COCAINE: 50 Tons Pass Through West Africa Yearly

Kwesi Ahwoi, Minister of The Interior

Approximately 50 tons of cocaine estimated at $2 billion goes through West Africa yearly since 2008.

A report filed by Afia Asare Kyei, say that nearly 50 per cent of all non-US bound cocaine or about 13 percent of all global flows, is now believed to be snuggled through West Africa.

West Africa has also beocme a major centre for the production and consumption of cocaine especially amongst the youth.

 The full report is published unedited;

Finding a Fix: The Rise of Drug Trafficking and Usage in West Africa By Afia Asare Kyei,

The rise of powerful and wealthy organised crime syndicates now illicitly trafficking narcotics across West Africa has thrown yet another poison into the toxic brewof threats plaguing the region. The rise in drug trafficking, including an increase in local drug production and consumption, is fast becoming a major challenge in the pursuit of peace, stability and security.

It is a challenge that requires a coordinated and multi-pronged solution, as well as the active involvement of civil society actors across the region.

Reaching a new high

Nacotics Routes In West Africa

In late January, Ghana Vice-President Kwesi Amissah-Arthur inaugurated the West Africa Commission on Drugs. Convened by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, and chaired by the former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, the commission plans to examine ways and means of combating drug trafficking and its effects. The establishment of the commission is certainly welcomed, and its inauguration timely.

Trans-shipment of illicit narcotics from Latin America through to West Africa and onwards to Europe has increased significantly in recent years. Since 2008, the volume of cocaine transiting through West Africa was roughly 50 tons a year and its annual worth estimated at $2 billion. Nearly 50% of all non-US-bound cocaine, or about 13% of all global flows, is now believed to be smuggled through West Africa. Just six hours away from Europe, and about 1,600 miles across the Atlantic from Latin America, West Africa geographical proximity to European markets make it strategically well-located for drug-smuggling purposes.

West Africa is not only a trans-shipment zone; local production and consumption is also on the rise especially among its burgeoning youth population. Over 70% of the sub-region estimated 300 million people are under the age of 35. The vast majority have limited education and are unemployed or working in the informal sector. Lack of employment opportunities or reliable income put youth in precarious positions where they may be vulnerable to involvement in the drug trade and drug use itself. In desperate circumstances, drugs offer a means of escaping the harsh realities of everyday life.

Apart from the damaging effects of drug use on West Africa peoples, related offences such as corruption and money-laundering have also had a severe impact on the socio-economic development and governance of the region.

 

Map of Mali

Drug-related corruption and money-laundering exacerbate the chronic poverty in many West African states by disrupting effective economic governance. In a number of countries, the profits from trafficked drugs exceed the gross national income. Rampant drug trafficking empowers criminal elements operating outside the law, undermines governance, weakens state institutions, and perverts the criminal justice system by bribing prosecutors, police officers, and judges. Drug traffickers do not simply undermine governments; they also use illicit money to buy, and in some cases seize, political and economic power and then wield such power in the most outrageous and scandalous manner.

Finding a fix

A lot of time and resources have been invested in trying to combat this scourge. At the regional level, the African Union (AU) has just developed its fourth revised plan of action. This new 2013-2017 policy on drug control seeks to strengthen continental and international cooperation and further integrate drug control issues into national legal and institutional frameworks.

At a sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued a declaration in 1998 entitled Community Flame Ceremony: the fight against drugs. That same year, the bloc set up a regional fund for financing drug control activities in West Africa. Ten years later, in 2008, ECOWAS adopted the Praia Plan of Action and the Abuja Declaration to address the security threats posed by drug trafficking in the sub-region. Unfortunately, all of these initiatives have so far had very limited success.

At the national level, almost all ECOWAS states have adopted National Integrated Programmes (NIPs). Many states have amended their drug trafficking and consumption legislations, empowered their judicial authorities, established new drug enforcement agencies and imposed stiffer penalties for offenders.

But these have fared no better than the regional efforts, and the obvious question remains: why have these plans and policies continued to fall short?
A shot in the arm for CSOs needed

Many factors may help explain continued shortcomings. Poor implementation, lack of funding, and singularly focusing on toughening punitive measures are all reasons to consider. Most policies have narrowly focused on one dimension instead of employing a multi-pronged approach. Apart from the absence of political will and a clear vision from West Africa’s leaders, there has been a failure, or inability, to mobilise a critical mass of the population to actively participate in the full length of the process – from inception to implementation, through to monitoring and review.

Akrasi Sarpong, Boss of Narcotics Control Board

At the regional and national levels, the dual failures to build alliances with civil society, non-governmental and community-based organisations, or to educate the populace, have been major missing elements in the fight against narcotics trafficking and use. Most governments continue to treat the drug problem as the exclusive domain of the state. Mere lip service is paid to engaging civil society.

But civil society organisations, including NGOs and community-based organisations, have an important role in raising awareness and educating citizens. So far, only token efforts have been made to provide information about the health, socioeconomic, and security problems associated with drug trafficking and consumption. In many countries, citizens unaware of the harmful impact of drugs continue to idolise drug-lords and dream of amassing their vast wealth, cruising around in flashy Hummers as so many drug barons do.

