the African leader who was to become the short-lived prime minister of an independent Congo. After his successor took power, she was arrested and beaten by his supporters.
She was able to get herself released and sought local UN intervention, securing the release of Britons and other foreigners, for which she was appointed OBE in 1960.
Congo's first democratically elected prime minister was abducted and killed in a cold war operation run by British intelligence, according to remarks said to have been made by the woman who was leading the MI6 station in the central African country at the time.
A Labour peer has claimed that Baroness Park of Monmouth admitted to him a few months before she died in March 2010 that she arranged Patrice Lumumba's killing in 1961 because of fears he would ally the newly democratic country with the Soviet Union.
In a letter to the London Review of Books, Lord Lea said the admission was made while he was having a cup of tea with Daphne Park, who had been consul and first secretary from 1959 to 1961 in Leopoldville, as the capital of Belgian Congo was known before it was later renamed as Kinshasa following independence.
He wrote: "I mentioned the uproar surrounding Lumumba's abduction and murder, and recalled the theory that MI6 might have had something to do with it. 'We did,' she replied, 'I organised it'."
Park, who was known by some as the "Queen of Spies" after four decades as one of Britain's top female intelligence agents, is believed to have been sent by MI6 to the Belgian Congo in 1959 under an official diplomatic guise as the Belgians were on the point of being ousted from the country.
"We went on to discuss her contention that Lumumba would have handed over the whole lot to the Russians: the high-value Katangese uranium deposits as well as the diamonds and other important minerals largely located in the secessionist eastern state of Katanga," added Lea, who wrote his letter in response to a review of a book by Calder Walton about British intelligence activities during the twilight of the British empire.
Doubts about the claim have been raised by historians and former officials, including a former senior British intelligence official who knew Park and told the Times: "It doesn't sound like the sort of remark Daphne Park would make. She was never indiscreet. Also MI6 never had a licence to kill."
Mystery has continued to surround the death of Lumumba, who was shot on 17 January 1961, although Belgian troops were known to have been involved.
Park met Lumumba, the African leader who was to become the short-lived prime minister of an independent Congo. After his successor took power, she was arrested and beaten by his supporters.
She was able to get herself released and sought local UN intervention, securing the release of Britons and other foreigners, for which she was appointed OBE in 1960.
We do not fight for glory or honors,
but for ideas we consider just.
—Fidel Castro Ruz
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| Cuban soldiers drove out apartheid from South Africa |
By Piero Gleijeses
This year marks the 20th
anniversary (written in 2007) of the opening of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale,
in south-eastern Angola, which pitted the armed forces of apartheid South
Africa against the Cuban army and Angolan forces. General Magnus Malan writes in his memoirs that this campaign marked a great victory for the South African Defense Force (SADF). But Nelson Mandela could not disagree more: Cuito Cuanavale, he asserted, "was the turning point for the liberation of our continent—and of my people—from the scourge of apartheid".
Debate over the significance of Cuito Cuanavale has been intense, partly because the relevant South African documents remain classified. I have, however, been able to study files from the closed Cuban archives as well as many US documents. Despite the ideological divide that separates Havana and Washington, their records tell a remarkably similar story.
Let me review the facts briefly. In July 1987, the Angolan army (Fapla) launched a major offensive in south-eastern Angola against Jonas Savimbi’s forces. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened in the south-east. By early November, the SADF had cornered elite Angolan units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them.
The United Nations Security Council demanded that the SADF unconditionally withdraw from Angola, but the Reagan administration ensured that this demand had no teeth.
US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: "The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds." [1] This gave the SADF time to annihilate Fapla’s best units.
By early 1988, South African military sources and Western diplomats were confident that the fall of Cuito was imminent. This would have dealt a devastating blow to the Angolan government. But on November 15 1987, Cuban President Fidel Castro had decided to send more troops and weapons to Angola—his best planes with his best pilots, his most sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons and his most modern tanks. Castro’s goal was not merely to defend Cuito, it was to force the SADF out of Angola once and for all. He later described this strategy to South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo: Cuba would halt the South African onslaught and then attack from another direction, "like a boxer who with his left hand blocks the blow and with his right—strikes". [2]
Cuban planes and 1,500 Cuban solders reinforced the Angolans, and Cuito did not fall.
On March 23 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack on the town. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault "was brought to a grinding and definite halt" by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces.
Now Havana’s right hand prepared to strike. Powerful Cuban columns were marching through south-western Angola toward the Namibian border. The documents telling us what the South African leaders thought about this threat are still classified. But we know what the SADF did: it gave ground. US intelligence explained that the South Africans withdrew because they were impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and because they believed that a major battle "involved serious risks". [3]
As a child in Italy, I heard my father talk about the hope he and his friends had felt in December 1941, as they listened to radio reports of German troops vacating Rostov on the Don—the first time in two years of war that the German "superman" had been forced to retreat. I remembered his words—and the profound sense of relief they conveyed—as I read South African and Namibian press reports from these months in early 1988.
On May 26 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that "heavily armed Cuban and Swapo [South West Africa People’s Organization] forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border". The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on June 26 that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SADF. He added that "the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety" in South Africa.
Such sentiments were however not shared by black South Africans, who saw the retreat of the South African forces as a beacon of hope.
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| Cuban revolutionaries who fought in Angola |
The South Africans arrived with high hopes: Foreign Minister Pik Botha expected that Resolution 435 would be modified; Defense Minister Malan and President PW Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only "if Russia and its proxies did the same." They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On March 16 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was "offering to withdraw into Namibia—not from Namibia—in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon."
But the Cubans had reversed the situation on the ground, and when Pik Botha voiced the South African demands, Jorge Risquet, who headed the Cuban delegation, fell on him like a ton of bricks: "The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over." South Africa, he said, was acting as though it was "a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield."[4]
As the talks ended, Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that they had taken place "against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic."[5]
The burning question was: Would the Cubans stop at the border? To answer this question, Crocker sought out Risquet: "Does Cuba intend to halt its troops at the border between Namibia and Angola?" Risquet replied, "If I told you that the troops will not stop, it would be a threat. If I told you that they will stop, I would be giving you a Meprobamato [a Cuban tranquillizer]. ... and I want to neither threaten nor reassure you ... What I can say is that the only way to guarantee [that our troops stop at the border] would be to reach an agreement [on Namibia’s independence]."[6]
The next day, June 27 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border. The CIA reported that "Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defenses" highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. A few hours after the Cubans’ successful strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, "to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend." [7] Never had the danger of a Cuban advance into Namibia seemed more real.
The last South African soldiers left Angola on August 30, before the negotiators had even begun to discuss the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola.
Despite Washington’s best efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of Southern African history. Even Crocker acknowledged Cuba’s role when he cabled Shultz, on August 25 1988: "Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground."[8]
The Cubans’ battlefield prowess and negotiating skills were instrumental in forcing South Africa to accept Namibia’s independence. Their successful defense of Cuito was the prelude for a campaign that forced the SADF out of Angola. This victory reverberated beyond Namibia.
Many authors—Malan is just the most recent example—have sought to rewrite this history, but the US and Cuban documents tell another story. It was expressed eloquently by Thenjiwe Mtintso, South Africa’s ambassador to Cuba, in December 2005: "Today South Africa has many newly found friends. Yesterday these friends referred to our leaders and our combatants as terrorists and hounded us from their countries while supporting apartheid ... These very friends today want us to denounce and isolate Cuba. Our answer is very simple: it is the blood of Cuban martyrs—and not of these friends—that runs deep in the African soil and nurtures the tree of freedom in our country."
