KUFUOR: Why He Left The PNDC; Facts And Fiction

John Agyekum Kufuor

By Duke Tagoe

Former President John Agyekum Kufuor’s claim is that he resigned from the Rawlings-led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) as a matter of principle.

What principle?

The impression former President Kufuor gives is that he was opposed to the policies and actions of the PNDC.

However, Dr Obed Asamoah, an active participant in PNDC rule tells a completely different story which suggests that President Kufuor had to leave because he could not measure up to some standards.

In his book “The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013), ” Dr Asamoah claims that former President Kufuor left the Government partly to “escape the sight of a multitude of women, some as old as his mother, in their birthday clothes” protesting against policies he had initiated.

Relevant excerpts of Dr Asamoah’s book are reproduced here for the benefit of our readers;

The appointments of Kufour, Asante, Mahama, and me drew the ire of revolutionary youth. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) issued a statement opposing them, saying that PNP Ministers had been replaced with APP men, in the mould of traditional party politics and that the appointments were not in the interest of the masses and reflected the call by the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB) for the PNDC to hand over power to a national government - a call made about the middle of January and echoed by the Ghana Bar Association. Some described us as the "Gang of Four", recalling the fall from grace in 1976 of Mao Tse-tung's last wife, Jiang Qjng, and her close associates Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Weng Yuan, and Wang Hongwen, one month after Mao's death. These four controlled the power organs of the Communist Party of China through the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

The students considered the four of us as being of the mould of political party tycoons who collaborated to rule the country in the interest of imperialist powers. The fact that I was married to an American lady, although she is black, reinforced what the students believed to be my credentials as an imperialist agent. The students called on the workers, students, and farmers to come out to denounce the appointments. Sure enough, a massive demonstration was mounted soon after which ended in a rally at the Black Star Square, where we the “imperialists agents” and  “anti-people people” were roundly condemned. That day I was in the office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now the “Blue Gate” occupied by Security Officers) close to the Black Star Square, when a sympathizer came to warn me that a massive demonstration against me and the other was under way and that, since the demonstrators would be passing by the Ministry, it was not safe for me to remain there. I quickly made my way home, avoiding the demonstrators’ route. Several years later, into the civilian National Democratic Congress (NDC) government, Quaynor-Mettle, one of the radicals at the time, told me he had been party to that demonstration but that he was happy I had not lefty office. He believed that I had provided invaluable service to the country which the protestors could not match. Unknown to him, the four of us, after agonizing over the predicament at my residence at Abelemkpe, decided to resign from government, against the advice of Capt. Tsikata.

Dr Obed Asamoah

Truly, at least Kufuor, Mahama Iddrisu, and I were members of the APP, formed out of a merger of four opposition parties at the time of the PNP regime of Dr Limann. The Alliance had been consummated barely three months before the 31^st December Revolution. From my discussion with Capt. Kojo Tsikata, I learnt that our inclusion had been deliberate, intended to create a braod-based government of different political persuasions which would contribute to the stability thje Revolution needed. What the students and cadres forgot was that the strong CPP-PNP elements were also in the government, including Capt. Tsikata, P.V. Obeng, and Ato Austin, the Secretary for Information who was, indeed, the leader of the Youth Wing of the PNP. Our entry into the government received the endorsement of Mr. Victor Owusu, the leader of APP, even though that did not influence my decision to serve in the government. I would have agreed to serve anyway because of my close association with Capt. Tsikata and my commitment to probity and accountability in governance, policies shared by the UNC and the 31 December Revolution. Be that as it may, we thought cadre sentiment had been so aroused against us that we decided that resignation was the best option.

My letter of resignation reads as follows:

28TH JANUARY '82

Dear Sir,
RESIGNATION

In view of the growing hysteria of a vocal minority of a
particular political hue over the appointment of some of us
who are being referred to as being "reactionary" and "anti-
people" I wish to resign from the position of Secretary of
Foreign Affairs.

I had accepted the appointment in order to be of service to
the country but certain slogan mongers think they can be of
better service and I should step down in order to pave the way
for them. My persistence in remaining at the post may create
the unfortunate impression that I need a job.

I believe that in these initial stages of formulating a path
for the future, the PNDC must be spared the distraction of
having to defend my appointment.

It may seem like I am giving in too easily to detractors but I
believe that those who think their judgment is superior to the
collective wisdom of the PNDC should be given the chance
to prove their worth.

I wish to express my gratitude for the confidence the PNDC
had in me and I wish the Council well.

Yours faithfully
(Sgd)

Dr. OBED ASAMOAH
THE CHAIRMAN
PNDC

ACCRA

Flt. L.t Rawlings invited us to Gondar Barracks for discussions. When we left him afterwards, we were in no mood to reconsider our resignations. My resolve was reinforced by the hostility I saw in the looks of one of the student leaders-one Kwesi Adu of the 4 June Movement, whom I met on my way to the Gondar Barracks. If looks could kill, I would have died instantly. Then, in the first week of February, he was made a member of the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC), created to co-ordinate activities of People’s Defence Committees (PDCs). For two weeks we heard nothing more from the PNDC, even though we had abandoned our offices at a time when no deputies had been appointed. It was embarrassing. We met nearly daily at my residence to agonise over the situation. Eventually, we decided to return to work. Later, Kufuor planned alone to leave the government permanently when market women objected to some policies of his Ministry, and from what I heard, they threatened to march in the nude to his office. Horror of Horrors! He had to escape the sight of a multitude of women, some as old as his mother, in their birthday clothes. He resigned about the third week of August 1982. The announcement of his resignation was made at the same time as those of the resignations of Rev. W.K Damuah and Joachim Amartey Kwei. I do not know the real reasons for the Rev. Damuah’s resignation, but Amartey Kwei had been implicated in the abduction and murder of Major Sam Acquah (Rtd) and three judges –Justices Cecilia Koranteng-Addow, S.P. Sarkodie, and K.A Agyepong-that had happened in the first week of July 1982. He was to stand trial and face execution. Rev. Damuah and Amartey Kwei were replaced by Mrs. Aana Ennin and Ebo Tawiah.

On 23^rd November 1982, an attempted coup was crushed, as a result of which Flt. Lt. Rawlings pronounced an impending purge of the NDC and the PNDC at a mammoth rally at Independence Square. Following this, Sgt. Akata Poree, Corporal Gyiwa, Corporal Adebuga, and four other officers were placed in custody, while Chris Atim was reported to have fled to Lome, where he joined forces with CPP exiles and ex-military intelligence officers also in exile to plot the overthrow of the PNDC government. The National Defence Committee Secretariat was dissolved, having been allegedly infiltrated by counter-revolutionaries involved in the insurgency of 23 November.

An official statement issued in the first week of November had alleged that the PNDC had faced and neutralised a serious threat to the Revolution. The statement went on to say that enemies had infiltrated the People's Armed Forces to sow deep tribal discord by spreading false rumours about events and members of the PNDC, and that a meeting of the NDC had been told of plans of change of government on 29 October 1982. Those officers of the NDC and others involved had been arrested, and investigations were proceeding. The story from the grapevine was that the northern elements of the Armed Forces alleged that they were deceived into joining the coup against Dr. Limann, who was also a Northerner. When they realised it, they rebelled against the regime. The names of those arrested at the end of the year and those in flight lent credence to
this story. It was not until July 1984 that two additional members of the PNDC were appointed - Mr. Justice Annan and Mrs. Susana Alhassan.