Most civil society groups currently lack the necessary expertise to make a meaningful contribution to the fight. There is an ardent need to strengthen the capacity of civil society to monitor and report on drug trafficking and other related crimes and to help implement the various regional and national action plans. Civil society groups can engage the public  including influential religious and traditional leaders  and help facilitate public debate. Both steps can make a huge difference in educating people about the impact of drugs.

In most instances, policies have been driven by external considerations. Civil society can help reverse this trend and ensure that local perspectives are heard and that initiatives are locally owned.

The new West Africa Commission on Drugs has set as one of its key objectives to mobilise public opinion and catalyse political support for further action at national, regional and international levels before drug-fuelled problems become totally unmanageable. In other parts of the world, civil society-led efforts have helped overturn social norms. It can be done in West Africa too.

EDITORIAL

ONE STEP FORWARD

Last Monday, Vice President Paa Kwesi Amissah –Arthur opened the Freedom Bookshop and Art Gallary in Accra to mark the 47^th Anniversary of the overthrow of Osayefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah.

 

Vice President Paa Kwesi Amissah Arthur

The bookshop sponsored by the Socialist Forum of Ghana (SFG) makes books by Nkrumah and about Nkrumah  available to the public.

 It also offers books on progressive thought around the world to the people of Ghana.

Vice President Amissah- Arthur Commanded the SFG for initiating the project and said  it would go a very long way in promoting the ideas of Nkrumah.

 The Insight fully agrees with Vice President Amissah-Arthur. At the very least, this is one more step forward.

 It is proof of the fact that thsoe who sought to obliterate Nkrumah’s ideas been roundly defeated.

We salute the SFG for this initiative and call on all progressive forces to embrace this project as their own and make it work.

A progressive bookshop  is a healthy sign on the path of revolution. 

 

Oxford pupils to vote on Israel boycott

Students at Oxford University will vote on a motion to boycott the apartheid regime of Israel this week, despite the proposer and seconder of the motion having received threatening emails.

The Oxford University Students' Union (OUSU) will meet on Wednesday to vote on a possible boycott of the Zionist entity, its companies and institutions, in protest against the regime’s illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories and its continuing human rights violations.

The motion, which would be formally presented at the National Union of Students conference in Sheffield in April, urges the student body to join the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel over its unfair treatment of defenseless Palestinians.

According to the reports, both the proposer and the seconder of the motion have received threatening emails, leading the seconder to withdraw his support. The proposer also demanded that she remains unnamed.

Last Wednesday, British Respect MP George Galloway walked out of an Oxford University meeting demanding the Israeli regime’s immediate withdrawal from the occupied West Bank, after he discovered he was debating with an Israeli.

“I refused this evening to debate with an Israeli, a supporter of the Apartheid state of Israel,” Galloway said in a statement after the debate.

“The reason is simple: no recognition, no normalization. Just boycott, divestment and sanctions, until the Apartheid state is defeated. I never debate with Israelis nor speak to their media. If they want to speak about Palestine, the address is the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization],” he added.

The West’s war against African development continues

By Dan Glazebrook

British PM, David Cameron

Tax havens, rising debt-extortion, loans to African military dictators, capital flight, unfair trade prices, militarization of Africa through AFRICOM are the many ways in which the West’s war against African development continues. The recent crisis in Mali and Algeria are being used by the West to further its domination over Africa.

Africa’s classic depiction in the mainstream media, as a giant basket case full of endless war, famine and helpless children creates an illusion of a continent utterly dependent on Western handouts. In fact, the precise opposite is true – it is the West that is reliant on African handouts. These handouts come in many and varied forms. They include illicit flows of resources, the profits of which invariably find their way into the West’s banking sector via strings of tax havens (as thoroughly documented in Nicholas Shaxson’s Poisoned Wells). Another is the mechanism of debt-extortion whereby banks lend money to military rulers (often helped to power by Western governments, such as the Congo’s former President Mobutu), who then keep the money for themselves (often in a private account with the lending bank), leaving the country paying exorbitant interest on an exponentially growing debt. Recent research by Leonce Ndikumana and James K Boyce found that up to 80 cents in every borrowed dollar fled the borrower nation in ‘capital flight’ within a year, never having been invested in the country at all; whilst meanwhile $20billion per year is drained from Africa in ‘debt servicing’ on these, essentially fraudulent, ‘loans.’ Another form of handout would be through the looting of minerals. Countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo are ravaged by armed militias who steal the country’s resources and sell them at sub-market prices to Western companies, with most of these militias run by neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi who are in turn sponsored by the West, as regularly highlighted in UN reports. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, are the pitifully low prices paid both for African raw materials and for the labour that mines, grows or picks them, which effectively amount to an African subsidy for Western living standards and corporate profits.

IMPOVERISHING AFRICA THROUGH DIVISION AND WEAKNESS

A US Drone

 This is the role for which Africa has been ascribed by the masters of the Western capitalist economy: a supplier of cheap resources and cheap labour. And keeping this labour, and these resources, cheap depends primarily on one thing: ensuring that Africa remains underdeveloped and impoverished. If it were to become more prosperous, wages would rise; if it were to become more technologically developed, it would be able to add value to its raw materials through the manufacturing process before exporting them, forcing up the prices paid. Meanwhile, extracting stolen oil and minerals depends on keeping African states weak and divided. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example – whose mines produce tens of billions of mineral resources each year – were only, in one recent financial year, able to collect a paltry $32million in tax revenues from mining due to the proxy war waged against that country by Western-backed militias.