1) SecState to American embassy, Pretoria, Dec. 5 1987, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
2) Transcripción sobre la reunión del Comandante en Jefe con la delegación de políticos de Africa del Sur (Comp. Slovo), "Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (CIFAR)", Havana
3) Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) to SecState, May 13 1988, FOIA
4) "Actas das Conversaciones Quadripartidas entre a RPA, Cuba, Estados Unidos de América e a Africa do Sul realizadas no Cairo de 24-26.06.988", Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havana
5) Crocker to SecState, June 26, 1988, FOIA
6) "Entrevista de Risquet con Chester Crocker, 26/6/88", ACC
7) CIA, "South Africa-Angola-Cuba", June 29, 1988, FOIA; CIA, "South Africa-Angola-Namibia", July 1, 1988, FOIA
8) Crocker to SecState, Aug. 25, 1988, FOIA
(*) Italian political scientist and historian, professor of U.S. Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, in Washington, D.C.
Venezuela's presidential elections: best chances for Maduro
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| Acting President Of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro |
On the 14th of April 2013,
Venezuelans will elect their new president for a term of six years. Various
polls indicate that the current Interim President, Nicolás Maduro (PSUV), will
win. He is leading with a margin of 20 to 24 points.
By Olivia Kroth
Actually, PSUV, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, has developed a collective leadership. Nicolás Maduro is seconded by Elías Jaua, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They work as a harmonious team according to Hugo Chávez's last wish. Furthermore, 21 of 23 Venezuelan governors are members of PSUV, supporting the presidential candidate, Nicolás Maduro, in their respective states.
All PSUV members have adopted the battle cry, "unity and leadership!" Millions are united in working towards the goal of securing a maximum of votes for Nicolás Maduro on the 14th of April, according to the PSUV slogan, "I swear to Chávez that my vote goes to Maduro." The late President of Venezuela, Comandante Hugo Chávez, who passed away on the 5th of March 2013, had asked all of his fans and followers to give their votes to his friend and comrade, Nicolás Maduro.
Who is Nicolás Maduro?
A tall handsome man, who stems from a working class family in Caracas, a PSUV member, a hard worker and strong character like Hugo Chávez was, but less fiery, less extroverted and less impulsive. He appears to be more pragmatic and reserved, which might partly be due to his wife's influence, lawyer Cilia Flores, whose last post was Attorney General of the Republic.
Nicolás Maduro was born on the 23rd of November 1962. Between 1991 and 1998, he worked for the Metro System of Caracas as a union leader. In 1999, he became a Deputy of Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly and one year later, in 2000, Deputy of the National Assembly, representing the Capital District. He was re-elected to this office in 2005.
In 2006, the late President, Hugo Chávez, appointed Nicolás Maduro as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity, he worked as a strong supporter of the Great Brother Leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the Socialist Libyan Jamahiriya, until it was bombed to rubble and ashes by NATO.
Nicolás Maduro also advocates friendship with President Manuel Santos of neighbouring Colombia. He helped to improve the relations between Venezuela and Colombia, which had soured under the previous Colombian president. In addition, Nicolás Maduro built up excellent contacts to the leaders of all the Latin American and Central American progressive governments, especially Cuba.
Nicolás Maduro is loyal to the socialist cause and will continue with all the social missions initiated by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. He is a tireless anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist fighter like his predecessor was. The Venezuelan masses have extended their love for Hugo Chávez to include Nicolás Maduro, whose portrait can be seen everywhere, on flags, caps, T-shirts and walls. When he recently opened a twitter account, he gained 1.5 million followers in just two days.
By Olivia Kroth
Actually, PSUV, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, has developed a collective leadership. Nicolás Maduro is seconded by Elías Jaua, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They work as a harmonious team according to Hugo Chávez's last wish. Furthermore, 21 of 23 Venezuelan governors are members of PSUV, supporting the presidential candidate, Nicolás Maduro, in their respective states.
All PSUV members have adopted the battle cry, "unity and leadership!" Millions are united in working towards the goal of securing a maximum of votes for Nicolás Maduro on the 14th of April, according to the PSUV slogan, "I swear to Chávez that my vote goes to Maduro." The late President of Venezuela, Comandante Hugo Chávez, who passed away on the 5th of March 2013, had asked all of his fans and followers to give their votes to his friend and comrade, Nicolás Maduro.
Who is Nicolás Maduro?
A tall handsome man, who stems from a working class family in Caracas, a PSUV member, a hard worker and strong character like Hugo Chávez was, but less fiery, less extroverted and less impulsive. He appears to be more pragmatic and reserved, which might partly be due to his wife's influence, lawyer Cilia Flores, whose last post was Attorney General of the Republic.
Nicolás Maduro was born on the 23rd of November 1962. Between 1991 and 1998, he worked for the Metro System of Caracas as a union leader. In 1999, he became a Deputy of Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly and one year later, in 2000, Deputy of the National Assembly, representing the Capital District. He was re-elected to this office in 2005.
In 2006, the late President, Hugo Chávez, appointed Nicolás Maduro as Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity, he worked as a strong supporter of the Great Brother Leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the Socialist Libyan Jamahiriya, until it was bombed to rubble and ashes by NATO.
Nicolás Maduro also advocates friendship with President Manuel Santos of neighbouring Colombia. He helped to improve the relations between Venezuela and Colombia, which had soured under the previous Colombian president. In addition, Nicolás Maduro built up excellent contacts to the leaders of all the Latin American and Central American progressive governments, especially Cuba.
Nicolás Maduro is loyal to the socialist cause and will continue with all the social missions initiated by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. He is a tireless anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist fighter like his predecessor was. The Venezuelan masses have extended their love for Hugo Chávez to include Nicolás Maduro, whose portrait can be seen everywhere, on flags, caps, T-shirts and walls. When he recently opened a twitter account, he gained 1.5 million followers in just two days.
Sympathy for Hugo Chávez's successor is increasing, as he tours the Venezuelan
states on his presidential campaign. The masses feel that they might lose all
their achievements and gains of the past 14 years, should the Bolivarian
Revolution fail. Nicolás Maduro has set his stakes high. His aim is to win
nine, even 10 million votes on the 14th of April. He is telling the people in
the streets that they will lose everything, if PSUV loses the upcoming
elections. He promises to always remain loyal to the legacy of Hugo Chávez,
which means "Socialism for the 21st Century."
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| Late President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez |
Nicolás Maduro also profits from Venezuela's recent entry into MERCOSUR, the
Common Market of South America, as his country takes over the rotating
presidency from Uruguay this summer. "On the 28th of June 2013, I will
travel to Montevideo, Uruguay, as Venezuela's President, because Venezuela
assumes the presidency of MERCOSUR," Nicolás Maduro announced during his
election campaign in Lara, one of Venezuela's western grassland states.
Who is Cilia Flores?
She is Nicolás Maduro's wife, but she does not want to be Venezuela's "First Lady" at the side of her husband, because she disdains this bourgeois concept. She would rather be the "First Female Patriot" and the "First Socialist Woman" of Venezuela.
