WHO IS TELLING THE TRUTH? Jake Obetsebi Lamptey or Kenedy Agyapong?

NPP National Chairman, Jake Obetsebi Lamptey

By Ekow Mensah

All of them cannot be telling the truth. One of them is seriously lying through his teeth but the question remains which one of them is telling the truth?

Could it be Mr Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, the National Chairman of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) or Honourable Kennedy Agyapong, the Party’s Member of Parliament for Assin South?

Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey is emphatic that Kennedy Agyapong cannot under any stretch of imagination be described as a financier of the party.

 On the other hand, Kennedy Agyapong insists that he is one of the financial back bones of the largest opposition political party in Ghana.

Kenedy Agyapong claims to have spent millions of Ghana cedis on the campaign to get Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo elected as President of the Republic of Ghana.

A large part of Kennedy Agyagpong’s millions allegedly went into the purchase of bicycles  and motorbikes  from China for distribution to party workers.

According to Mr Agyapong some of the leaders of the party stole the items he donated or at best failed to use them for the intended purpose.

He actually calls the party leaders “thieves”

This has turned Mr Obetsebi –Lamptey livid with anger and he has called for full scale investigation into the allegation.

Unfortunately, Mr Agyagpong has said that he would not appear before any such investigative body.

Some newspapers have quoted him as saying that “anybody who wants him to face any form of enquiry should first refund the money he spent on the party”.

Under these circumstances, it has become almost impossible to tell the liar from the honest and the controversy is likely to linger on for a while.

 As a fact this controversy is most unhelpful to the campaign of Mr Obetsebi Lamptey for re-election.

 Perhaps the only option available to Mr Obestebi-Lamptey is the pursuit of legal action to clear his name.

 Another question is, can Mr Obetsebi Lamptey be courageous enough to do that?

Editorial

FAILURE

Over the last 30 years at least 29 African countries have embarked on the path of structural Adjustment on the marching orders of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

It is now clear that this neo-liberal programme has failed to stimulate growth, facilitate development and reduce poverty.

The structural adjustment Programme has left in its wake, hunger, disease, mass misery, homelessness and devastated economies.

In a report the World Bank itself said “Adjustment programs were often unresponsive to country conditions and changes in external circumstance, which led to a lack of shared vision between the bank and recipient governments as to the aim of the program”.

In 2011, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) noted that in the SAP era, Africa recorded the lowest growth rates in post independence history.

World Bank data shows that Africa’s average annual growth rate declined from 4.7 per cent in 1961-70 to 2.7 per cent in 1980-2000 before rising to 4.6 per cent in 2001-12.

We wonder why in the face of the monumental failure of the SAP , African governments including Ghana’s governments continue to slavishly follow the instructions of the World Bank and the IMF.

The time has come to do what works in the interest of the African People.

Perhaps, the time has come to listen to the words of Osagyefo DR Kwame Nkrumah, when he wrote in his book “Africa Must Unite” that “once political independence has been achieved, the country’s full potentialities can, and must be explored. The domestic economy must be planned to promote the interest of its own nationals; and new and wider economic links must be created with other countries. Otherwise the newly independent country may fall victim to the highly dangerous forces of economic imperialism, and find that it has merely substituted one kind of colonialism for another.”

The plight of Benin's Vidomègon children

 By Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey

Not surprisingly, the name "Vidomègon" will probably only raise an eyebrow among readers who find the word strange, not because it describes the plight of over one hundred thousand children, mainly girls, sold into slavery, prostitution and child pornography rings from Western Africa, undergoing rape, mutilation and murder.

Vidomègon, in the Fon (Gbe) language, means "the child at one's side" and the practice of Vidomègon is an ancient tradition in Benin through which a child is leased, for a sum of money, to another (usually wealthier) family which raises him or (usually) her. Originally carried out for the benefit of children from poorer agricultural families, the idea being that the child would have more options and possibly an education under this scheme, today it has been perverted into a cheap supply line for slave labour, prostitution, child pornography both from inside Benin and also through Benin, using it as a hub for trafficking from the wider area.

International bank system needs Afghan drugs to live

By Lyuba Lulko

The situation with the production of drugs in Afghanistan has reached a critical level. The States, having spent huge amounts to combat drug trafficking in Afghanistan, contributed to the opposite effect (many believe that Washington wanted exactly that). The Russian Federation suffered most from it.