The African Union, established in 2002 was a threat to all of this: a more integrated, more unified African continent would be harder to exploit. Of special concern to Western strategic planners are the financial and military aspects of African unification. On a financial level, plans for an African Central Bank (to issue a single African currency, the gold-backed dinar) would greatly threaten the ability of the US, Britain and France to exploit the continent. Were all African trade to be conducted using the gold-backed dinar, this would mean Western countries would effectively have to pay in gold for African resources, rather than, as currently, paying in sterling, francs or dollars which can be printed virtually out of thin air. The other two proposed AU financial institutions – the African Investment Bank and the African Monetary Fund – could fatally undermine the ability of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund to manipulate the economic policies of African countries through their monopoly of finance. As Jean Paul Pougala has pointed out, the African Monetary Fund, with its planned startup capital of $42billion, ‘is expected to totally supplant the African activities of the International Monetary Fund which, with only US$25 billion, was able to bring an entire continent to its knees and make it swallow questionable privatization like forcing African countries to move from public to private monopolies.’

AFRICOM AS A NEO-COLONIAL TOOL OF WESTERN DOMINATION

Africom Commander, Carter Ham

Along with these potentially threatening financial developments come moves on the military front. The 2004 AU Summit in Sirte, Libya, agreed on a Common African Defence and Security Charter, including an article stipulating that ‘any attack against an African country is considered as an attack against the Continent as a whole,’ mirroring the Charter of NATO itself. This was followed up in 2010 by the creation of an African Standby Force, with a mandate to uphold and implement the Charter. Clearly, if NATO was going to make any attempt to reverse African unity by force, time was running out.

Yet the creation of the African Standby Force represented not only a threat, but also an opportunity. Whilst there was certainly the possibility of the ASF becoming a genuine force for independence, resisting neocolonialism and defending Africa against imperialist aggression, there was also the possibility that, handled in the right way, and under a different leadership, the force could become the opposite – a proxy force for continued neocolonial subjugation under a Western chain of command. The stakes were – and are – clearly very high.

Meanwhile, the West had already been building up its own military preparations for Africa. Its economic decline, coupled with the rise of China, meant that it was increasingly unable to continue to rely on economic blackmail and financial manipulation alone in order to keep the continent subordinated and weak. Comprehending clearly that this meant it would be increasingly forced into military action to maintain its domination, a US white paper published in 2002 by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group recommended ‘A new and vigorous focus on US military cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, to include design of a sub-unified command structure which could produce significant dividends in the protection of US investments.’ This structure came into existence in 2008, under the name of AFRICOM. The costs – economic, military and political - of direct intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, however – with the costs of the Iraq war alone estimated at over three trillion dollars - meant that AFRICOM was supposed to primarily rely on local troops to do the fighting and dying. AFRICOM was to be the body which coordinated the subordination of African armies under a Western chain of command; which turned, in other words, African armies into Western proxies.

DIVISION WITHIN THE AU OVER LIBYA

Muammar Al Qaddafi

The biggest obstacle to this plan was the African Union itself, which categorically rejected any US military presence on African soil in 2008 – forcing AFRICOM to house its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, a humiliating about turn after President Bush had already publicly announced his intention to set up the HQ in Africa itself. Worse was to come in 2009, when Colonel Gaddafi – the continent’s staunchest advocate of anti-imperialist policies - was elected Chairman of the AU. Under his leadership, Libya had already become the biggest financial donor to the African Union, and he was now proposing a fast-track process of African integration, including a single African army, currency and passport.

His fate is clearly now a matter of public record. After mounting an invasion of his country based on a pack of lies worse than those told about Iraq, NATO reduced Libya to a devastated failed state and facilitated its leader’s torture and execution, thus taking out their number one opponent. For a time, it appeared as though the African Union had been tamed. Three of its members – Nigeria, Gabon and South Africa – had voted in favour of military intervention at the UN Security Council, and its new chairman – Jean Ping – was quick to recognize the new Libyan government imposed by NATO, and to downplay and denigrate his predecessor’s achievements. Indeed, he even forbade the African Union assembly from observing a minute’s silence for Gaddafi after his murder.

NATO ARROGANTLY IGNORES THE AU

However, this did not last. The South Africans, in particular, quickly came to regret their support for the intervention, with both President Zuma and Thabo Mbeki making searing criticisms of NATO in the months that followed. Zuma argued – correctly – that NATO had acted illegally by blocking the ceasefire and negotiations that had been called for by the UN resolution, had been brokered by the AU, and had been agreed to by Gaddafi. Mbeki went much further and argued that the UN Security Council, by ignoring the AU’s proposals, were treating ‘the peoples of Africa with absolute contempt’ and that ‘the Western powers have enhanced their appetite to intervene on our Continent, including through armed force, to ensure the protection of their interests, regardless of our views as Africans.’ A senior diplomat in the South African Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Relations said that ‘most SADC [Southern African Development Community] states , particularly South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, Namibia and Zambia which played a key role in the Southern African liberation struggle, were not happy with the way Jean Ping handled the Libyan bombing by NATO jets.’ In July 2012, Ping was forced out and replaced – with the support of 37 African states - by Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: former South African Foreign Minister, Thabo Mbeki’s ‘right hand woman’ – and clearly not a member of Ping’s capitulationist camp. The African Union was once again under the control of forces committed to genuine independence.