Cilia Flores was born in Tinaquillo, Cojedes, on the 1st of January 1953. She graduated from the University Santa María in Caracas as a lawyer, specialized in Labour Law and Penal Law. In 1993, Cilia Flores founded the Bolivarian Circle of Human Rights. In 1994, she was a member of the lawyers' team that liberated Hugo Chávez from prison.
In 1998, Cilia Flores supported Hugo Chávez as presidential candidate and won a Deputy's seat in the first National Assembly of Venezuela, in 2000. She was re-elected to this post, in 2005, and became the first female President of the National Assembly, in 2006. On the 31st of January 2012, Cilia Flores was appointed Attorney General of the Republic by the late President, Hugo Chávez.
Women play a great role in Venezuela since the Bolivarian Revolution began, in 1999. They are visible and powerful. Venezuelan women work as doctors, lawyers, teachers and in many other professions. There are high ranking female officers in the Venezuelan Armed Forces. Many women hold high political posts as mayors, state governors or ministers.
"A revolutionary, a socialist, must be a true feminist," Hugo Chávez once pronounced. Women have profited greatly from Venezuela's social missions. Many women will be at the front in the upcoming presidential elections, organizing rallies in their neighbourhoods, persuading their compatriots to vote for Nicolás Maduro.
"Que grande ha sido Chávez," Nicolás Maduro emphasized, "how great Chávez was." He himself is not a tiny man either, with his towering height of 1.90 metres. During the next presidential term, from 2013 to 2019, he will surely get his chance of proving that he is also a political giant, like Hugo Chávez, the strong and inspiring leader, whose memory will live on in Nicolás Maduro and the wonderful people of Venezuela.
Hugo Chávez has acquired his rightful place in history as one of Latin America's great freedom fighters, in line with Simón Bolívar, José Marti and Ché Guevara.
La Revolución sigue. The Revolution goes on.
Prepared for publication by:
Lisa Karpova
Who is Cilia Flores?
She is Nicolás Maduro's wife, but she does not want to be Venezuela's "First Lady" at the side of her husband, because she disdains this bourgeois concept. She would rather be the "First Female Patriot" and the "First Socialist Woman" of Venezuela.
Cilia Flores was born in Tinaquillo, Cojedes, on the 1st of January 1953. She graduated from the University Santa María in Caracas as a lawyer, specialized in Labour Law and Penal Law. In 1993, Cilia Flores founded the Bolivarian Circle of Human Rights. In 1994, she was a member of the lawyers' team that liberated Hugo Chávez from prison.
In 1998, Cilia Flores supported Hugo Chávez as presidential candidate and won a Deputy's seat in the first National Assembly of Venezuela, in 2000. She was re-elected to this post, in 2005, and became the first female President of the National Assembly, in 2006. On the 31st of January 2012, Cilia Flores was appointed Attorney General of the Republic by the late President, Hugo Chávez.
Women play a great role in Venezuela since the Bolivarian Revolution began, in 1999. They are visible and powerful. Venezuelan women work as doctors, lawyers, teachers and in many other professions. There are high ranking female officers in the Venezuelan Armed Forces. Many women hold high political posts as mayors, state governors or ministers.
"A revolutionary, a socialist, must be a true feminist," Hugo Chávez once pronounced. Women have profited greatly from Venezuela's social missions. Many women will be at the front in the upcoming presidential elections, organizing rallies in their neighbourhoods, persuading their compatriots to vote for Nicolás Maduro.
"Que grande ha sido Chávez," Nicolás Maduro emphasized, "how great Chávez was." He himself is not a tiny man either, with his towering height of 1.90 metres. During the next presidential term, from 2013 to 2019, he will surely get his chance of proving that he is also a political giant, like Hugo Chávez, the strong and inspiring leader, whose memory will live on in Nicolás Maduro and the wonderful people of Venezuela.
Hugo Chávez has acquired his rightful place in history as one of Latin America's great freedom fighters, in line with Simón Bolívar, José Marti and Ché Guevara.
La Revolución sigue. The Revolution goes on.
Prepared for publication by:
Lisa Karpova
Horror in Mossad: 30,000 spies
exposed
 |
| Benjamin Nyetanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel |
By
Gordon Duff
Last
week, the hacker organization “Anonymous,” symbolized by the famous “Guy
Fawkes” mask, hacked Israel’s Mossad.
The hack, initially exposing a hidden network of 30,000 covert operatives, some openly labeled “hitman,” came only days after Israel admitted to their 2010 act of piracy and terrorism against the Freedom Flotilla.
Now the Israeli regime has filled the internet with threats against “Anonymous,” if detailed information on their terror cells is leaked.
After all, who is better to carry out acts of terrorism than an organization with 30,000 covert operatives around the world, almost all trained in use of explosives and demolition, building IEDs, car bombs, kidnapping and assassination and with a long and very public history of, not just murdering people but getting away with it as well.
Every day we see it in the news, dozens killed in Pakistan, dozens more in Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, the covert army of 30,000, planning terror, building a dozen car bombs a day and then being able to, not just write the lies blaming others but, in most cases, direct public officials, controlled through blackmail, threats or bribery, to “respond as directed.”
Did I forget Syria?
The army, more correctly the “cells” exposed by Anonymous include:
1. Direct Action: Assassins, explosives experts (for the Mossad “signature” car bombs) and kidnap/rendition teams
2. Espionage: Made up of trained agent handlers and signals intelligence personnel, often specially trained while posing as doing their “national service,” this group runs the Pentagon and White House, makes up Congressional employees, most think tanks, AIPAC and the ADL/SPLC. Key espionage operatives are seldom Israeli. Many are Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian and even Cuban diplomats.
3. Controlled opposition: Most obvious are the White Supremacist/Neo-Nazi groups recently exposed as being funded through Merkel’s government in Germany at the direction of the Likudist Party in Israel. Nearly every individual or organization, with few exceptions, that describes itself as “holocaust denial,” “anti-Zionist” or “historical revisionist” is now funded and directed through Israel.
4. Thought Control: No textbook, no university chair, no broadcast executive nor any news editor is ever employed unless a member of the “30,000.” All belong, all are, not just “answerable,” but actively involved in creating cover stories to shift blame for mass killings, political assassination, economic crimes or simply to put forth a continual “drumming,” of the big lie.
Birth by Murder
The first major act of terrorism by Israel’s Irgun, the predecessor to the Mossad, was in 1949. America’s first Secretary of Defense, an office Chuck Hagel only recently assumed, a man under 24-hour protection against Mossad assassins even today, was James Forrestal.
Forrestal was an enemy of Stalin and his inner circle of Zionists who, with the influence of Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, took control of President Truman, pushing him to back the occupation of Palestine by Communists, establishing a Soviet foothold in the Middle East under the guise of a “Jewish state.”
Under the guidance of Morgenthau, one million German POWs were starved to death, Germany was de-industrialized and Stalin was allowed to move into Eastern Europe and gain de facto control of France, Italy, establish broad terror and espionage cells that spread across the world, particularly in Washington.
When the now reviled Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed the State Department was filled with communists, he was totally correct.
Bernard Baruch told Forrestal that Zionists were going to kill him. The Irgun had tried to kill British Foreign Secretary Brevin in 1946.
Forrestal, though Secretary of Defense, was continually attacked by the media, Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson, the most influential columnists of the day, wrote scathing attacks against Forrestal continually.