The latest UN report says that the production of opium in Afghanistan has increased by almost 50 percent over the last year. According to the report, released Wednesday by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the total square of ​​agricultural land that is used in Afghanistan for poppy cultivation, increased by 36 percent in 2012 compared to 2007. The total production of opiates reached 5,500 tons, which was almost 50 percent more than last year (3,700 tons).

Afghanistan has long become a leading producer of opium in the world (75 percent of global production last year, according to UNODC). The Taliban became the biggest beneficiary, senior Afghan government officials, corrupt commanders of the army and officers of law enforcement agencies are no less involved in the business.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. has spent nearly $7 billion to combat the production of opiates through the eradication of poppy fields, allocation of subsidies for alternative crops and incentive payments to the population of opium-free regions. However, the recent UNODC report shows that the opium trade has gone deeper in the real sector of the Afghan economy, becoming the leading sector of production.

UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov described the results as "sobering." In the foreword to the report, written in collaboration with the head of the branch of Afghanistan, he wrote that the persistent opium "virus" threatened to further destabilize the country after the withdrawal of ISAF international forces. In an interview with Reuters, Fedotov said that Afghanistan could soon become a "full-fledged narco-state" unless the international community gave the country appropriate support. "An integrated, comprehensive response to the drug problem is required," said Fedorov.

Who will propose a specific plan and who will implement it? The Americans, in an anticipation of the withdrawal, wrap up all operations. What kind of operations were they? There were so-called "response teams" organized to burn poppy fields. But, according to UNODS, eradication efforts reduced this year by 24 percent, after attacks on those teams became more frequent: 143 deaths vs. 102 in 2012. The Afghan army refused to escort the teams. The Americans preferred to raid villages in search of Taliban fighters rather than expose themselves to dangers in combat actions on the border with Pakistan - the stronghold of the Taliban and the main center of poppy cultivation. As for the promotion of alternative crops, it was complicated with incomparable prices (much higher on opium) and complete uncertainty of the future of Afghanistan. And this uncertainty has been growing.

The withdrawal of international forces, the core of which is U.S. soldiers (about 10,000 people), is scheduled for the end of 2014. An agreement is being developed between the U.S. and Afghanistan on how bilateral relations should be built after the withdrawal. Experts suggest that with the departure of Hamid Karzai, who has served his two presidential terms, another person will come, who will most likely become US-oriented in the next few years. Civil war scenarios are also possible. The deteriorating level of security will affect economy; GDP is to decline this year by ten percent, according to World Bank forecasts. U.S. analysts say that agricultural infrastructure was destroyed during the war against the Soviet Union. They also indicate an increase in the use of drugs in Afghanistan (the consumption of opiates between 2005 and 2009 doubled; the consumption of heroin has increased 140 percent). Supposedly, this is the reason why many farmers turned to growing poppy, Amar Toor wrote in The Verge.

However, according to the Russian Federal Service for Drug Control, under the Taliban (before 2001), the opium poppy production was minimal. It increased dramatically - nearly 40 times - with the deployment of American troops in the country. Today, "four million farmers are engaged in the cultivation of opium poppy. A third or a half of the population of Afghanistan is involved in the  production of drugs," Chairman of the State Anti-Drug Committee, the head of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, Viktor Ivanov, said on November 11 at a press conference. According to Russian security services, there are about two thousand heroin laboratories in Afghanistan, and more than four million people are involved in the process.

Ivanov sees completely different reasons for such a sad state of affairs. "The drug industry is needed for many thousands of drug addicts. The international bank system needs it as well, because it is the bank system that eventually absorbs income from this industry," said Ivanov. According to him, more than $1 trillion was invested in transnational crime of selling heroin. "Those wars that take place in Afghanistan are the wars between drug cartels. The international community needs to fully accept responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan," said Ivanov.

"The crowning effort in Afghanistan is to curb drug trafficking by motivating specific countries, unions and companies," military expert Boris Podoprigora, former deputy commander of the joint group from the North Caucasus, told Pravda.Ru. In his opinion, it goes about Russia, the countries of the SCO and the CSTO.

"We need to work with the north of Afghanistan, where Uzbeks and Tajiks live. We should boost their economy and give those people alternative employment. This is the only way to protect Russia from heroin and opium drug trafficking."

On October 28, a two-day meeting of the heads of anti-drug agencies of Central Asian anti-drug quartet finished in Islamabad. The group includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan. The meeting considered the implementation of the "road map" (2012 - 2017) of the four states in the field of anti-drug cooperation. The group of four is to have another member - Iran, that shares more than two thousand kilometers of land border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the UN, Iran takes the lead in the struggle against drugs.