NATO

 LIBYA’S KEY ROLE IN THE SAHEL-SAHARA REGION

However, Gaddafi’s execution had not only taken out a powerful member of the African Union, but also the lynchpin of regional security in the Sahel – Sahara region. Using a careful mixture of force, ideological challenge and negotiation, Gaddafi’s Libya was at the head of a transnational security system that had prevented Salafist militias gaining a foothold, as recognized by US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2008: ‘The Government of Libya has aggressively pursued operations to disrupt foreign fighter flows, including more stringent monitoring of air/land ports of entry, and blunt the ideological appeal of radical Islam…Libya cooperates with neighbouring states in the Sahara and Sahel region to stem foreign fighter flows and travel of transnational terrorists. Muammar Gaddafi recently brokered a widely-publicized agreement with Tuareg tribal leaders from Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria in which they would abandon separatist aspirations and smuggling (of weapons and transnational extremists) in exchange for development assistance and financial support…our assessment is that the flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of veterans to Libya has diminished due to the Government of Libya’s cooperation with other states…’

This ‘cooperation with other states’ refers to the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), an organization launched by Gaddafi in 1998 aiming at free trade, free movement of peoples and regional development between its 23 member states, but with a primary focus on peace and security. As well as countering the influence of Salafist militias, the CEN-SAD had played a key role in mediating conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and within the Mano River region, as well as negotiating a lasting solution to the rebellion in Chad. CEN-SAD was based in Tripoli and Libya was unquestionably the dominant force in the group; indeed CEN-SAD support was primarily behind Gaddafi’s election as Chairman of the AU in 2009.

The very effectiveness of this security system, was a double blow for Western hegemony in Africa: not only did it bring Africa closer to peace and prosperity, but simultaneously undercut a key pretext for Western intervention. The US had established its own ‘Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership’ (TSCTP), but as Muatassim Gaddafi (Libyan National Security Advisor) explained to Hilary Clinton in Washington in 2009, the ‘Tripoli-based Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the North Africa Standby Force obviated TSCTP’s mission.’
 

Map of Africa

As long as Gaddafi was in power and heading up a powerful and effective regional security system, Salafist militias in North Africa could not be used as a ‘threatening menace’ justifying Western invasion and occupation to save the helpless natives. By actually achieving what the West claim to want (but everywhere fail to achieve) - the neutralization of ‘Islamist terrorism’ – Libya had stripped the imperialists of a key pretext for their war against Africa. At the same time, they had prevented the militias from fulfilling their other historical function for the West - as a proxy force to destabilize independent secular states (fully documented in Mark Curtis’ excellent Secret Affairs). The West had supported Salafi death squads in campaigns to destabilize the USSR and Yugoslavia highly successfully, and would do so again against Libya and Syria.

SECURITY FALLS APART

With NATO’s redrawing of Libya as a failed state, this security system has fallen apart. Not only have the Salafi militias been provided with the latest hi-tech military equipment by NATO, they have been given free reign to loot the Libyan government’s armouries, and provided with a safe haven from which to organize attacks across the region. Border security has collapsed, with the apparent connivance of the new Libyan government and its NATO sponsors, as                                                                                                                     this=40367tx_ttnews[backPid]=381cHash=5a7b4cffa91bea02b8d8f33718a6656d]damning report from global intelligence firm Jamestown Foundation notes: ‘Al-Wigh was an important strategic base for the Qaddafi regime, being located close to the borders with Niger, Chad and Algeria. Since the rebellion, the base has come under the control of Tubu tribal fighters under the nominal command of the Libyan Army and the direct command of Tubu commander Sharafeddine Barka Azaiy, who complains: ‘During the revolution, controlling this base was of key strategic importance. We liberated it. Now we feel neglected. We do not have sufficient equipment, cars and weapons to protect the border. Even though we are part of national army, we receive no salary.’ The report concludes that ‘The Libyan GNC [Governing National Council] and its predecessor, the Transitional National Council (TNC), have failed to secure important military facilities in the south and have allowed border security in large parts of the south to effectively become ‘privatized’ in the hands of tribal groups who are also well-known for their traditional smuggling pursuits. In turn, this has jeopardized the security of Libya’s oil infrastructure and the security of its neighbors. As the sale and transport of Libyan arms becomes a mini-industry in the post-Qaddafi era…the vast amounts of cash available to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are capable of opening many doors in an impoverished and underdeveloped region. If the French-led offensive in northern Mali succeeds in displacing the Islamist militants, there seems to be little at the moment to prevent such groups from establishing new bases in the poorly-controlled desert wilderness of southern Libya. So long as there is an absence of central control of security structures in Libya, that nation’s interior will continue to present a security threat to the rest of the nations in the region.’