Assassination teams following Forrestal were arrested more than once but released on orders from President Truman who, in March of 1949, finally fired Forrestal over his opposition to Israel’s ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people.
 |
| Tamir Pardo, MOSSAD Boss |
Soon afterward, Forrestal was poisoned and taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital.
While there, he was thrown out of a 16th story window, his body showing signs
of a desperate struggle, the room in disarray.
Walter Winchell, an accused Stalinist agent, called Forrestal’s death a “suicide,” a verdict certified later despite evidence to the contrary. The control of the press, likely 10,000 of the identities Anonymous accessed, seen today was “alive and well” many decades ago.
As, decades later, the public became aware that the killings of Forrestal, the Kennedy’s, Martin Luther King, even prominent American Jews like Senator Paul Wellstone and his family were Mossad operations.
The Hollywoodism “spin” on the Forrestal assassination is the classic. We are told that Secretary of Defense Forrestal killed himself because his brain had been taken over by one of the aliens that crash-landed at Roswell, New Mexico in 1947.
Jeremy Kagen, producer of the 1981 film, “The Chosen,” depicting New York’s Hasidic community, is responsible for the 1994 film, “Roswell,” which implies Forrestal was murdered by aliens.
We have seen it for over 60 years, if the trail leads to Tel Aviv, it must have been “little green men.”
Is the Story Dead?
As soon as the story hit, press assets, both “blogosphere shills” and the MSM passed on the word, “Mossad assassination teams know where to find ‘Anonymous’ and are ready to kill family members, pets, blow up neighborhoods or even shoot up another elementary school.”
Those passing on the threats are guilty as co-conspirators, covering for espionage and terror groups, using terrorism to protect terrorists.
Thus far, we have only seen the email accounts, a horror in itself, revealing what may only be the “tip of the iceberg.”
What if only 5,000 of the 30,000 are “agent handlers?” Does this mean there are tens of thousands of additional “deep cover agents” armed with dirty bombs or ready to kill public officials if, let’s say, there is a threat to cut aid to Israel?
Wait, isn’t this exactly what brought on 9/11?
Walter Winchell, an accused Stalinist agent, called Forrestal’s death a “suicide,” a verdict certified later despite evidence to the contrary. The control of the press, likely 10,000 of the identities Anonymous accessed, seen today was “alive and well” many decades ago.
As, decades later, the public became aware that the killings of Forrestal, the Kennedy’s, Martin Luther King, even prominent American Jews like Senator Paul Wellstone and his family were Mossad operations.
The Hollywoodism “spin” on the Forrestal assassination is the classic. We are told that Secretary of Defense Forrestal killed himself because his brain had been taken over by one of the aliens that crash-landed at Roswell, New Mexico in 1947.
Jeremy Kagen, producer of the 1981 film, “The Chosen,” depicting New York’s Hasidic community, is responsible for the 1994 film, “Roswell,” which implies Forrestal was murdered by aliens.
We have seen it for over 60 years, if the trail leads to Tel Aviv, it must have been “little green men.”
Is the Story Dead?
As soon as the story hit, press assets, both “blogosphere shills” and the MSM passed on the word, “Mossad assassination teams know where to find ‘Anonymous’ and are ready to kill family members, pets, blow up neighborhoods or even shoot up another elementary school.”
Those passing on the threats are guilty as co-conspirators, covering for espionage and terror groups, using terrorism to protect terrorists.
Thus far, we have only seen the email accounts, a horror in itself, revealing what may only be the “tip of the iceberg.”
What if only 5,000 of the 30,000 are “agent handlers?” Does this mean there are tens of thousands of additional “deep cover agents” armed with dirty bombs or ready to kill public officials if, let’s say, there is a threat to cut aid to Israel?
Wait, isn’t this exactly what brought on 9/11?
Afghanistan: The Way to Peace
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| Hamid Karzai, Afghan President |
By Anatol Lieven
A very strange idea has spread in the Western media
concerning Afghanistan: that the US military is withdrawing from the country
next year, and that the present Afghan war has therefore entered into an
endgame. The use of these phrases
reflects a degree of unconscious wishful thinking that amounts to collective
self-delusion.
In fact, according a treaty signed by the United States and the Karzai administration, US military bases, aircraft, special forces, and advisers will remain in Afghanistan at least until the treaty expires in 2024. These US forces will be tasked with targeting remaining elements of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan and Pakistan; but equally importantly, they will be there to prop up the existing Afghan state against overthrow by the Taliban. The advisers will continue to train the Afghan security forces. So whatever happens in Afghanistan after next year, the United States military will be in the middle of it unless of course it is forced to evacuate in a hurry.
As to the use of the word endgame, this might be appropriate if next year, upon the departure of US ground forces, the entire Afghan population, overcome with sorrow at the loss of their beloved allies, rolls over and dies on the spot. The struggle for power in Afghanistan will not end and US policymakers should not, as in the past, hop away from a swamp they’ve done much to create.
Two major new books, together with a number of lesser works, are crucial to an understanding of Afghanistan, the flaws of the Western project there, the enemies that we are facing, and therefore of possible future policies. Barnett Rubin, senior adviser to the US special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the first Obama term, has been consistently among the wisest and most sensible of US expert voices on Afghanistan. His book Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror is a compilation of his essays and briefing papers over the years, framed by passages looking back at the sweep of Afghan history and the US involvement there since 1979.
Peter Bergen is a former journalist and long-standing commentator and writer on the region now working at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C.1 He has edited and introduces Talibanistan, a frequently brilliant collection of essays by different experts on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including an analysis of the extent to which their past links with al-Qaeda represent an enduring threat to the West, and of how far a peace settlement with them may be possible. Rubin’s and Bergen’s works should be read in conjunction with a fascinatingly detailed new book by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler on the Haqqani network, the insurgent group led by Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, which operates on both sides of the Afghan Pakistani border. Its title, Fountainhead of Jihad, is the name of a magazine published by the Haqqanis.
Brown and Rassler bring out the deep roots of the Haqqanis in the history and culture of this region, on both sides of the Durand Line, which was drawn up in 1893 by the British to mark the border between India (later Pakistan) and Afghanistan. As far as the locals are concerned it has always been largely theoretical. In the words of Jalaluddin Haqqani himself, Our tribes are settled on both sides of the Durand line since ages. Our houses are divided on both sides of the border. Both sides are my home. Brown and Rassler point out that from this point of view, all the US invasion of 2001 managed to do was force this [Haqqani] nexus a few dozen kilometers east.
In fact, according a treaty signed by the United States and the Karzai administration, US military bases, aircraft, special forces, and advisers will remain in Afghanistan at least until the treaty expires in 2024. These US forces will be tasked with targeting remaining elements of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups operating from Afghanistan and Pakistan; but equally importantly, they will be there to prop up the existing Afghan state against overthrow by the Taliban. The advisers will continue to train the Afghan security forces. So whatever happens in Afghanistan after next year, the United States military will be in the middle of it unless of course it is forced to evacuate in a hurry.
As to the use of the word endgame, this might be appropriate if next year, upon the departure of US ground forces, the entire Afghan population, overcome with sorrow at the loss of their beloved allies, rolls over and dies on the spot. The struggle for power in Afghanistan will not end and US policymakers should not, as in the past, hop away from a swamp they’ve done much to create.