Mr. Justice Annan was also appointed the chairman of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), a position that enabled him to play a pivotal role in the development of the process towards constitutional rule. Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu was also elevated from the status of a PNDC Secretary to a member of the PNDC in the first week of October 1984, obviously to compensate for the fall out of such Northerners as Chris Atim and Sgt. Akata-Poree. Capt. Kojo Tsikata and P. V. Obeng were appointed members of the PNDC in the middle of July 1985, the position of Special Advisers being abolished. That remained the shape of the PNDC until the advent of constitutional government in January 1993. As regards PNDC Secretaries, there were several reshuffles, none of which affected me. I served as PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the entire PNDC era and continued as the Minister for Foreign Affairs under constitutional rule until about January 1997, when I was confined to being the substantive Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, having carried that portfolio in an acting capacity since about October 1993, in addition to the Foreign Minister portfolio. It was not until about the middle of June 1987 that Dr. Ibn Chambas was appointed a Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs. However, the Foreign Affairs workload had been shared between Capt. Tsikata, the Special Adviser to the PNDC, and me even before Capt. Tsikata's elevation as a PNDC member with responsibility for Foreign Affairs.

The PNDC operated a cabinet system almost in the same way as a civilian government does, and it met under the chairmanship of PV Obeng, the Co-ordinating PNDC Secretary. Sector PNDC secretaries presented memoranda on policy and other issues to the cabinet for consideration before the PNDC approved them. The PNDC draft Policy Guidelines and the Policy Guidelines of the different ministries received the same treatment. However, the PNDC was acutely concerned about “demystifying” government in its quest to bring government to the doors of the people. Hence, it introduced some innovations on how the cabinet operated. It also introduced the practice of announcing cabinet decisions by way of press statements. This eroded the traditional principles of cabinet secrecy which allow me to feel free to disclose official information. Furthermore, PNDC Secretaries were obliged to appear at Press Conferences periodically to tell the populace what their ministries were doing and to answer questions. I believe this has become a convention. The PNDC further introduced the system of Advisory Boards for ministries to advise their Minister. The board under the chairmanship of the PNDC Secretary for the ministry included representatives of the technical or professional divisions of the ministry, to be determined at the discretion of the PNDC  Secretary, two National Defense Committee members (one from the ministry’s Workers’ Defence Committee [WDC] ),  a nominee of the Armed Forces and of the Police, and representatives of the major organisations related to the ministry but outside it, to be determined at the discretion of the PNDC Secretary. You can imagine the challenges this system posed for the Foreign Ministry, where secrecy in diplomacy was often required. The WDC concept posed another challenge.

These changes went hand in hand with the restructuring of the Civil Service involving the abolition of the post of one Chief Director for a ministry in favour of a system of Chief Directors for all technical departments who would have direct access to the PNDC Secretary. Furthermore, a new department of planning, budget, monitoring, evaluation, statistics, and training was created for all ministries.

Three years into office, in 1985, I had a most serious motor accident virtually on the outskirts of Kpong as I drove towards it, I almost died, my jaw was broken, and I sustained other injuries that required considerable repair work to get me to look the way I do today, and I thank the doctors at the Military and Korle Bu hospitals for their proficiency. Superstition is never far from the African mind. I was due to travel to Ethiopia the next day, and because I so frequented my village, it was rumored that I did so for spiritual fortifications from juju men before travelling and that it was precisely on my journey back to Accra after one such ritual that the accident happened. The car was a wreck, and the fact that I survived the accident further stoked the fires of superstition. It made me seem invincible - a welcome but undeserved warning to my enemies.

I sometimes chaired cabinet meetings, particularly after the return to constitutional rule. During these, I was so firm on the need for discussants to speak only to the subject that I earned the nickname "Gestapo". I sternly rebuked anyone who disagreed for being "severely out of order", or some such phraseology, the choice of words that I intended to, and that often did, provoke humour. But as a result, cabinet meetings, which usually dragged on into the late afternoon on Tuesdays, rarely went beyond 1.00 p.m. when I was in the chair. The members were elated and invariably elected me to chair cabinet meetings in the absence of P. V. Obeng or the President.

Mahama Iddrisu

The return to constitutional rule did not substantially change the manner in which the cabinet operated. Many of us retained our portfolios anyway. The cabinet operated four sub-committees - Finance and Economic; Legal, Political, and Security; Social Sector; and Infrastructure and Utilities. I convened the Legal, Political, and Security sub-Committee, but its meetings took place at the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney- General and Minister of Justice presided over them. After the return to constitutional rule, this sub-committee's operations gave rise to the negative opposition propaganda that a cabal was behind the Attorney- General, insinuating that I overshadowed the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General. Detractors were eager to point at a supposed infringement of the Constitution which provided for the Attorney- General to be the principal legal adviser of the government. A Ministry of Information statement clarified the situation.

In August 1985, a public statement explained that as a result of experience gained by F. A. Danso, secretary to the cabinet, on attachment to the British Cabinet office, the cabinet had endorsed major reforms, involving detailed work by the four cabinet sub-committees. The sub-committees would now be more functional through the innovative involvement of official technocrats and experts, including top civil servants of ministries, chosen for their knowledge and experience. The statement further explained that the Minister of Justice and Attorney-General chaired the Legal, Political, and Security Sub-Committee and that I was only
the convenor. With my appointment also as the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, both roles resided in one person. In March 1996, the cabinet decided at its meeting of21 March 1996 to inform the public of important decisions taken. The cabinet continued to discuss and approve Ministerial policy guidelines for public consumption. It is appropriate to end this section with a statement about how local levels of administration were run. Initially, Interim Management Committees were appointed for regional, district, and local councils. PNDC Secretaries were appointed the political heads of regions and districts, and assisted by Regional Consultative Councils in the case of regions. A new local government structure, the flagship of the participatory democracy the PNDC promoted, was to be developed later.

Prosecuting the Revolution

As noted earlier, Fit. Lt. Rawlings announced that the aim of the Revolution was to transform the social and economic structure of the Ghanaian society and to prosecute a "holy war" to enable soldiers, farmers, workers, policemen, and other poor people to be actively involved in the decision-making process. The retention or overthrow of the Constitution, he said, would be determined by the people. He accused the Limann regime of being a bunch of criminals. He announced the suspension of the Constitution and Parliament, the dismissal of government officers, and the abolition of political parties in a radio broadcast on 3 January 1982.

With the abrogation of the Constitution, a new legal framework for administering Ghana had to be created. The Proclamation was the answer. It wisely preserved such institutions as the Judiciary and the Public Services while introducing new revolutionary concepts such as the National Defence Committee (NDC) and Public Tribunals (PT). A final comprehensive legal framework came up in 1983 in the form ofPNDCL 42, which introduced the concept of Directive Principles of State Policy into the constitutional lexicon of Ghana. The text was finalised by a team of lawyers involved in the government - Tsatsu Tsikata, KwamenaAhwoi, Okaidja Adamafio, Ato Dadzie, Aikins, myself, and others over a period of several weeks at meetings in my house at night during curfew hours, when great volumes of Awoyo, a Togolese beer, were consumed. I had the beer in great quantities thanks to President Eyadema, who learnt I liked it when I paid him a visit once. PNDCL 42 amended the Proclamation, which had preserved the legal status of Ghana as a republic and of the regions in existence then. However, by a decree promulgated on or about 12 August 1982, the PNDC accorded full legal status to Greater Accra as a region, and in January 1983, it created the Upper West Region, which was formally inaugurated in September 1987.