MALI’S DESTABILIZATION IS LINKED TO INVASION OF LIBYA

The most obvious victim of this destabilization has been Mali. That the Salafist takeover of Mali is a direct consequence of NATO’s actions in Libya is not in doubt by any serious analysts. One result of the spread of NATO-backed destabilization to Mali is that Algeria – who lost 200,000 citizens in a deadly civil war with Islamists in the 1990s - is now surrounded by heavily armed Salafist militias on both its Eastern (Libya) and Southern (Mali) borders. Following the destruction of Libya and the toppling of Mubarak, Algeria is now the only state in North Africa still governed by the anti-colonial party that won its independence from European tyranny. This independent spirit is still very much in evidence in Algeria’s attitude towards Africa and Europe. On the African front, Algeria is a strong supporter of the African Union, contributing 15 percent of its budget, and has $16billion committed to the establishment of the African Monetary Fund, making it the Fund’s largest contributor by far. In its relations with Europe, however, it has consistently refused to play the subordinate role expected of it. Algeria and Syria were the only countries in the Arab League to vote against NATO bombings of Libya and Syria, and Algeria famously gave refuge to members of Gaddafi’s family fleeing NATO’s onslaught. But for European strategic planners, perhaps more worrying than all of this is that Algeria – along with Iran and Venezuela – is what they call an OPEC ‘hawk’, committed to driving a hard bargain for their natural resources. As an exasperated article in the Financial Times recently explained, ‘resource nationalism’ has taken hold, with the result that ‘Big Oil has soured on Algeria [and] companies complain of crushing bureaucracy, tough fiscal terms and the bullying behavior of Sonatrach, the state-run energy group, which has a stake in most oil and gas ventures.’ It goes on to note that Algeria implemented a ‘controversial windfall tax” in 2006, and quotes a western oil executive in Algiers as saying that ‘[oil] companies…have had it with Algeria.’ It is instructive to note that the same newspaper had also accused Libya of ‘resource nationalism” – that most heinous of crimes for readers of the Financial Times, it seems - barely a year before NATO’s invasion. Of course, ‘resource nationalism’ means exactly that – a nation’s resources being used primarily for the benefit and development of the nation itself (rather than foreign companies) – and in that sense Algeria is indeed guilty as charged. Algeria’s oil exports stand at over $70bn per year, and much of this income has been used to invest in massive spending on health and housing, along with a recent $23billion loan and public grants programme to encourage small business. Indeed, high levels of social spending are considered by many to be a key reason why no ‘Arab Spring’ style uprising has taken off in Algeria in recent years.

ALEGERIA’S IMPORTANCE TO EU MEMBERS

This tendency to ‘resource nationalism’ was also noted in a recent piece by STRATFOR, the global intelligence firm, who wrote that ‘foreign participation in Algeria has suffered in large part due to protectionist policies enforced by the highly nationalistic military government.’ This was particularly worrying, they argued, as Europe is about to become a whole lot more dependent on Algerian gas as North Sea reserves run out: ‘Developing Algeria as a major natural gas exporter is an economic and strategic imperative for EU countries as North Sea production of the commodity enters terminal decline in the next decade. Algeria is already an important energy supplier to the Continent, but Europe will need expanded access to natural gas to offset the decline of its indigenous reserves.’ British and Dutch North Sea gas reserves are estimated to run out by the end of the decade, and Norway’s to go into sharp decline from 2015 onwards. With Europe fearful of overdependence on gas from Russia and Asia, Algeria – with reserves of natural gas estimated at 4.5 trillion cubic metres, alongside shale gas reserves of 17 trillion cubic meters - will become essential, the piece argues. But the biggest obstacle to European control of these resources remains the Algerian government – with its ‘protectionist policies’ and ‘resource nationalism.’ Without saying it outright, the piece concludes by suggesting that a destabilized ‘failed state’ Algeria would be far preferable to Algeria under a stable independent ‘protectionist’ government, noting that ‘the existing involvement of EU energy majors in high-risk countries like Nigeria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq indicates a healthy tolerance for instability and security problems.’ In other words, in an age of private security, Big Oil no longer requires stability or state protection for its investments; disaster zones can be tolerated; strong, independent states cannot.

A NEW ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IN AFRICA?

It is, therefore, perceived to be in the strategic interests of Western energy security to see Algeria turned into a failed state, just as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have been. With this in mind, it is clear to see how the apparently contradictory policy of arming the Salafist militias one minute (in Libya) and bombing them the next (in Mali) does in fact make sense. The French bombing mission aims, in its own words, at the ‘total reconquest’ of Mali, which in practice means driving the rebels gradually Northwards through the country – in other words, straight into Algeria.

Thus the wilful destruction of the Libyan-centred Sahel-Sahara security system has had many benefits for those who wish to see Africa remain consigned to its role of underdeveloped provider of cheap raw materials. It has armed, trained, and provided territory to militias bent on the destruction of Algeria, the only major resource-rich North African state committed to genuine African unity and independence. In doing so, it has also persuaded some Africans that – in contrast to their united rejection of AFRICOM not long ago – they do, after all, now need to call on the West for ‘protection’ from these militias. Like a classic mafia protection racket, the West makes its protection ‘necessary’ by unleashing the very forces from which people require protection. Now France is occupying Mali, the US are establishing a new drone base in Niger and David Cameron is talking about his commitment to a new ‘war on terror’ spanning six countries, and likely to last decades.