Two major new books, together with a number of lesser works, are crucial to an understanding of Afghanistan, the flaws of the Western project there, the enemies that we are facing, and therefore of possible future policies. Barnett Rubin, senior adviser to the US special representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the first Obama term, has been consistently among the wisest and most sensible of US expert voices on Afghanistan. His book Afghanistan from the Cold War Through the War on Terror is a compilation of his essays and briefing papers over the years, framed by passages looking back at the sweep of Afghan history and the US involvement there since 1979.
Peter Bergen is a former journalist and long-standing commentator and writer on the region now working at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C.1 He has edited and introduces Talibanistan, a frequently brilliant collection of essays by different experts on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including an analysis of the extent to which their past links with al-Qaeda represent an enduring threat to the West, and of how far a peace settlement with them may be possible. Rubin’s and Bergen’s works should be read in conjunction with a fascinatingly detailed new book by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler on the Haqqani network, the insurgent group led by Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, which operates on both sides of the Afghan Pakistani border. Its title, Fountainhead of Jihad, is the name of a magazine published by the Haqqanis.
Brown and Rassler bring out the deep roots of the Haqqanis in the history and culture of this region, on both sides of the Durand Line, which was drawn up in 1893 by the British to mark the border between India (later Pakistan) and Afghanistan. As far as the locals are concerned it has always been largely theoretical. In the words of Jalaluddin Haqqani himself, Our tribes are settled on both sides of the Durand line since ages. Our houses are divided on both sides of the border. Both sides are my home. Brown and Rassler point out that from this point of view, all the US invasion of 2001 managed to do was force this [Haqqani] nexus a few dozen kilometers east.
The authors situate the identity and policies of the Haqqanis with respect to
three powerful local traditions: first comes an ancient fight for local tribal
autonomy against attempts to impose outside state power. This led the Haqqanis
in 1999 and 2000 to clash with Taliban attempts to impose their own version of
centralized Afghan rule. Next is a history of revolt in the name of Islam,
orchestrated by local religious figures. Finally, there is the regions
long-standing role (in the phrase of the anthropologist James C. Scott) as the
location for shatter zones, remote, usually mountainous areas that have not
been fully penetrated and controlled by states, and that serve as refuges for a
variety of fugitives and outlaws from elsewhere, who often create in these
regions their own new communities. The refuge given to al-Qaeda can be seen as
part of this tradition, as well as reflecting ideological affinities and
material benefits.
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| Map of Afghanistan |
Brown and Rassler see the very close relationship between the Haqqanis and
Pakistani military intelligence, dating back to the 1990s, not as the Haqqanis
acting as Pakistani agents, but rather as a pragmatic alliance with practical
benefits for both sides. The Haqqanis get immunity from Pakistani attack and a
measure of indirect technical and expert help. The Pakistanis gain a source of
influence within Afghanistan and, equally importantly, in their struggle to
contain their own Pashtun Islamist rebellion. The authors leave open the
question of how the Haqqanis would respond to Pakistani pressure to enter into
an Afghan peace settlement. Their first concern no doubt would be to preserve
their own continued dominance in their own region.
A basic question raised by these books is what the Afghan experience of the past decade can tell us about the United States and its Western allies when they go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Some lessons were taught by the Vietnam War, but then largely forgotten mainly it seems because they were too offensive to America’s self-image. During the US debate to give it that name that preceded the invasion of Iraq in 2003, I was appalled by the extent to which the Vietnam experience had been forgotten: not so much lessons about the nature of guerrilla war and its horrors as about the United States itself.
These include the dangers of demonizing the enemy of the moment, on the basis of a belief that any enemy of the United States must inevitably be evil. Not only does this tendency make pragmatic compromises with opponents much more difficult (and much more embarrassing should they eventually have to be reached), but, consciously or unconsciously, it allows the US government and media to blind the US public, and often themselves, to the evils of America’s own allies.
The US did this again and again during the cold war. In Afghanistan it has done it twice: first in its blind backing of the often murderous and fanatical Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s against the Soviet occupiers and their Communist allies; then, since September 11, against the Taliban most of whose Pashtun footsoldiers are descendants of the same ordinary farmers who once filled the ranks of the Mujahideen, and who are now fighting for the same reasons of religious orthodoxy and hostility to outsiders. This is certainly not to say that either the Vietnamese Communists or the Taliban were or are desirable forces in themselves just that they represent strong elements in their own societies, and from the point of view of many Vietnamese and Afghans, they are no worse than the forces that we support. Rubin, for example, is as aware of the grim treatment of women by the Taliban as anyone else; but he and some of Bergen s contributors also find many American allies capable of widespread abuses.
A basic question raised by these books is what the Afghan experience of the past decade can tell us about the United States and its Western allies when they go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Some lessons were taught by the Vietnam War, but then largely forgotten mainly it seems because they were too offensive to America’s self-image. During the US debate to give it that name that preceded the invasion of Iraq in 2003, I was appalled by the extent to which the Vietnam experience had been forgotten: not so much lessons about the nature of guerrilla war and its horrors as about the United States itself.
These include the dangers of demonizing the enemy of the moment, on the basis of a belief that any enemy of the United States must inevitably be evil. Not only does this tendency make pragmatic compromises with opponents much more difficult (and much more embarrassing should they eventually have to be reached), but, consciously or unconsciously, it allows the US government and media to blind the US public, and often themselves, to the evils of America’s own allies.
The US did this again and again during the cold war. In Afghanistan it has done it twice: first in its blind backing of the often murderous and fanatical Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s against the Soviet occupiers and their Communist allies; then, since September 11, against the Taliban most of whose Pashtun footsoldiers are descendants of the same ordinary farmers who once filled the ranks of the Mujahideen, and who are now fighting for the same reasons of religious orthodoxy and hostility to outsiders. This is certainly not to say that either the Vietnamese Communists or the Taliban were or are desirable forces in themselves just that they represent strong elements in their own societies, and from the point of view of many Vietnamese and Afghans, they are no worse than the forces that we support. Rubin, for example, is as aware of the grim treatment of women by the Taliban as anyone else; but he and some of Bergen s contributors also find many American allies capable of widespread abuses.
The catastrophic difficulties that the Western intervention has faced in
Afghanistan have been principally due to the realities of Aghanistan itself;
but they have been made far worse by a series of policy mistakes, and the
deeper features of Western government and society that they reflect. These
began with specific and disastrous decisions by the Bush administration, which
are mercilessly dissected by Rubin. The first, from which many of the others
stemmed, was also in some ways the most forgivable. This was the decision in
the days immediately following September 11 to give the Taliban the shortest of
deadlines to hand the old al-Qaeda leadership over to the United States. The
haste of the American response was understandable in view of the mood in the US
following September 11. The result, however, was to make the US war effort
disastrously dependent on warlords from the surviving anti-Taliban opposition,
since they had the only armed forces on the ground.
 |
| US led Nato Forces in Afghanistan |
According to Rubin, the hundreds of millions of dollars handed out by US
officials to these figures went, among other things, to finance the restoration
of the heroin trade, which the Taliban (for their own reasons) had temporarily
suppressed. Afghanistan is now the largest producer of opium in the world, and
the Taliban forces are deeply involved in its production. The results of this
have not been much felt in the US, where heroin is a relatively minor
problem—but they are all too apparent in Europe, Russia, and Iran.