Anarchic actions threatened the success of the Revolution. The soldiers harassed civilians, and from the onset soldiers and their civilian accomplices were warned against looting. The soldiers were subsequently withdrawn from the streets by April, but that had the unintended effect of increasing the crime rate. In early May, Capt. George Mfodwo, Chief Press Officer of the PNDC Headquarters, Gondar Barracks, asked the public to report soldiers who molested civilians. He also asked civilians to refrain from reporting friends to soldiers when he addressed the People's Defence Committee (PDC) of Edward Nasser & Co. Ltd. To curtail indiscipline, some soldiers, including Capt. Kojo Lee, who was accused of murder, were tried and executed. I have already referred to the abduction and murder of an ex-army major and three judges by soldiers, for which retribution followed.

Given the multiplicity of radical movements and the immaturity of some political appointees, bizarre statements and actions were legion. The BrongAhafo Regional Secretary Kwame Sarah-Mensah ordered traders coming to BrongAhafo region to purchase foodstuffs to obtain authority notes from their respective Regional Secretaries. Soldiers and PDCs accordingly seized goods without such cover, leading to food shortages, particularly in Ashanti. B. B. D. Asamoah and others proscribed the wearing of suits. The Deputy Regional Secretary for the Volta Region, Kwesi Kamassah, was to popularize the wearing of “Afro Moses”, sandals made from used lorry tyres. It was rumoured that he had cut up carpets at the residency into pieces for distribution to the masses as a socialist measure. The Eastern Regional Secretary, Akrasi Sarpong, banned the sale of fried plantain, while that of the Greater Accra Region, Atukwei Okai, banned the sale of kebab as measure to curb food shortages. Dr Issakah Tinorgfah pf the Upper East Region sought the moral development of his people by banning the sale of local gin (akpeteshie). The sale of drinks at lunch time was also banned; I cannot remember by whom. The bans on the sale of drinks at lunchtime and on the sale of fried plantain and kebab were quickly lifted on 9 May 1982 by the PNDC and, those PNDC Secretaries engaged in such banning edicts did not last long at their posts. On 28^th July 1982 in a reshuffle, Amarkai Amarteifio replaced Atukwei Okai for Greater Accra, and Col. Twum Ampofo replaced Akrasi Sarpong for the Eastern Region. The latter, however, became the Secretary for PDCs and WDCs. John Ndebugre also replaced Tinorgah for Upper East Region, among other changes, including the replacement of B.B.D Ewa (Rtd.), the PNDC Chief of Staff came out with a directive on 13 June 1982 requiring all announcements on matters of policy to be channeled through the PNDC Press Centre.

Actually in a warm climate such as that of Ghana, it is more comfortable not to wear suits, but the attire of PNDC Secretaries degenerated into worn-out dungarees with sandals as footwear, following the edict of B.B.D Asamoah. To go this far without regard to occasion threatened to ridicule the revolution. I wore open-necked shirts and trousers to work in the early days of my appointment, in order not to worsen my case with the radicals, but on seeing Ambassadors who were often immaculately dressed in suits coming for consultations with me, I quickly took to wearing suits. I recall I was a member of a delegation to Benin toi deliver a message to President Kerekou. Our leader was Chris Atim who was dressed in military shirt, worn-out pair of corduroy trousers and brown shoes that you would think saw heavy duty in World War II, perhaps in Burma. We could not see President Kerekou on the day of arrival and had to stay over until the next day. Chris Atim was in his attire all that time, day and night. I wore a suit. When we were ushered into President Kerekou’s office and we sat down, he looked Chris Atim up and down for some time in apparent wonderment, turning to me with an enquiring gaze. He was immaculately dressed in a Chinese-style tunic suit. I was more than embarrassed. Chris Atim was my boss and I was not about to commit political suicide by advising him on what to wear. He was to lead delegations, of which I was thankfully not a member, to East European countries inApril1982. I do not know what impressions he came out with as the East European officials I dealt with were invariably impeccably dressed in suits even as they espoused radical socialism or communism. On 5 January, in a radio and TV broadcast, Fit. Lt. Rawlings said that to carry out the Revolution the PNDC would rely on the people; hence, there was the need forthe formation of local defence committees at all levels of national life, in towns, villages, factories, offices and work places. The immediate task of the defence committees was to expose saboteurs.
This was the signal for the creation of a cadre corps that was to fight social evils and promote the stability of the regime. Was this also a signal for the pursuit of a particular ideology? That debate was soon to ensue, considering the ideologues that flocked the cause of the Revolution, and the re-designation of the security forces as "People's" Armed Forces, "People's" Police Force, and "People's" Border Guards. "People's" shops were also soon established to combat the anti-social behaviour of traders. "People's" is a prefix often employed in communist countries. 

Flt. Lt Jerry John Rawlings

The rhetoric of some of the movements that supported the Revolution, such as the 4 June Movement, the Democratic Youth League of Ghana (DYLG), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), and the People's Defence Committees (PDC) was radical, sometimes socialist or communist. Furthermore, institutions like the State Committee for Economic Co-operation (SCEC) mirrored the practice in communist countries. Even the creation of the PDC system was used by some people to champion the takeover of Ghana's foreign missions by People's Bureaux in the fashion of the so-called Socialist Revolution launched in Libya by Col. Gaddafi.

However, as early as 10 January, FIt. Lt. Rawlings said, in relation to foreign countries that in search for friends ideology was not the deciding factor, and that the country would co-operate with all countries. B. B. D. Asamoah, Secretary to the PNDC, followed this up with a pronouncement that this was not the time to discuss ideologies, but to grow food, for which he was severely taken to task by the Daily Graphic editorial of 4 May 1982, reflecting the existence of ideologues in the highest echelons of the PNDC. The criticism was echoed by the JFM on 20 June. He was, however partially supported when Kojo Ababio-Nubour, a member of the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) said on 7 May that the PNDC had given out revolutionary directions and programmes in Rawlings's broadcast of 5 January. What was left, he said, was practical implementation, not slogans or shouts for ideology. What was important, he went on to say, was food, clothing and shelter. On the other hand, Amartey Kwei, a PNDC member, declared on 9 May that Ghana needed an ideology. Years later, in an interview with the Daily Graphic in early March 1987, Rawlings said that measures taken by the government in the past five years were an integral part of a new wave of realism, cutting across geographical and ideological boundaries throughout the world. The existence of a multiplicity of organisations, without a uniform ideology and vision, gave rise to fears about the slowing down of the tempo of the Revolution. The national conference of the JFM held at Koforidua on 1 May 1982, for example, identified bureaucracy at the PNDC headquarters supposedly orchestrated by reactionary forces as accounting for this and called for the heads of those responsible to roll, be they senior army officers or infiltrators. The conference expressed regret for the near-neglect of publicity as the result of the non-availability of newsprint. It called for restructuring, re-organisation and revolutionary discipline of cadres, and the creation of a formidable national front of progressive forces. Reflecting divisions in the PNDC, the Daily Graphic editorial of 13 April 1982 admitted that the tempo of the Revolution had slowed, attributing this to (a) absence of a statement about the exact political direction of the Revolution, (b) lack of information material on the Revolution, (c) divided opinion on the role of students, (d) questions about the revolutionary credentials of some members of the top hierarchy, and (e) resurfacing of kalabule, with some men in uniform alleged to be taking bribes from people arrested by the PDCs. The editorial urged progressives to fight for socialism. A follow-up editorial on the next day lamented the absence of a clear-cut revolutionary strategy for achieving the goals of the Revolution and the absence of an economic policy. Some of the concerns of the JFM and the Daily Graphic were to be addressed in due course, but not in terms of the socialism they envisaged. On the other hand, as early as mid-April 1982, Warrant Officer Adjei Buadi, a member of the PNDC, denied reports that the tempo of the Revolution had slackened, calling those saying so as self-seekers. With the reliance of the PNDC on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), economic policy was bound to be quite conventional. The issue of an ideology needed to be dealt with, in the light of these discordant voices. A PNDC Draft Policy Guideline was adopted in the middle of May 1982. It avoided labels but spoke of the achievement of a national democratic revolution, a complete and radical change of existing social and economic structures, and human and mental elements within government as an initial phase in a transition to a more rational organisation of national life. The Revolution, it stated, was anti-imperialist and anti-colonial, and it aimed at a people's democracy. Policy guidelines for the different ministries ensued, the most important in terms of ensuring the people's participation in the decision-making process, being that of the Ministry of Local Government. The guidelines of this Ministry were to complement the work of the People's Defence Committees in ensuring popular participation in the decision-rnaking process. The adoption of guidelines did not end the cacophony of policy statements about the aims of the Revolution, or with regard to administrative directives for a while.