It is not, however, all good on the imperialist front. Far from it; indeed the West had almost certainly hoped to avoid sending in their own soldiers at all. The initial aim was that Algeria would be sucked in, lured into exactly the same trap that was successfully used against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, an earlier example of Britain and the US sponsoring a violent sectarian insurgency on their enemy’s borders, attempting to drag their target into a destructive war in response. The USSR’s war in Afghanistan ultimately not only failed but destroyed the country’s economy and morale in the process, and was a key factor behind the gratuitous self-destruction of the Soviet state in 1991. Algeria, however, refused to fall into this trap, and Clinton and Hollande’s good cop-bad cop routine – the former’s ‘pressure for action’ in Algiers last October followed by French attempts at sucking up 2 months later – came to nothing. Meanwhile, rather than sticking to the script, the West’s unpredictable Salafi proxies expanded from their base in Northern Mali not North to Algeria as intended, but South to Bamako, threatening to unseat a Western-allied regime that had only just been installed in a coup less than a year earlier. The French were forced to intervene to drive them North and back towards the state that had been their real target all along. For now, this invasion appears to have a certain level of support amongst those Africans who fear the West’s Salafi proxies more than the West’s own soldiers. Once the occupation starts to drag on, boosting the credibility and numbers of the guerrillas, whilst exposing the brutality of the occupiers and their allies, we will see how long that lasts. 

Did the Pope quit to dodge blame for misdeeds?

 

Pope Benecict

 The latest allegation that a gay priest blackmail scandal was the reason for Benedict XVI’s sudden resignation shows that his sudden decision will be queried long after his departure, perhaps robbing him of his greatest achievement while in office.

Italian newspaper La Repubblica has reported that the Pope was overwhelmed when presented with evidence in mid-December last year (collected in "two volumes of almost 300 pages – bound in red”) of a network of highly-placed Vatican priests who did not only engage in illicit homosexual “worldly relations” with outsiders, but let themselves be blackmailed by their gay lovers.

Among the listed locations for alleged trysts were a sauna, a beauty parlor, and even a residence used by an archbishop.

The newspaper claims it was then that Pope decided that he could not carry on, declaring that he was “no longer suited” to the demands of the job during his resignation speech earlier this month.

With cack-handedness that marked public relations throughout Benedict’s term, the Vatican immediately issued a denial that almost invited more speculation.

"Neither the cardinals' commission nor I will make comments to confirm or deny the things that are said about this matter. Let each one assume his or her own responsibilities. We shall not be following up on the observations that are made about this," said Father Federico Lombardi, the Vatican spokesman.

The media quickly latched onto to the simultaneous announcement on Friday of a transfer of Ettore Balestrero, a senior clergyman, to a new prestigious post in Colombia, saying it was intended to get him out of the Vatican after unnamed transgressions.

This forced Lombardi into making a second statement on the same day. The spokesman shot the insinuations down as "absurd, totally without foundation", saying the decision had been made weeks ago.

Both the report and the figure of Balestrero did not come out of the blue, but to the press they are a continuation of the scandals that rocked the Papacy last year.

Paolo Gabriele

Throughout 2012, the Pope’s butler, Paolo Gabriele, aided by a selection of powerful officials leaked documents to an Italian journalist, Gianluigi Nuzzi that confirmed the worst outsider prejudices about the Holy See. The Vatileaks exposed the Papacy’s spiritual home as a highly-factionalized breeding ground for gossip, plotting and dirty tricks (including an instance when one newspaper editor was removed from his post by a rival with the help of anonymous letters falsely alleging his homosexuality). Even those who leaked the revelations themselves were suspected to be jockeying for position within the Holy See.Pinto
"The Pope was never the same after that. It was like shooting Achilles in the heel," one insider told Reuters after the resignation was announced.

The quick trial of Gabriele by Vatican cardinals was seen as a whitewash (concerned only with the specifics of how he obtained the documents, not why) but Benedict did order a deeper investigation by three trusted cardinals.

It was apparently their report, which showed the situation as even worse than assumed, that tipped the Benedict’s hand.

The other insurmountable embarrassment of 2012 was the interconnected but separate failure of the Vatican Bank to get on the “white list” of Moneyval, the EU’s banking compliance commission that had criticized the lack of transparency at the institution (something Vatileaks amply confirmed).

The man who led the Vatican’s efforts? Ettore Balestrero.

For the critics the assorted facts compose paint a picture of a Pontiff forced to abandon his post, unable to stem the tide of revelations, and possibly facing censure for personal mistakes, if not in deeds, then in appointing corrupt men to high places.

Even one of the investigating cardinals, Julian Herranz, conceded that this might have been one of the “hypotheses”.

"He could content himself with doing very little except praying ... but because the people he had in place were not adequate, instead of removing them, he removed himself," said yet another insider to Reuters.

But the does the notion of a Pope on the verge of disgrace (not only due to Vatileaks, but possibly also as a result of the sexual abuse allegations rocking the church) really stand up?
In his statement the 85-year-old Benedict XVI said his ebbing “strength of mind and body” was the reason for his resignation.

"The pope's decision was made many months ago, after the trip to Mexico and Cuba [almost a year ago] and kept in an inviolable privacy that nobody could penetrate," wrote the official Vatican newspaper l'Osservatore Romano.

It was on that trip to Mexico that the Pope fell and hurt his head while in an unfamiliar hotel room. He has also had a pacemaker installed in recent months.

The Catholic Church

But it is perhaps a description of the pontiff from his own biographer Peter Seewald, who saw him last at the end of 2012, which most vividly conveys his true state.

"His hearing had worsened. He couldn't see with his left eye. His body had become so thin that the tailors had difficulty keeping up with newly fitted clothes ... I'd never seen him so exhausted-looking, so worn down," Seewald recently wrote in the German magazine Focus.
This does not nullify the degree of decay at the Holy See, but perhaps draws a more nuanced portrait of Benedict’s final year.