These warlords not only were and remain dreadfully flawed figures in themselves but were detested by much of the Pashtun population in particular. This applies in the first instance to most not all of the warlords from non-Pashtun ethnic groups, grouped in the so-called Northern Alliance, who fought first against the Pashtun Mujahideen of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and then against the mainly Pashtun Taliban in the 1990s. But equally detested were the Pashtun Mujahideen warlords such as Gul Agha Sherzai, who dominated the south and east of Afghanistan after the fall of the Communist government in 1992. It was indeed to get rid of both these groups of forces that so many Pashtuns (and some others) had helped the Taliban to power in the first place. Rubin notes that a Western tendency to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by anti-Taliban warlords against the Taliban predates September 11, and began with the UN’s indifference to such cases in the 1990s.
As described by Rubin and several of the writers in Bergen’s collection, the return of the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan can be largely explained by the way in which the United States restored these warlords to local power, and then not merely allowed but in many cases actively helped them to eliminate local rivals. In a great many cases, this involved the persecution or even assassination of Taliban figures who had already expressed their desire to reconcile with the Karzai administration. One such former Taliban commander in Zabul province was Hajji Pay Mohammed, who was killed by the new local authorities after he had already agreed to lay down his arms. His body and those of his men were then publicly displayed for several days rather than being given to their families to be buried an appalling breach of the Pashtun code.
In his chapter in Talibanistan, Anand Gopal writes that many Taliban did not take up arms simply as an exercise of the principle of jihad or expulsion of foreigners, but rather because it was the only viable alternative for individuals and groups left without a place in the new state of affairs.
These warlords not only were and remain dreadfully flawed figures in themselves but were detested by much of the Pashtun population in particular. This applies in the first instance to most not all of the warlords from non-Pashtun ethnic groups, grouped in the so-called Northern Alliance, who fought first against the Pashtun Mujahideen of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and then against the mainly Pashtun Taliban in the 1990s. But equally detested were the Pashtun Mujahideen warlords such as Gul Agha Sherzai, who dominated the south and east of Afghanistan after the fall of the Communist government in 1992. It was indeed to get rid of both these groups of forces that so many Pashtuns (and some others) had helped the Taliban to power in the first place. Rubin notes that a Western tendency to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by anti-Taliban warlords against the Taliban predates September 11, and began with the UN’s indifference to such cases in the 1990s.
As described by Rubin and several of the writers in Bergen’s collection, the return of the Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan can be largely explained by the way in which the United States restored these warlords to local power, and then not merely allowed but in many cases actively helped them to eliminate local rivals. In a great many cases, this involved the persecution or even assassination of Taliban figures who had already expressed their desire to reconcile with the Karzai administration. One such former Taliban commander in Zabul province was Hajji Pay Mohammed, who was killed by the new local authorities after he had already agreed to lay down his arms. His body and those of his men were then publicly displayed for several days rather than being given to their families to be buried an appalling breach of the Pashtun code.
In his chapter in Talibanistan, Anand Gopal writes that many Taliban did not take up arms simply as an exercise of the principle of jihad or expulsion of foreigners, but rather because it was the only viable alternative for individuals and groups left without a place in the new state of affairs.
 |
| Taliban fighters keeps battling Nato forces |
Gopal describes the case of Hajji Burget Khan in the Kandahari district of
Maiwand, some 350 miles southwest of Kabul. He was an elderly and respected
local figure who had no personal links to the Taliban. US forces raided his
house in 2002, killing him and leaving his son a paraplegic an incident that
was crucial in persuading local people to rejoin the Taliban. According to
Gopal, The most likely explanation [for the murder] is that the commanders with
whom US forces had allied had seen Khan as a rival.
I had a taste of this during a visit of my own to Afghanistan in early 2002, soon after the fall of the Taliban. During my trip, I met a lesser warlord known to the population of south Kabul as the wolf man, because he supposedly interrogated prisoners with the help of a pet wolf, to whom he then fed their remains. The truth more likely is that the wolf was a large dog and that the wolf man was employing some of the tactics later used by US interrogators at Abu Ghraib. But whatever the truth, he was not liked by local people, and the fact that the new authorities supported by the US had made him a local police chief did not increase public approval of them or their US backers. Resentment at the United States and its allies has grown so strong that on February 24, the Afghan government announced that it would bar American Special Operations forces from working in the strategically important province of Maidan Wardak, which lies just southwest of Kabul and frequently serves as a base for Taliban fighters attacking the capital. Afghans employed by the US military were said to have tortured and killed civilians there.
During the same trip, I met another warlord in Ghazni province who named for me a list of local former Taliban figures who he said had only pretended to accept the rule of Karzai. Mistaking me for a CIA officer, he offered to bring me their heads packed in salt in return for $100,000. A number of US officials, it seems, did not decline similar offers. Unfortunately, as I found again and again in Washington during those years, any attempt to urge reconciliation with parts of the Taliban was liable to be brushed away with some variant of the phrases We don’t negotiate with evil and We don’t talk to terrorists.
I had a taste of this during a visit of my own to Afghanistan in early 2002, soon after the fall of the Taliban. During my trip, I met a lesser warlord known to the population of south Kabul as the wolf man, because he supposedly interrogated prisoners with the help of a pet wolf, to whom he then fed their remains. The truth more likely is that the wolf was a large dog and that the wolf man was employing some of the tactics later used by US interrogators at Abu Ghraib. But whatever the truth, he was not liked by local people, and the fact that the new authorities supported by the US had made him a local police chief did not increase public approval of them or their US backers. Resentment at the United States and its allies has grown so strong that on February 24, the Afghan government announced that it would bar American Special Operations forces from working in the strategically important province of Maidan Wardak, which lies just southwest of Kabul and frequently serves as a base for Taliban fighters attacking the capital. Afghans employed by the US military were said to have tortured and killed civilians there.
During the same trip, I met another warlord in Ghazni province who named for me a list of local former Taliban figures who he said had only pretended to accept the rule of Karzai. Mistaking me for a CIA officer, he offered to bring me their heads packed in salt in return for $100,000. A number of US officials, it seems, did not decline similar offers. Unfortunately, as I found again and again in Washington during those years, any attempt to urge reconciliation with parts of the Taliban was liable to be brushed away with some variant of the phrases We don’t negotiate with evil and We don’t talk to terrorists.
This reliance on hideously flawed local allies also, however, reflected two
other disastrous features of the Bush administration: Donald Rumsfeld’s belief
that wars could be won, and their gains secured, with very limited US forces
that thereafter would maintain a light footprint in the countries conquered; and the decision made, it would
seem, immediately after the Taliban were overthrown to attack Iraq. This meant
that in the spring of 2002, before the US had even succeeded in driving many
al-Qaeda elements from Afghanistan, US troops were already being withdrawn from
there to retrain for the invasion of Iraq. At almost every stage thereafter, US
ground troops were inadequate to the tasks facing them, and every subsequent
increase in US and allied troops was an inadequate reaction to gains made by
the Taliban.
Even these errors would not have been so bad had they not been combined with a
second project that was utterly incompatible with the light footprint strategy.
This was the plan to develop Afghanistan as an effective, centralized, modern,
liberal, and democratic state. Given the nature of Afghan society and the
almost complete collapse of Afghan state institutions, such a project could
only have had the remotest chance of success if the West had been prepared to
deploy large forces and enormous amounts of money and attention over a period
of generations.