The People's Defence Committee (PDC/CDR) and Mass Movement

The People's Defence Committees (PDCs) were invented as vehicles for the prosecution of the Revolution, in terms of its stability, the promotion of its values, including the expression of people's participation in the decision-making process. However, it took a long time to tame them and ensure discipline. At the community level they were called Community Defence Committee (CD C), while at establishments or workplaces they were called Workers Defence Committee (WDC). An Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) was established in early February to co-ordinate the activities of the PDCs. Those appointed into the INCC included, among others, ChrisAtim, P. V. Obeng,Johnnie Kwadwo, Kwesi Adu, and Eric Heymann, a veteran CPP journalist. To prevent confusion, the INCC decreed in May that district-level defence committees could not be established until PDCs were established at village and town levels.

In a radio and TV broadcast in the last week of July, Flt. Lt. Rawlings
recounted the value of the PDCs, the WDCs, and the INCC as:

a)     reversing the trend of apathy and cynicism,

b)     arousing popular energies,

c)      bringing to light public corruption and criminal wastage and
destruction of public property in factories and offices,

d)     exposing lack of interest of those in charge of economic

management,

e)     checking smuggling in border areas,

f)       helping to clear refuse in urban areas,

g)     making controversial enforcement of price control,

h)    establishing community farms, and

       i) raising the political consciousness of the people.

He admitted the weaknesses of the PDCs as:

a)     assumption of police powers,

b)     the making of rash allegations against management personnel.
and

c)      Conflict with local trade unions.

He announced that government had created a National Defence Committee (NDC) to direct, supervise and co-ordinate the activities of PDCs and WDCs, while similar co-ordinating committees would be established at local, district and regional levels. They will elect the leadership of PDCs and WDCs. A national congress would be organised to elect the NDC, which would be answerable to a proposed congress of progressive forces. Realising the problems caused by the existence of a multiplicity of progressive organisations, he further announced that plans were afoot to call a national conference to establish a National Front of patriotic and democratic individuals and organisations, which will be the main movement for the transitional period.

This was a reasonable attempt to structure the revolutionary process. It was necessary as the weaknesses of the defence committees he referred to were real and a danger to the progress of the Revolution. By virtue of the powers of investigation entrusted to PDCs, some soon set up courts to try cases. I remember confronting the PDC in my Traditional Area to stop them from trying land cases. It was reported that the court proceedings often ended up with fines and huge pots of palm wine} which the adjudicating panel enjoyed after the proceedings. No one had the courage to challenge them} and when I did I could understand why. The chairman of the panel} one Kwame Avadu of Likpe Avedzerne, who was incidentally my NAL party organiser in the 1969 elections} was very rude to me} even though he had been my friend. On another occasion on my way to my village I stopped at Hohoe to visit one of my sisters. While there I received a report that another sister} also proceeding home} had been arrested at a checkpoint at the police station at Bla, a suburb of Hohoe, manned by the PDC and policemen. It was a notorious point of harassment and extortion. I proceeded to the barrier} and as I approached some of the PDC began to melt away. The police could not} and had to face my questions. I was told my sister had been arrested for having with her one cake of a foreign soap - English Leather. I asked how one could be arrested for this} particularly as she was travelling from Accra and not from the village which was near the border. I was told it is because she was carrying a foreign product. I asked the police whether they should not be arrested for the uniforms they wore or the guns they carried} as the material for the uniforms and the guns were similarly imported. Even though they did not particularly seem to appreciate my explanation that the Revolution did not bar the import of foreign goods} they let her go.

Any time I visited home} I checked such abuses of power. Some of the PDCs threatened to report me to the Castle} which I believe they did. It was to the credit of the PNDC that they did not pay any attention to these reports. My experiences were a reflection of the extortion and harassment perpetrated by the PDCs and by some policemen and soldiers against innocent civilians. George Agyekum, Chairman of the Board of Public Tribunals} had occasion in December 1982 to warn PDCs against setting up courts. Their function} he explained} was to investigate and send reports to the police to build dockets. As late as December 1989 Dan Abodakpi had occasion to reiterate that CDR secretariats were not courts to give judgments. The arbitration and complaints departments of the CDRs were just that. He advised the CDRs to refer cases to the police and monitor progress. This shows how long the indiscipline of the CDRs persisted. I also had occasion in May 1989 to address a one-day political conference of cadres, chiefs, police, army and border guards at Hohoe, when I highlighted the international implications of the indiscipline of the CDRs. I indicated that by arbitrary and oppressive conduct cadres affected the image of Ghana, in the light of the universal commitment to respect human rights. I said the Revolution was intended to expand and not to restrict freedom.

At work places, the WDCs were a law unto themselves, dismissing management at will. In February 1982, workers suspended the top brass of seventeen affiliate unions of the TUC, leaving the staff unaffected. Imported vehicles parked at the State House were disappearing fast, while some were being misused in town. Avoiding unilateral action, the WDC of Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC) agreed with the executive of the INCC and the Secretary for Trade, K. B. Asante, that four top officials of GNTC proceed on indefinite leave, pending investigations of allegations of maladministration. Meanwhile, workers of State Transport Corporation (STC) wanted four top men out of office, pending a probe into the activities of the corporation. The Library Board PDC demanded the suspension of four staff members, while that of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism asked for three top management staff to go on leave. The WDC of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) wanted the boss, Mr. Justice Kingsley-Nyinah, out. The WDC of National Saving and Credit Bank (NSCB) called on the PNDC to send three top men on leave. All these took place in April 1982, even as Akata-Poree warned that some management staff were revolutionary, while some of the workers were rather corrupt. Meeting the press at Gondar Barracks in a public education exercise in early April 1982, Flt. Lt. Rawlings warned PDCs not to substitute themselves for management. He said that the PDC did not cancel the leadership role of management. The PDC idea was to allow for the participation of the neglected in the decision-making process. He urged management to contribute to correct the current confusion on the role of the PDCs, which had inter alia resulted in the summary dismissal of top personnel. He said political education was needed to rectify the situation. Brigadier Arnold Quainoo also stressed that PDCs were to participate in the decision-making process, but not to take over management. Tsatsu Tsikata, also taking part in the exercise, blamed press reports for the confusion over the role of PDCs. By giving prominence to the dismissals of management, they encouraged the practice, he said.

The indiscipline did not end there, however. Massive demonstrations against the call by the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies for the PNDC to hand over power occurred at about the end of July, occasioning the destruction of lodge buildings in Accra and Kumasi by PDCs. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and Rev. Damuah condemned of PDCs. By giving prominence to the dismissals of management, they encouraged the practice, he them for it, and Rev. Damuah was in turn condemned by the Nungua PDC. Speaking to heads of departments in the Volta Region, Asamoah- Tutu, who had in a reshuffle of 28 July taken over from Dr. Yao Fiabge as PNDC Secretary for the Volta Region, advised workers to substantiate allegations against management, which would be investigated before action was taken. He promised to see to the security of the regional heads of departments. The Regional Manager of the State Housing Corporation appealed to the Regional Secretary to advise his deputy, Kwesi Kamassah, to stop instigating workers against the heads of departments. In the Volta Region there had been indiscipline of border guards at border crossings, and the public was agitating against molestation.