Poppy fields forever? Record opium output boosts Afghan warlords’ power base

An opium field in Afghanistan

Despite efforts to curb Afghan’s opium culture, cultivation has hit record levels as NATO forces prepare to exit the country. The UN warned warlords may be the biggest benefactor of the situation.

The report, the Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2013, provides little cause for optimism among countries that have witnessed a surge in incidences of heroin abuse among their populace since US-led forces started a military offensive against the Taliban on Afghan soil in 2001.

Afghanistan, long the world’s main heroin supplier, has seen its total area of poppy seed plantations explode to 516,000 acres - a 36 percent increase from 2012, according to the report, released on Wednesday.

Last year, the war-torn Central Asian country accounted for 75 percent of the world’s opium supplies; Jean-Luc Lemahieu, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Afghanistan, has said in the past that supplies may reach 90 percent of the global total this year.

The new data surpasses the previous record set in 2007, when 477,000 acres were cultivated, according to the UN drug watchdog. Total opium output is estimated at 5,500 tons, up 49 percent from 3,700 tons in 2012.

At the same time, efforts to eradicate poppy fields have waned, with the total area targeted down 24 percent from last year.

With profits from opium cultivation nearing $1 billion, or 4 percent of gross domestic product, insurgency groups like the Taliban will only benefit from the cash crop.

A massive inflow of cash connected to the sale of opium has helped the Taliban insurgency, which imposes a tax on poppy farmers in areas it controls, in addition to the outright participation in the selling and transferring of the crop. 

Afghan government officials and tribal warlords have also helped themselves to a piece of the opium trade action. 

"The short-term prognosis is not positive," said Jean-Luc Lemahieu, as quoted by Reuters. "The illicit economy is establishing itself, and seems to be taking over in importance from the licit economy." 

One reason for the surge in opium cultivation is the lack of political will, which is noticeably lacking with April presidential elections on the horizon, Lemahieu said. Afghan President Hamid Karzai is ineligible to run again, while some of the potential candidates receive their financial support from poppy producers.

Afghan authorities, however, pointed to some successes in stemming the opium business. 

“Last year alone we confiscated 14 percent of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan and arrested 4,000 smugglers, including small, midrange and major smugglers,” Maj. Gen. Khalilullah Bakhtiyar, head of operations for the Afghan government’s Counter Narcotics Police, told The New York Times.

UNODC carried out its first survey of the Afghan poppy, the source of opium, in 1994. At that time, the crop covered some 175,000 acres. The territory increased to more than 247,000 acres after US-led forces removed the Taliban in 2001.

Last month, UNODC chief Yuri Fedotov, a Russian national, told Reuters the opium situation presented grave threats to the future of Afghanistan.

"We have a serious risk that without international support, without more meaningful assistance, this country may continue to evolve into a full-fledged narco-state," he said.

This is a serious problem not only for Afghanistan, but for Europe and Russia, which have both witnessed a dramatic spike in heroin abuse since 2001.

The US-led coalition has rejected any crop eradication operations by its soldiers for fear of bankrupting farmers and forcing them to join the insurgency, a policy criticized by Russia, among others. 

Cameron's hypocrisy

David Cameron, British Prime Minister

By Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey

Who shall we bomb next?

David Cameron has questioned Sri Lanka's human rights record before the Commonwealth Summit begins on Friday, yet another example of the intrusive arrogance that goes hand-in-hand with NATO foreign policy, yet another example of sheer hypocrisy, insolence and chauvinism.

The pig-faced arrogance with which NATO committed war crimes in Libya, entering the country with boots on the ground in direct breach of UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the sheer callousness of its attacks on civilian targets without any regard for human lives or well-being, the strafing and cold-blooded murder of the Gaddafi grandchildren, roasted alive in their skins by a NATO coward-murderer in a military aircraft, sent a shiver down the spine of every single well-meaning, good human being on this planet.

The hypocrisy with which the United Kingdom entered the Libyan civil war was stunning, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, presided over by William Hague, actively supported terrorists on its own list of proscribed groups, among these the LIFG, which despite claims by the FCO, was still on the lists when it was being supported as it committed atrocities against the Libyan civilian population.