The decision to try to create a modern Afghan democracy revealed in part the fundamental flaw in Rumsfeld’s thinking that should be remembered before the US again launches a war to overthrow a regime: namely that, in Colin Powell’s words, if you break it, you own it. Having overthrown the Taliban rulers by December 2001, some form of government had to be put in their place. The vast extent of the Western project in Afghanistan was also, however, a result of the Bush administration’s adoption of the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East, largely to help justify the Iraq war. As in Afghanistan, the nonmilitary resources that the US was prepared to expend on this agenda were abysmally inadequate to realize its immense ambitions.
Europe bears its own share of the blame for this mismatch. On the one hand, the European Union and America’s NATO allies were pathetically anxious to demonstrate their importance to Washington by nation-building in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Europeans real commitment was even weaker than that of Americans. I remember in 2002 listening to a German official talking about how by 2006 Afghanistan would have had presidential and parliamentary elections, established a stable democracy, and we can leave. When I objected that nothing serious could possibly be achieved in such a time, the response was Yes, but we have to tell the German voters that we are out of there quickly or they will reject the whole mission.
Having inherited this mess, and having so far failed to resolve it either through victory or negotiation, how should the Obama administration proceed as it begins its second term? The first work that US officials should read in this regard is the last chapter in Talibanistan, the Afghan expert Thomas Ruttig’s essay Negotiations with the Taliban a model of lucid analysis. As Ruttig writes, central to the problem is the number of forces and persons involved. A short and by no means exhaustive list of these includes, on the anti-Taliban side: the US government and military (which of course have their own serious differences); the Karzai presidency and clan, and their immediate allies; non-Pashtun warlords and other leaders opposed to the Taliban; and Westernized Afghan officials and NGO figures in Kabul.
Among the armed opposition, the list includes the Taliban under Mullah Omar (which also has potentially serious internal divisions); the Haqqani network; the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the remnants of al-Qaeda in the region; the Pakistani Taliban; and anti-Indian terrorist groups based in Pakistan, some now in rebellion against the Pakistani state, others still allied to it. Then there are the other nations involved: Pakistan, and above all the Pakistani military and military intelligence service, India, Iran, China, and Russia.
The decision to try to create a modern Afghan democracy revealed in part the fundamental flaw in Rumsfeld’s thinking that should be remembered before the US again launches a war to overthrow a regime: namely that, in Colin Powell’s words, if you break it, you own it. Having overthrown the Taliban rulers by December 2001, some form of government had to be put in their place. The vast extent of the Western project in Afghanistan was also, however, a result of the Bush administration’s adoption of the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East, largely to help justify the Iraq war. As in Afghanistan, the nonmilitary resources that the US was prepared to expend on this agenda were abysmally inadequate to realize its immense ambitions.
Europe bears its own share of the blame for this mismatch. On the one hand, the European Union and America’s NATO allies were pathetically anxious to demonstrate their importance to Washington by nation-building in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Europeans real commitment was even weaker than that of Americans. I remember in 2002 listening to a German official talking about how by 2006 Afghanistan would have had presidential and parliamentary elections, established a stable democracy, and we can leave. When I objected that nothing serious could possibly be achieved in such a time, the response was Yes, but we have to tell the German voters that we are out of there quickly or they will reject the whole mission.
Having inherited this mess, and having so far failed to resolve it either through victory or negotiation, how should the Obama administration proceed as it begins its second term? The first work that US officials should read in this regard is the last chapter in Talibanistan, the Afghan expert Thomas Ruttig’s essay Negotiations with the Taliban a model of lucid analysis. As Ruttig writes, central to the problem is the number of forces and persons involved. A short and by no means exhaustive list of these includes, on the anti-Taliban side: the US government and military (which of course have their own serious differences); the Karzai presidency and clan, and their immediate allies; non-Pashtun warlords and other leaders opposed to the Taliban; and Westernized Afghan officials and NGO figures in Kabul.
Among the armed opposition, the list includes the Taliban under Mullah Omar (which also has potentially serious internal divisions); the Haqqani network; the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the remnants of al-Qaeda in the region; the Pakistani Taliban; and anti-Indian terrorist groups based in Pakistan, some now in rebellion against the Pakistani state, others still allied to it. Then there are the other nations involved: Pakistan, and above all the Pakistani military and military intelligence service, India, Iran, China, and Russia.
 |
| US President, Hussein Obama |
Each of these distrusts all the others, including, not least, their own
ostensible allies. By the same token, all fear any peace negotiations in which
they are not included. Thus Karzai wishes to pursue talks with some Taliban
leaders (though, as seems likely, to try to split the Taliban rather than to
make a deal with the organization as a whole). But he detests talks between the
US administration and the Taliban. Most of these actors are themselves
internally divided. All have the capacity to damage peace negotiations, and
most can destroy hopes for peace altogether if they choose.
I strongly support the argument of Thomas Ruttig that the first essential step for a US administration is to commit itself fully to a political solution, and not as has too often been the case up to now try to use talks to split and weaken the Taliban rather than reach agreement with the organization as a whole. Only a genuine commitment along these lines will allow Washington to play the part of an honest broker between all the forces I have outlined above. In Ruttig’s words:
Instead of the current double strategy of shooting and talking at the same time, it [the United States] should concentrate on talking instead of shooting. This means turning the tanker round, not steering it a bit more to the east or west. It would redefine the current understanding of position of strength away from strictly military terms to political and moral terms. In this framework, military means would be used only for self-defense (which includes defending Afghan institutions and their officials). Such a shift in the military approach would also significantly remove a major recruitment factor for the insurgents: civilian casualties.
The commitment then should be first and foremost to Afghan peace. This also serves the vital interests of the United States and its Western allies. For as long as the conflict continues, al-Qaeda will continue to have opportunities to make itself useful to the Taliban and the Haqqani network; and all the different armed actors involved will need to go on taxing the heroin trade in order to support their armed forces.
A peace settlement would also be a considerable boost to America’s image in the Muslim world; and perhaps most important of all, would allow for a reduction of the dangerous level of tension between the United States and Pakistan, which is a major source of radicalization in Pakistan and therefore of terrorist threat to the US and its allies especially those like Britain that contain large Pakistani minorities.
Certain indications from the Taliban side are encouraging. In July 2012, I was part of an academic group that held conversations in the Persian Gulf with leading figures close to the Taliban.2 They told us that there is a widespread recognition within the Taliban that while they can maintain a struggle in the south and east of Afghanistan indefinitely, they will not be able to conquer the whole country in the face of the Afghan and international forces arrayed against them.
The crucial reason for this belief is that in their own estimate the Taliban have the support of only around 30 percent of the Afghan population. This is in accordance with a recent opinion survey by the Asia Foundation,3 and seems plausible, since it would represent around two thirds of the Pashtuns. We were told that the Taliban therefore recognize the need for compromise with other groups in Afghanistan (which I took to mean groups representing other nationalities such as the Tajiks).
However, they categorically ruled out any deal with the Karzai government, and insisted that there would have to be a national debate including the Taliban on a new constitution though, interestingly enough, they also said that the constitution that emerged would probably not be very different from the existing one. They said that there can be no return to a pure government of mullahs as before September 11 and that any Afghan government would have to include technocrats, and allow modern education (albeit with women and men strictly separated). It is possible that this view reflects a growing awareness of Afghanistan’s mineral and energy wealth, and the need for a technocratic elite capable of exploiting it.