As we saw earlier, the National Defence Council (NDC) was created in late July to direct, supervise and co-ordinate the activities of PDCs and WDCs. It soon grew horns itself. I remember the attitude of some of the NDC Secretariat, such as Professor Mawuse Dake, who thought of the NDC as being even above the PNDC. Not surprisingly, it became a den of conspirators seeking ultimate power. Early in November the PNDC issued a statement informing of the arrest of some members of the Secretariat for counter-revolutionary conduct. Following the attempted coup of 23 November 1982, FIt. Lt. Rawlings announced an impending purge of the PNDC and NDC. The NDC was finally dissolved on 14 December 1982, its Secretariat being declared to have been infiltrated by counter-revolutionaries. By then Sgt. Alolga Akata- Poree and several army personnel were under arrest and Chris Atim had fled to Lome, Togo. The Secretariats for Greater Accra and the Volta Region were dissolved. Following the dissolution of the NDC, a Standing Committee was established by the PNDC, which was working out guidelines for defence committees and streamlining their structure, work and struggle. Mr Akrasi Sarpong, who had been appointed the PNDC Secretary for Defence Committees, announced in February 1983 new guidelines for PDCs. By this pronouncement, official and sub-committee of defence committees would have a life span of one year, after which there would be elections. There would be Community Defense Committees (CDC) of a membership of between forty and one hundred persons. Revised guidelines were published in early April, prescribing the levels of operations, aims and objectives of defence committees, membership, officer’s tenure of office, removal from office, functions at all levels, production and storage, education and training, health, sanitation, conduct of meetings, submission of reports, elections, and so on. They also concerned the composition of national, regional, and district level-defence committees and provided  for conferences from block to zonal levels, which would  precede the District Congress with a new membership. Professor Mawuse Dake remained the Secretary to the NDC, and he organized the first national cadre school at the University of Ghana, Legon, for three weeks in early July 1983. Many such schools were organized thereafter.

Editorial

CUBA

The raging debate is about the effect of the intended normalisation of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Island State of Cuba.

While some maintain that this development will necessarily lead to the subversion and eventual collapse of the Cuban revolution, others say that the Cuban system has been so entrenched that it cannot be easily uprooted.

The Insight sees recent developments in US-Cuba relations as a major victory for the forces of progress, especially the Cuban people who have had to endure more than 50 years of blockade.

In fact, the Cuban people gave up nothing for the US to appreciate the futility of its attempt to topple the revolution.

The Cuban people and their chosen way of life can survive even in the face of the new moves by imperialism.

Our duty as friends of Cuba is to continue supporting their efforts to maintain their national independence until final victory.

We must urge the Cubans to be vigilant but they can only be vigilant to the extent of their own determination and our support.

We wish the people and Government of Cuba well.

FULL TEXT OF A PRESS STATEMENT ON THE PURPORTED ENSTOOLMENT OF KUMAWUHENE

Osei Tutu II

Ladies and gentlemen of the press, we have invited you here to update you on
current developments with regard to the Kumawu chieftaincy matters. We wish to
state that:

The said selection and installation of one Dr. Yaw Sarfo as Kumawuhene is a
nullity because:

1. The process of selection and installation contravened established Asante
customary practices and tradition.

ii. Due process was not followed. Out of the nine kingmakers of Kumawu of which
four are deceased' only two were consulted. The critical roles of the Krontihene and

Acting President of the Kumawu Traditional Council, the Akwamuhene and the -

Akyempimhene, were completely ignored. The two alone by themselves cannot select and install a Kumawuhene without inputs of other kingmakers, who are alive.

iii. It is obvious that proper vetting of the candidate was not done. His qualification
for the high office of Omanhene is therefore doubtful.

2. It is not the customary right of the Asantehene to install a Kumawuhene. What
happened at the Manhyia Palace, where Dr.Y aw Sarfo is said to have sworn an
Oath of Allegiance to the Asantehene without prior selection and installation
processes at Kumawu amounts to an illegality and an imposition.

3. The chiefs and elders of Kumawuman and the people of Kumawu are not

prepared to accept an illegal imposition. We therefore totally reject Dr. Yaw Sarfo

as KumaWuhene.

4. We urge the people of Kumawu to ignore rumors that some Kumawu chiefs
have been destooled. The purported destoolment is of no effect. Otumfuo Osei
Tutu II, Asantehene, has no customary right to destool any Kumawu chief.

5. We note with concern the creeping threat of arbitrariness in the conflict
resolution of chieftaincy and other traditional problems in Asanteman .

6. That if care is not taken, such high-handedness and the penchant to ignore age-

old and tried practices and behaviour could gradually but surely endanger the very
basis of Asanteman - founded and anchored on the tenets of a confederacy, which
delimits powers within the confederacy to include also the sanctity of the
Amanhene, their installation processes and their traditional role of holding lands of
the "aman" in trust for their people.

7. We wish to assure Kumawuman that at the right time, proper procedures will be
followed to give them a Paramount Chief. In this quest, we shall not be
intimidated, cajoled or frightened.

Thanks to all for honoring our invitation.

Nana Sarfo Agyekum II, Aduanahene

Nana Kwasi Okyere Darko Fordjour, Nsumankweahene

Nana Akwasi Baffoe II, Akwamuhene

Nana Otchere Kwarpah, Akyempimhene

Nana Agyei Boateng Benkumhene, Bodwease.

IMF policies criticised over Ebola outbreak

International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies left healthcare systems in the African countries worst affected by Ebola underfunded and lacking doctors, and hampered a coordinated response to the outbreak, researchers have said.

Links between the IMF and the rapid spread of the disease were examined by researchers from Cambridge University's sociology department, with colleagues from Oxford University and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

They found IMF programmes held back the development of effective health systems in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the three countries at the epicentre of the outbreak that has killed over 7,370 people.

Reforms advocated by the IMF hampered the ability of the health systems to cope with infectious disease outbreaks and other emergencies, the researchers found.

"A major reason why the Ebola outbreak spread so rapidly was the weakness of healthcare systems in the region, and it would be unfortunate if underlying causes were overlooked," said Cambridge sociologist and lead study author Alexander Kentikelenis.

"Policies advocated by the IMF have contributed to under-funded, insufficiently staffed, and poorly prepared health systems in the countries with Ebola outbreaks."

The researchers examined policies enforced by the IMF before the outbreak, using information from IMF lending programmes from 1990 to 2014, and analysed their effects on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

They found the healthcare systems were weakened by the IMF's requirement of economic reforms that cut government spending, a requirement of caps on the public sector wage bill, and a policy of decentralised healthcare systems.

On the requirement to reduce government spending, researchers found that "such policies have been extremely strict, absorbing funds that could be directed to meeting pressing health challenges."

"In 2013, just before the Ebola outbreak, the three countries met the IMF's economic directives, yet all failed to raise their social spending despite pressing health needs," said Cambridge sociologist and study co-author Lawrence King.

The public wage cap meant the countries were unable to hire nurses and doctors and pay them adequately, while decentralised healthcare systems made it hard to mobilise coordinated responses to outbreaks of infectious diseases such as Ebola.

A spokesman for the IMF said that the organisation's mandate did not specifically include public health and that it was "completely untrue" that the spread of Ebola was a consequence of IMF policies.

"Such claims are based on a misunderstanding, and, in some cases, a misrepresentation, of IMF policies," the spokesman said.