There is little doubt that Benedict XVI served a calamitous eight years as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church. His time in charge has lurched from public relations disasters, to damaging revelations, to endless lawsuits from all corners of the world.

The Vatican’s instinctive response to crisis situations has been to close ranks, hide information and try to deal with transgressions internally, something that simply amplifies the scale of any misdeed once the truth inevitably emerges in this telecommunications age.
Whatever his reported knowledge on theological matters, Pope Benedict was rarely a successful communicator, often on the defensive after making pronouncements on the most routine issues, and regarded as out-of-touch and uncharismatic.

But for all his flaws, no one has doubted the personal religious devotion of the pontiff (and none of the scandals incriminated him in anything other than passiveness in his dealing with problems).

Perhaps due to his age and inherent traditionalism, he was never the right man for the Papacy, but at least he knew his limitations.

Benedict learned from observing his close friend John Paul II in the last months of his Papacy in 2005, body trembling with symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, and voice barely above a whisper as he attempted to struggle through services in front of crowds of thousands.

For all the unexpectedness of his resignation, Benedict said as far back as in 2010 that he would step down as soon as he was unable to perform this job.

He has done as he promised, with his dignity intact.

By being the first Pope to leave his post alive in 600 years, Joseph Ratzinger may have angered the traditionalists (who say that being God’s representative on Earth isn’t a job you can just quit), but he may have also set an example to his successors that will help the Papacy avoid becoming a constant deathwatch as its decrepit heads are driven around the world in wheelchairs.

And for this he should be treated with respect, instead of having his motives queried and twisted by those pursuing their own agendas, however valid.

In the meantime, the world can switch its attention to the new man at the Vatican, who will hopefully be able to address the very problems Benedict XVI failed to overcome.

An African chapter in the failed war on terror

By Joan Nimarko

Although witnessed in the full glare of the international community, Mali’s descent into war appeared remarkable even against the backdrop of a volatile sub region. In little over a year, the country has plunged from rebellion, to coup into a full blown conflict in what could evolve into a toxic regional crisis.

The extent of civil discontent concentrated in the long contested Northern regions of the country was palpable following a popular rebellion amongst the Tuareg against an embattled government rapidly losing its grip on political power. In the face of a endemic economic crisis and demands for sweeping political reform to address corruption, cronyism and lack of democratic representation, the executive crumbled after a swift military coup leaving a fragile interim government to head off a mushrooming Northern insurgency.

French military action appeared inevitable after a rebel advance towards the capital Bamako, however the prospects of a French led military operation appeared unfavourable to the Malian government, the UN and notably ECOWAS and the African Union only months earlier, where plans for a regional intervention were placed in motion. The hijacking of the Tuareg rebellion led by the MLNA by radical Islamist groups proved to be the catalyst for French involvement, however claims of Mali’s imminent collapse into a terrorist strong hold capable of launching attacks against the West appear at best fanciful and at worst negligent considering the recent history of the failed war on terror and the implications of a second front on fertile African soil.

ANOTHER CHAPTER IN FAILED WAR ON TERROR

Without learning the difficult lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, European nations led by France and in unison with the United States have become entangled in what may become another protracted military intervention with disastrous implications for the long term peace and security for the people of Mali.

Map of West Africa

A revival of the war of terror comes at a time of growing scepticism around the legitimacy of its aims combined with widespread criticism of the unfolding security crisis in Libya, placing under question the viability of short term military action in the region. Justification of a new counter terrorism front are primarily driven by the consolidation of the US driven AFRICOM where Africa’s militarization has been steadily pursued in tandem with the protection of the region’s vast natural resources as a key strategic priority.

In this context Mali’s war on terror is a clear opportunity to protect entrenched Western market interests in the region, while developing security infrastructure in defence of critical energy reserves. Emphasis has already been placed on US directed intelligence monitoring and surveillance through the use of military drones in neighbouring Niger.

Maghreb in the form of the AQIM has fuelled suspicion of external interference in domestic Malian affairs. Rising suspicion over the influx of armed fighters into Mali from Libya following the downfall of Gadaffi, points to startling negligence within Western intelligence circles unable to forecast the threat to West African peace and security.

MALI’S INTERNAL DIVIDE

Behind the headline success of the French military advance the deep social divisions which sparked Mali’s internal crisis remain. Regional disparities in development and democratic representation legitimised calls for change in the North, which has faced decades of marginalisation at the hands of Mali’s clientelist state. Since Malian independence successive rebellions amongst the Tuareg have highlighted the extent of national disunity as the government failed to legitimise its rule outside of Bamako instead depending on a fragile network of regional elites with questionable loyalty to the state.

The military has also been prey to high ethnic tensions contributing to the large scale defection of Tuareg within the armed forces, after accusations of spying on behalf of the MLNA. Growing conflict over the neutrality of security services has contributed to a decline in public faith over fair representation of ethnic groups in national institutions.

The inability to craft genuine provincial democratic institutions through a process of devolution and accountability from below is the underlying root cause behind the current conflict. Without a genuine process to achieve this, efforts to enforce political stability primarily through military action may prove fruitless into the long term.