Finally, and most strikingly, they said that the Taliban might be prepared to agree to US bases remaining until 2024. This seems to reflect the greatest fear of the Taliban, and many other Afghans, that the country will fragment into different ethnic warlord fiefdoms backed by different regional powers like Russia and India, as occurred in the early and mid-1990s. Even a prolonged US presence, it seems, may possibly be acceptable if it helps prevent the Afghan National Army from disintegrating along these lines.
I strongly support the argument of Thomas Ruttig that the first essential step for a US administration is to commit itself fully to a political solution, and not as has too often been the case up to now try to use talks to split and weaken the Taliban rather than reach agreement with the organization as a whole. Only a genuine commitment along these lines will allow Washington to play the part of an honest broker between all the forces I have outlined above. In Ruttig’s words:
Instead of the current double strategy of shooting and talking at the same time, it [the United States] should concentrate on talking instead of shooting. This means turning the tanker round, not steering it a bit more to the east or west. It would redefine the current understanding of position of strength away from strictly military terms to political and moral terms. In this framework, military means would be used only for self-defense (which includes defending Afghan institutions and their officials). Such a shift in the military approach would also significantly remove a major recruitment factor for the insurgents: civilian casualties.
The commitment then should be first and foremost to Afghan peace. This also serves the vital interests of the United States and its Western allies. For as long as the conflict continues, al-Qaeda will continue to have opportunities to make itself useful to the Taliban and the Haqqani network; and all the different armed actors involved will need to go on taxing the heroin trade in order to support their armed forces.
A peace settlement would also be a considerable boost to America’s image in the Muslim world; and perhaps most important of all, would allow for a reduction of the dangerous level of tension between the United States and Pakistan, which is a major source of radicalization in Pakistan and therefore of terrorist threat to the US and its allies especially those like Britain that contain large Pakistani minorities.
Certain indications from the Taliban side are encouraging. In July 2012, I was part of an academic group that held conversations in the Persian Gulf with leading figures close to the Taliban.2 They told us that there is a widespread recognition within the Taliban that while they can maintain a struggle in the south and east of Afghanistan indefinitely, they will not be able to conquer the whole country in the face of the Afghan and international forces arrayed against them.
The crucial reason for this belief is that in their own estimate the Taliban have the support of only around 30 percent of the Afghan population. This is in accordance with a recent opinion survey by the Asia Foundation,3 and seems plausible, since it would represent around two thirds of the Pashtuns. We were told that the Taliban therefore recognize the need for compromise with other groups in Afghanistan (which I took to mean groups representing other nationalities such as the Tajiks).
However, they categorically ruled out any deal with the Karzai government, and insisted that there would have to be a national debate including the Taliban on a new constitution though, interestingly enough, they also said that the constitution that emerged would probably not be very different from the existing one. They said that there can be no return to a pure government of mullahs as before September 11 and that any Afghan government would have to include technocrats, and allow modern education (albeit with women and men strictly separated). It is possible that this view reflects a growing awareness of Afghanistan’s mineral and energy wealth, and the need for a technocratic elite capable of exploiting it.
Finally, and most strikingly, they said that the Taliban might be prepared to agree to US bases remaining until 2024. This seems to reflect the greatest fear of the Taliban, and many other Afghans, that the country will fragment into different ethnic warlord fiefdoms backed by different regional powers like Russia and India, as occurred in the early and mid-1990s. Even a prolonged US presence, it seems, may possibly be acceptable if it helps prevent the Afghan National Army from disintegrating along these lines.
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| Taliban Fighters |
All of the figures with whom we spoke said that breaking with al-Qaeda would
not be a problem for the Talibans long as this was part of a settlement, and not
a precondition for talks. They reminded us that the Taliban leaders have
repeatedly distanced themselves from international terrorism, and said that
ordinary Taliban fighters also see al-Qaeda as non-Afghans who brought disaster
on Afghanistan.
The people we talked to became highly evasive, however, when asked whether the Haqqani network would be willing to accept the views they had put forward. Brown and Rassler’s book also gives no definitive answer to this question. However, reading the evidence they present, and drawing upon the historical record of the tribes from whom the Haqqani forces are drawn, my own provisional conclusion would be the following: the Haqqanis will support any settlement that is acceptable to Mullah Omar and to the Pakistani military, and that leaves the Haqqanis in de facto control of their own region on the Pakistan frontier; as part of this they would be prepared to exclude any significant presence of al-Qaeda from that region. But on the other hand, nothing on earth will prevent this region from remaining a haven for smaller groups of assorted outlaws, since this has been the case for many hundreds of years.
The first thing that the Obama administration needs to decide, therefore, is whether it really wants Afghan presidential elections under the existing constitution to go ahead next year, in view of the immense twofold risk involved. First, such an election will make a peace agreement with the Taliban impossible in the short to medium term. Second, repetition of the widespread rigging of the vote of 2009 will render the result illegitimate as far as most Afghans are concerned, plunging the country into a deep political crisis just as US ground troops withdraw.
The alternative would be for the US to acknowledge the deep flaws in the existing constitution (which in truth was imposed on Afghanistan from outside), and to declare that it supports the idea of a new constitutional assembly. This would also help open the way to genuine peace talks with the Taliban. If the Obama administration cannot summon the nerve to take such a step, it will have to decide who it thinks would be the best candidate to be the next Afghan president.
The one thing the Obama administration cannot honorably and realistically do is to walk away from all this with the declaration that it is a matter for the Afghans themselves. This might sound modest and democratic, but it would in fact be an abdication of responsibility for an Afghan mess that is to a considerable extent of America’s own making; and responsibility to the American soldiers the troop trainers and advisers and others and officials who will be left in the middle of this mess after US ground troops withdraw next year.
The people we talked to became highly evasive, however, when asked whether the Haqqani network would be willing to accept the views they had put forward. Brown and Rassler’s book also gives no definitive answer to this question. However, reading the evidence they present, and drawing upon the historical record of the tribes from whom the Haqqani forces are drawn, my own provisional conclusion would be the following: the Haqqanis will support any settlement that is acceptable to Mullah Omar and to the Pakistani military, and that leaves the Haqqanis in de facto control of their own region on the Pakistan frontier; as part of this they would be prepared to exclude any significant presence of al-Qaeda from that region. But on the other hand, nothing on earth will prevent this region from remaining a haven for smaller groups of assorted outlaws, since this has been the case for many hundreds of years.
The first thing that the Obama administration needs to decide, therefore, is whether it really wants Afghan presidential elections under the existing constitution to go ahead next year, in view of the immense twofold risk involved. First, such an election will make a peace agreement with the Taliban impossible in the short to medium term. Second, repetition of the widespread rigging of the vote of 2009 will render the result illegitimate as far as most Afghans are concerned, plunging the country into a deep political crisis just as US ground troops withdraw.
The alternative would be for the US to acknowledge the deep flaws in the existing constitution (which in truth was imposed on Afghanistan from outside), and to declare that it supports the idea of a new constitutional assembly. This would also help open the way to genuine peace talks with the Taliban. If the Obama administration cannot summon the nerve to take such a step, it will have to decide who it thinks would be the best candidate to be the next Afghan president.
The one thing the Obama administration cannot honorably and realistically do is to walk away from all this with the declaration that it is a matter for the Afghans themselves. This might sound modest and democratic, but it would in fact be an abdication of responsibility for an Afghan mess that is to a considerable extent of America’s own making; and responsibility to the American soldiers the troop trainers and advisers and others and officials who will be left in the middle of this mess after US ground troops withdraw next year.
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