"Since 2009, loans from the IMF to low-income countries have been at zero interest rate, which has freed up resources for countries to spend more on health and education."

The spokesman added that the IMF had provided a $130 million financial package in September towards Ebola, and that they were working towards offering a package worth a similar amount to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone next year.

Source; yahoonews

From Energy War to Currency War: America’s Attack on the Russian Ruble

The Russian Ruble

By Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

A multi-spectrum war is being waged against Moscow by Washington. If there are any doubts about this, they should be put to rest. Geopolitics, science and technology, speculation, financial markets, information streams, large business conglomerates, intelligentsia, mass communication, social media, the internet, popular culture, news networks, international institutions, sanctions, audiences, public opinion, nationalism, different governmental bodies and agencies, identity politics, proxy wars, diplomacy, countervailing international alliances, major business agreements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights, prestige, military personnel, capital, and psychological tactics are all involved in this multi-spectrum war. On a daily basis this struggle can be seen playing out on the airwaves, in the war theaters in Ukraine and the Middle East, through the statements and accusations of diplomats, and in the economic sphere.

Additionally, the debates and questions on whether a new cold war—a post-Cold War cold war—has emerged or if the Cold War never ended should be put to rest too. The mentality of the Cold War never died in the Washington Beltway. From the perspective of Russian officials, it is clear that the US never put down its war mace and continued the offensive. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, defeating the Soviets and Eastern Bloc, and seeing the Soviet Union dismantled into fifteen republics was not enough for the Cold War warriors in the US. The newly emergent Russian Federation had to be placated in their views.

Petro-politics have been a major feature of this multi-spectrum war too. [1] Not only have energy prices been a factor in this struggle, but so are financial markets and national currencies. The manipulated decline in the price of energy, which has been driven by the flooding of the global market with oil, is now being augmented by a siege on the value of the Russian ruble. This is part of what appears to be a deliberate two-pronged attack on the Russian Federation that seeks to cut Russia’s revenues through market manipulation via economic sanctions and price drops. It is what you would call a «double whammy». While sanctions have been imposed on the Russian economy by the US and its allies, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, and Japan, offensives on Russia’s main source of revenue — energy — and its national currency have taken place.

Currency Warfare and Inflation

The price of the Russian ruble begun to drop in December 2014 as a consequence of the economic siege on the Russian Federation, the drop in global energy prices, and speculation. «Judging by the situation in the country, we are in the midst of a deep currency crisis, one that even Central Bank employees say they could not have foreseen in their worst nightmares», Interfax’s Vyacheslav Terekhov commented on the currency crisis while talking to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a Kremlin press conference on December 18, 2014. [2] Putin himself admitted this too at the press conference. While answering Terekhov, Putin explained that «the situation has changed under the influence of certain foreign economic factors, primarily the price of energy resources, of oil and consequently of gas as well». [3]

Some may think that the drop in the Russian ruble’s value is a result of the market acting on its own while others who recognize that there is market manipulation involved may turn around and blame it on the Russian government and Vladimir Putin. This process, however, has been guided by US machinations. It is simply not a result of the market acting on its own or the result of Kremlin policies. It is the result of US objectives and policy that deliberately targets Russia for destabilization and devastation. This is why Putin answered Terekhov’s question by saying that the drop in the value of the Russian ruble «was obviously provoked primarily by external factors». [4]

Both US Assistant-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland — the wife of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) co-founder and neo-conservative advocate for empire Robert Kagan — and US Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives in May 2014 that the objectives of the US economic sanctions strategy against the Russian Federation was not only to damage the trade ties and business between Russia and the EU, but to also bring about economic instability in Russia and to create currency instability and inflation. [5] In other words, the US government was targeting the Russian ruble for devaluation and the Russian economy for inflation since at least May 2014.

It appears that the US is trying to manipulate the Kremlin into spending Russia’s resources and fiscal reserves to fight the inflation of the Russian ruble that Washington has engineered. The Kremlin, however, will not take the bait and be goaded into depleting the approximately $419 billion (US) foreign currency reserves and gold holdings of the Russian Federation or any of Russia’s approximately 8.4 trillion ruble reserves in an effort to prop the declining value of the Russian ruble. In this regard, while holding a press conference, President Putin stated the following on December 18, 2014: «The Central Bank does not intend to ‘burn’ them all senselessly, which is right». [6] Putin emphasized this again when answering Vyacheslav Terekhov’s question by saying that the Russian government and Russian Central Bank «should not hand out our gold and foreign currency reserves or burn them on the market, but provide lending resources». [7]

The Kremlin understands what Washington is trying to do. The US is replaying old game plans against Russia. The energy price manipulation, the currency devaluation, and even US attempts to entrap Russia in a conflict with its sister-republic Ukraine are all replays of US tactics that have been used before during the Cold War and after 1991. For example, dragging Russia into Ukraine would be a replay of how the US dragged the Soviet Union into Afghanistan whereas the manipulation of energy prices and currency markets would parallel the US strategy used to weaken and destabilize Baathist Iraq, Iran, and the Soviet Union during the Afghan-Soviet War and Iran-Iran War.

Instead of trying to stop the value of the ruble from dropping, the Kremlin appears to have decided to strategically invest in Russia’s human capital. Russia’s national reserve funds will be used to diversify the national economy and strengthen the social and public sectors. Despite the economic warfare against Russia, this is exactly why the wages of teachers in schools, professors in post-secondary institutions of learning and training, employees of cultural institutions, doctors in hospitals and clinics, paramedics, and nurses — the most important sectors for developing Russia’s human capital and capacity — have all been raised.

The Russian Bear Courts the Turkish Grey Wolf

The Kremlin, however, has an entire list of options at its disposal for countering the US offensive against Russia. One of them involves the courting of Turkey. The Russian courtship of Turkey has involved the Russian move away from the construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline from Russia across the Black Sea to Bulgaria.

Putin announced that Russia has cancelled the South Stream project on December 1, 2014. Instead the South Stream pipeline project has been replaced by a natural gas pipeline that goes across the Black Sea to Turkey from the Russian Federation’s South Federal District. This alternative pipeline has been popularly billed the «Turk Stream» and partners Russian energy giant Gazprom with Turkey’s Botas. Moreover, Gazprom will start giving Turkey discounts in the purchase of Russian natural gas that will increase with the intensification of Russo-Turkish cooperation.

The natural gas deal between Ankara and Moscow creates a win-win situation for both the Turkish and Russian sides. Not only will Ankara get a discount on energy supplies, but Turk Stream gives the Turkish government what it has wanted and desired for years. The Turk Stream pipeline will make Turkey an important energy corridor and transit point, complete with transit revenues. In this case Turkey becomes the corridor between energy supplier Russia and European Union and non-EU energy customers in southeastern Europe. Ankara will gain some leverage over the European Union and have an extra negotiating card with the EU too, because the EU will have to deal with it as an energy broker.

For its part, Russia has reduced the risks that it faced in building the South Stream by cancelling the project. Moscow could have wasted resources and time building the South Stream to see the project sanctioned or obstructed in the Balkans by Washington and Brussels. If the European Union really wants Russian natural gas then the Turk Stream pipeline can be expanded from Turkey to Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Austria, and other European countries that want to be integrated into the energy project.

The cancellation of South Stream also means that there will be one less alternative energy corridor from Russia to the European Union for some time. This has positive implications for a settlement in Ukraine, which is an important transit route for Russian natural gas to the European Union. As a means of securing the flow of natural gas across Ukrainian territory from Russia, the European Union will be more prone to push the authorities in Kiev to end the conflict in East Ukraine.