French troops in Mali

LIMITS OF FRENCH MILITARY ACTION

On the basis of reports from the international media, the French mission in Mali is predicted to be brief and straightforward. Compared to the might of the French military machine the capacity of rebels to successfully launch an offensive are perceived as less than unlikely. Yet military success for the French may be short-lived and without efforts to equip and develop Mali’s national army the long term options for national security remain opaque.

In fact, the West may be haunted by the decision not to provide the Malian government with either arms supplies or military training after the coup d’etat in March last year, instead opting to wait until a complete collapse in military defences as a basis for foreign intervention.

In a familiar pattern amongst anti terrorists operations seen typically in the Middle East, foreign forces remain unprepared for drawn out guerrilla warfare preferred by rebel forces. Unremarkably French military intervention in Mali faces a high risk of a protracted insurgency contributing to a power vacuum in a struggle for national control. If this were to occur ordinary Malians would pay the price for liberation in what could be a lost decade for national development.

Confronted with the prospect of a lengthy occupation by foreign forces largely unaccountable to their government, the impunity of French forces in alliance with their counterparts in the Malian army is likely to trigger a rush of human rights abuses in the Northern territories. Ethnic reprisals have already occurred with allegations of human rights violations made against Malian forces.

Human Rights Watch exposed civilians testimonies from within Tuareg and Arab communities targeted in violent ethnic reprisals by security forces after accusations of support to armed rebels.

The French led military action is constrained not only by a lack of financial resources for a prolonged offensive (in the context of European austerity), but by the absence of a long term exit strategy based on the legitimacy of effective national and regional institutions and bound by the accountability of a UN mandate.

TOWARDS A REGIONAL SOLUTION

Criticism around ECOWAS and the AU’s slow reaction to the unfolding crisis in Mali comes in the midst of growing unease over the lack of autonomy undertaken by Africa’s institutions in the area of peace and security. Perceived deference toward colonial ties worsened by continuing aid links have fuelled allegations that African leaders have sanctioned Western dominance over regional security instead of taking firm ownership over the delivery of regional solutions.

However Mali is providing a fresh opportunity for ECOWAS and the AU to assert rising African confidence that it can lead the way in forging diplomatic settlements and take charge in the deployment of peacekeeping forces under its authority. The position of countries such as South Africa who have strongly backed African leadership of the military operation in the country in place of Western command have bolstered arguments that the time has come for Africa to stand on its own. Increasing numbers of troops have already been deployed from a number of African countries including from Burkina Faso, Chad and Ghana.

Crucially much work can only be done by regional institutions on post conflict development with their enhanced understanding of the national context and political leverage. Here, ECOWAS can play an instrument role in the provision of support to the Malian government to forge alliances towards an effective peace settlement able to address the deficits in democratic governance which initially triggered the crisis.

THE FUTURE FOR MALI

The next few months for Mali are essential in determining the trajectory of war and for defining the path towards national reconciliation. Mali’s entanglement in an emerging front in the war on terror poses a direct threat to national stability and development, as the polarized discourse over extremist forces in the hunt for terrorist insurgency overshadows legitimate calls for reform from the moderate centre, pulling the country further away from a swift political settlement.

The strengthening of a social movements embedded in civil society networks with the influence to bring warring factions back towards the negotiating table is paramount, alongside the capacity to demand the accountability of the foreign occupation and national armed forces in serving the interests of the Malian people.

Principally , whether Mali will avoid the cycle of insecurity and decline characterised by countries engulfed in military action under the clock of counter terrorism, will depend largely on the depth of its civic resolve to gradually build the process of national consensus on the foundation of a renewed social democracy. Constructing progressive alliances from within supported by calls for dialogue from across the region may prove critical to the success of efforts to pull Mali back from the brink.

* Joan Nimarko holds an MSc in International Development Studies from the University of London and studied Politics at Leeds.

ENDNOTES:

1. International Crisis Group ‘Mali: Avoiding Escalation’ – July 2012
2. VOA ‘ ECOWAS ready to intervene in Mali’ 1st August 20102

3. Global Research ‘China and the Congo wars: AFRICOM America’s new military command’ http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-and-the-congo-wars-africom-america-s-new-military-command/11173
4. US signs deal with Niger to operate military drones in West African state http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/29/niger-approves-american-surveillance-drones
5. Professor Jeremy Keenan ‘ Mali is not another African War’ New African - Jan 2013 http://newafricanmagazine.com/special-reports/other-reports/the-sponsors-of-war/mali-is-not-another-african-war
6. International Crisis Group ‘Mali: Avoiding Escalation’ – July 2012
7. Ibid
8. Aljazeera: ‘Mali’s North face a new fear’ 25th Jan 2013 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/mali/2013/01/20131241925020203.html
9. BBC News ‘ French success in Mali may herald ‘war of the shadows’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21233394

10. Aljazeera: ‘Mali’s North face a new fear’ 25th Jan 2013 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/mali/2013/01/20131241925020203.html

11. Africa Review ‘The AU’s love for dithering leaves the West in charge again’ 30th Jan 2013 http://www.africareview.com/Blogs/Stand-back-Africa-the-Sheriff-is-in-town-again/-/979192/1679878/-/9r68qu/-/index.html

12. ‘ECOWAS needs to lead Mali interventions’ http://ewn.co.za/2013/01/24/Africa-needs-to-lead-Mali-interventions--Ebrahim