In more ways than one the Turk Stream pipeline can be viewed as a reconfigured of the failed Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Not only will Turk Stream court Turkey and give Moscow leverage against the European Union, instead of reducing Russian influence as Nabucco was originally intended to do, the new pipeline to Turkey also coaxes Ankara to align its economic and strategic interests with those of Russian interests. This is why, when addressing Nabucco and the rivalries for establishing alternate energy corridors, this author pointed out in 2007 that «the creation of these energy corridors and networks is like a two-edged sword. These geo-strategic fulcrums or energy pivots can also switch their directions of leverage. The integration of infrastructure also leads towards economic integration». [8]

The creation of Turk Stream and the strengthening of Russo-Turkish ties may even help placate the gory conflict in Syria. If Iranian natural gas is integrated into the mainframe of Turk Stream through another energy corridor entering Anatolia from Iranian territory, then Turkish interests would be even more tightly aligned with both Moscow and Tehran. Turkey will save itself from the defeats of its neo-Ottoman policies and be able to withdraw from the Syrian crisis. This will allow Ankara to politically realign itself with two of its most important trading partners, Iran and Russia.

It is because of the importance of Irano-Turkish and Russo-Turkish trade and energy ties that Ankara has had an understanding with both Russia and Iran not to let politics and their differences over the Syrian crisis get in the way of their economic ties and business relationships while Washington has tried to disrupt Irano-Turkish and Russo-Turkish trade and energy ties like it has disrupted trade ties between Russia and the EU. [9] Ankara, however, realizes that if it lets politics disrupt its economic ties with Iran and Russia that Turkey itself will become weakened and lose whatever independence it enjoys

Masterfully announcing the Russian move while in Ankara, Putin also took the opportunity to ensure that there would be heated conversation inside the EU. Some would call this rubbing salt on the wounds. Knowing that profit and opportunity costs would create internal debate within Bulgaria and the EU, Putin rhetorically asked if Bulgaria was going to be economically compensated by the European Commission for the loss.

The Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon

It is clear that Russian business and trade ties have been redirected to the People’s Republic of China and East Asia. On the occasion of the Sino-Russian mega natural gas deal, this author pointed out that this was not as much a Russian countermove to US economic pressure as it was really a long-term Russian strategy that seeks an increase in trade and ties with East Asia. [10] Vladimir Putin himself also corroborated this standpoint during the December 18 press conference mentioned earlier when he dismissed — like this author — the notion that the so-called «Russian turn to the East» was mainly the result of the crisis in Ukraine.

In President Putin’s own words, the process of increasing business ties with the Chinese and East Asia «stems from the global economic processes, because the East – that is, the Asia-Pacific Region – shows faster growth than the rest of the world». [11] If this is not convincing enough that the turn towards East Asia was already in the works for Russia, then Putin makes it categorically clear as he proceeds talking at the December 18 press conference. In reference to the Sino-Russian gas deal and other Russian projects in East Asia, Putin explained the following: «The projects we are working on were planned long ago, even before the most recent problems occurred in the global or Russian economy. We are simply implementing our long-time plans». [12]

From the perspective of Russian Presidential Advisor Sergey Glazyev, the US is waging its multi-spectrum war against Russia to ultimately challenge Moscow’s Chinese partners. In an insightful interview, Glazyev explained the following points to the Ukrainian journalist Alyona Berezovskaya — working for a Rossiya Segodnya subsidiary focusing on information involving Ukraine — about the basis for US hostility towards Russia: the bankruptcy of the US, its decline in competitiveness on global markets, and Washington’s inability to ultimately save its financial system by servicing its foreign debt or getting enough investments to establish some sort of innovative economic breakthrough are the reasons why Washington has been going after the Russian Federation. [13] In Glazyev’s own words, the US wants «a new world war». [14] The US needs conflict and confrontation, in other words. This is what the crisis in Ukraine is nurturing in Europe.

Sergey Glazyev reiterates the same points months down the road on September 23, 2014 in an article he authors for the magazine Russia in Global Affairs, which is sponsored by the Russian International Affairs Council — a think-tank founded by the Russian Foreign Ministry and Russian Ministry of Education 2010 — and the US journal Foreign Affairs — which is the magazine published by the Council on Foreign Relation in the US. In his article, Glazyev adds that the war Washington is inciting against Russia in Europe may ultimately benefit the Chinese, because the struggle being waged will weaken the US, Russia, and the European Union to the advantage of China. [15] The point of explaining all this is to explain that Russia wants a balanced strategic partnership with China. Glazyev himself even told Berezovskaya in their interview that Russia wants a mutually beneficial relationship with China that does reduce it to becoming a subordinate to Beijing. [16]

Without question, the US wants to disrupt the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Moscow’s strategic long-term planning and Sino-Russian cooperation has provided the Russia Federation with an important degree of economic and strategic insulation from the economic warfare being waged against the Russian national economy. Washington, however, may also be trying to entice the Chinese to overplay their hand as Russia is economically attacked. In this context, the price drops in the energy market may also be geared at creating friction between Beijing and Moscow. In part, the manipulation of the energy market and the price drops could seek to weaken and erode Sino-Russian relations by coaxing the Chinese into taking steps that would tarnish their excellent ties with their Russian partners. The currency war against the Russian ruble may also be geared towards this too. In other words, Washington may be hoping that China becomes greedy and shortsighted enough to make an attempt to take advantage of the price drop in energy prices in the devaluation of the Russian ruble.

Whatever Washington’s intentions are, every step that the US takes to target Russia economically will eventually hurt the US economy too. It is also highly unlikely that the policy mandarins in Beijing are unaware of what the US may try to be doing. The Chinese are aware that ultimately it is China and not Russia that is the target of the United States.

Economic Terrorism: An Argentina versus the Vulture Funds Scenario?

The United States is waging a fully fledged economic war against the Russian Federations and its national economy. Ultimately, all Russians are collectively the target. The economic sanctions are nothing more than economic warfare. If the crisis in Ukraine did not happen, another pretext would have been found for assaulting Russia.

Both US Assistant-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and US Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser even told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives in May 2014 that the ultimate objectives of the US economic sanctions against Russia are to make the Russian population so miserable and desperate that they would eventually demand that the Kremlin surrender to the US and bring about «political change». «Political change» can mean many things, but what it most probably implies here is regime change in Moscow. In fact, the aims of the US do not even appear to be geared at coercing the Russian government to change its foreign policy, but to incite regime change in Moscow and to cripple the Russian Federation entirely through the instigation of internal divisions. This is why maps of a divided Russia are being circulated by Radio Free Europe. [17]

According to Presidential Advisor Sergey Glazyev, Washington is «trying to destroy and weaken Russia, causing it to fragment, as they need this territory and want to establish control over this entire space». [18] «We have offered cooperation from Lisbon to Vladivostok, whereas they need control to maintain their geopolitical leadership in a competition with China,» he has explained, pointing out that the US wants lordship and is not interested in cooperation. [19] Alluding to former US top diplomat Madeline Albright’s sentiments that Russia was unfairly endowed with vast territory and resources, Putin also spoke along similar lines at his December 18 press conference, explaining how the US wanted to divide Russia and control the abundant natural resources in Russian territory.

It is of little wonder that in 2014 a record number of Russian citizens have negative attitudes about relations between their country and the United States. A survey conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center has shown that of 39% of Russian respondents viewed relations with the US as «mostly bad» and 27% as «very bad». [20] This means 66% of Russian respondents have negative views about relations with Washington. This is an inference of the entire Russian population’s views. Moreover, this is the highest rise in negative perceptions about the US since 2008 when the US supported Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in Tbilisi’s war against Russia and the breakaway republic of South Ossetia; 40% viewed them as «mostly bad» and 25% of Russians viewed relations as «very bad» and at the time. [21]

Russia can address the economic warfare being directed against its national economy and society as a form of «economic terrorism». If Russia’s banks and financial institutions are weakened with the aim of creating financial collapse in the Russian Federation, Moscow can introduce fiscal measures to help its banks and financial sector that could create economic shockwaves in the European Union and North America. Speaking in hypothetical terms, Russia has lots of options for a financial defensive or counter-offensive that can be compared to its scorched earth policies against Western European invaders during the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, and the Second World War. If Russian banks and institutions default and do not pay or delay payment of their derivative debts and justify it on the basis of the economic warfare and economic terrorism, there would be a financial shock and tsunami that would vertebrate from the European Union to North America. This scenario has some parallels to the steps that Argentina is taken to sidestep the vulture funds.

The currency war eventually will rebound on Washington and Wall Street. The energy war will also reverse directions. Already, the Kremlin has made it clear that it and a coalition of other countries will de-claw the US in the currency market through a response that will neutralize US financial manipulation and the petro-dollar. In the words of Sergey Glazyev, Moscow is thinking of a «systemic and comprehensive» response «aimed at exposing and ending US political domination, and, most importantly, at undermining US military-political power based on the printing of dollars as a global currency». [22] His solution includes the creation of «a coalition of sound forces advocating stability — in essence, a global anti-war coalition with a positive plan for rearranging the international financial and economic architecture on the principles of mutual benefit, fairness, and respect for national sovereignty». [23]

The coming century will not be the «American Century» as the neo-conservatives in Washington think. It will be a «Eurasian Century». Washington has taken on more than it can handle, this may be why the US government has announced an end to its sanctions regime against Cuba and why the US is trying to rekindle trade ties with Iran. Despite this, the architecture of the post-Second World War or post-1945 global order is now in its death bed and finished. This is what the Kremlin and Putin’s presidential spokesman and press secretary Dmitry Peskov mean when they impart—as Peskov stated to Rossiya-24 in a December 17, 2014 interview — that the year 2014 has finally led to «a paradigm shift in the international system».

NOTES

[1] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «Oil Prices and Energy Wars: The Empire of Frack versus Russia,» Strategic Culture Foundation, December 5, 2014.

[2] Official Kremlin version of the transcribed press conference — titled «News conference of Vladimir Putin» (December 18, 2014)—has been used in quoting Vladimir Putin.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «Psychological War In The Financial Markets And The Sino-Russian Gas Deal,» Mint Press News, May 29, 2014.

[6] Supra. n.2.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «The ‘Great Game’ Enters the Mediterranean: Gas, Oil, War, and Geo-Politics,» Global Research, October 14, 2007.

[9] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «Oil Prices and Energy Wars,» op. cit.; Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «Turkey & Iran: More than meets the eye»RT, January 20, 2014.

[10] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «Psychological War In The Financial Markets,» op. cit.

[11] Supra. n.2.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Sergey Glazyev, «Alyona Berezovskaya interviews Sergei Glazyev,» Interview with Alyona Berezovskaya, Ukraine.ru, July 17, 2014: .

[14] Ibid.

[15] Sergey Glazyev, «The Threat of War and the Russian Response,» Russia in Global Affairs, September 24, 2014.

[16] Sergey Glazyev, «Alyona Berezovskaya interviews,» op. cit.

[17] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, «WWIII aimed to redraw map of Russia?» Strategic Culture Foundation, September 10, 2014.

[18] Sergey Glazyev, «Alyona Berezovskaya interviews,» op. cit.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения [Russian Public Opinion Research Center], «Россия-США отношенияв точке замерзания» [«Russia-US Relations at Freezing Point»], Press release 2729, December 4, 2014: .

[21] Ibid.

[22] Sergey Glazyev, «The Threat of War,» op. cit.

[23] Ibid.

Putin’s press conference for all seasons

President Vladimir Putin

Tough love, a harsh economic climate, a Sino-centric eastern trade pivot and commitment to defend Russia against Western aggression marked the latest Putin’s press conference marathon.

For over three hours the Russian president transfixed the world’s media, even those who viscerally oppose him.

Former Speaker of the US House of Representatives ‘Tip’ O’Neill is best remembered for his remark “all politics is local.” That moniker seemed apt while listening to the remarkable pre-Christmas marathon which is President Putin’s annual press conference. A massive 1259 journalists were accredited although my first reaction was that an awful lot of them looked rather scruffy. This emphasized the neat tailoring of the Kremlin team who regained sartorial elegance somewhere during Gorbachev’s Glasnost era and have retained it through subsequent revolutions and elections.

The venue was a veritable cauldron of anticipation as President Putin’s opening remarks demonstrated that just like any road accident; there are two ways to view many situations. Nonetheless many Western media were eager to remain convinced that no matter what Mr. Putin said, it would imply imminent Russian decline and overthrow of the Putin government. Neither appeared remotely apparent today as Mr. Putin did the sort of thing that I thought democrats were supposed to do - facilitate dialogue with the voting public. Indeed, if Russia is as economically irrelevant as so many Western commentators feel, quite why did they spend over three hours transfixed by this press conference when they could concentrate on their domestic economic problems instead?

Some of the most instructive answers were amongst the local issues which Western media ignored. Indeed the ability of President Putin to opine on the problems of Moscow’s parking laws is alone impressive, particularly given Western ‘leaders’’ aloofness from ordinary people’s problems. Could any Western politician withstand several hours being grilled by diverse global media without notes? Indeed Britain’s David Cameron has previously spent months in office without a single press conference.

President Putin has clearly mastered the “all politics is local” missive which is truly an achievement given that his constituency is the world’s largest nation stretching from...well somewhere about the middle to way over there in the east, according to my world map. Wikipedia notes succinctly: “Due to its size, Russia displays both monotony and diversity,” which brings us back to the press conference. While the world’s media waited for sparks to fly (veteran British journalist John Simpson generated a few asking the ‘new cold war’ question), much discussion centered on parking, pensions and other items deemed banal by global media. Yet amidst this local talk Mr. Putin demonstrated clear commitment to keep improving Russian living standards. This not fitting with their templates seeking to profile an irrational despot, collective Western media amnesia has already ensued. Displaying, well, leadership, Putin’s core economic message involved resolutely tough love: prepare for a two year downturn (it may end earlier). This contrasts starkly with Western political denial of local problems whether at national level (ballooning debt all round despite austerity chit chat) let alone that debauched debacle parodying coherent economics which is the eurozone.

There is a desire to diversify the economy from dependence on oil and Mr. Putin seemed keen to encourage enterprise. The Kvas question was instructive: that drink may not displace Coca-Cola but across the vast terrain of Russia, the President correctly perceives many such products, some traditional, others innovative, can be nurtured; can help wean the economy away from its ‘energycentricity.’

Meanwhile, the emphasis that China is now Russia’s primary economic partner was a hammer blow largely unreported in the West. It ought to generate sleepless nights for everybody in the German manufacturing food chain from lavish downtown Mercedes dealerships in Vladivostok all the way west to Berlin and Bavaria. A blunt message the West ignores at its peril: sanctions have driven a pivot that will reduce traditionally significant exports (which the EU cannot afford to lose).

Finally a simple thought. The annual Presidential press conference marathon fills the world’s news agenda for a day. Some Western media appear to spend inordinate resources slanting Presidential statements to fit their relentlessly negative agenda of the moment. However, if Russia is really the economic anti-democratic political irrelevance they are so eager to trumpet, then why bother giving Mr. Putin the oxygen of blanket publicity?

On both the local and international level, no current leader fascinates the media like President Putin.

Source: Pravda.ru