The participation by the United Kingdom in the Libyan Civil War was in two words, a war crime. Those responsible for this human rights outrage are war criminals (*) because they were actively engaged in financing, aiding, supporting, sponsoring or committing actions which occasioned murder, grievous or actual bodily harm to non-combatants, or to combatants outside a formal declaration of war, and destruction of property, mutilation, acts of terrorism and rape.

David Cameron was a key player in this human rights outrage, whether or not it is true that he was the one who gave the instruction to "get Gaddafi" like some spoilt prep-school boy preparing to gang-up on an isolated pupil in an act of bullying, or like some escapade by the stuck-up prigs of the Bullingdon Club, readying themselves to get drunk and trash a restaurant, destroying the jobs and livelihoods of those working there.

  

So, in plain English, who the Hell is David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the country where 80,000 children do not have a home, the one who took part in NATO's criminal campaign in Libya and who tried very hard to start the same sort of campaign in Syria, before Russia smashed him back down to size, to start opining on human rights issues, or any others for that matter?

Who the Hell is he, the Prime Minister of the country whose streets are unusable after six o'clock p.m. because they are filled with marauding drunkards bawling obscenities or drug addicts kicking old ladies in the face on the pavement to steal their meager pension money, who the Hell is Cameron, the Prime Minister of the country where the corporations report profits of billions while farmers struggle to survive and old folk have insufficient money to keep warm in Winter?

Who the Hell is David Cameron and what authority does the man (?) have, whose railway stations reek of excrement, whose trains are so splattered with graffiti that you can hardly see out of the windows, whose trains are decked knee-high in trash and God alone knows what else?

It is patently apparent that the world of David Cameron is a cosy little place in the Home Counties where "good chaps" get together and chortle over a bottle of port and sweeping policy-making decisions are taken by drawing lines on maps, settling the affairs of the world in a top-down, simplistic approach which runs along the lines of civilizing savages with the Bible and the bullet, what?

 While NATO is based upon the same precepts, the rest of the world is not. Sri Lanka has its own institutions to deal with legal issues, as its President said in answer to his British upstart of a guest. David Cameron, for all these reasons, is not fit to represent the United Kingdom at the Commonwealth Summit, or indeed anywhere else.

Let us be honest. Read the indictment below and ask yourself whether you would wish to be represented by a key political player in this campaign.

(*) http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/06-11-2011/119534-indictment_nato-0/

The Geopolitics of Water in the Nile River Basin

By Prof. Majeed A. Rahman

In Africa, access to water is one of the most critical aspects of human survival. Today, about one third of the total population lack access to water. Constituting 300 million people and about 313 million people lack proper sanitation. (World Water Council 2006). As result, many riparian countries surrounding the Nile river basin have expressed direct stake in the water resources hitherto seldom expressed in the past. In this paper, I argue that due to the lack of consensus over the use of the Nile basin regarding whether or not “water sharing” or “benefit sharing” has a tendency to escalate the situation in to transboundary conflict involving emerging dominant states such as the tension between Ethiopia-Egypt over the Nile river basin.  At the same time, this paper further contributes to the Collier- Hoeffler conflict model in order to analyze the transboundary challenges, and Egypt’s position as the hegemonic power in the horn of Africa contested by Ethiopia.   Collier- Hoeffler model is used to predict the occurrence of conflicts as a result of empirical economic variables in African states given the sporadic civil strife in many parts of Africa. In order to simplify my argument and analysis, I focused on Ethiopia and Egypt to explicate the extent of water crisis in the North Eastern part of Africa.

One may question why Ethiopia?  My answers are grounded in three main assumptions. The first is based on the failed Anglo-Ethiopia treaty in 1902 which never materialized.  The second assumption is based on the exclusion of Ethiopia, since 1902 and the subsequent water agreement of 1929 between Britain and Egypt and the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan after the later became independent in 1956. The final assumption is the emergence of Ethiopia   as a powerful and influential nation in the horn of Africa because of its military power in the sub region.

Ethiopia has pushed forward her demand to develop water resources through hydroelectric power along the Nile. However, for several decades, Egypt has denied other riparian countries complete access to water resources along the Nile, and for that matter has exercised her hegemonic powers over the development and control of the use of water resources in the Nile river basin for many decades. The Nile river basin has survived centuries, and for many years has served as Egypt’s economic hub, political power and growth since ancient times. The water resources in the Nile basins have also served as economic, political, social and cultural achievements of Egypt’s influence in the sub region1.

The water resources in the past were used as trade routes which enhanced Egypt’s mobile communication and international relations for centuries.  In which many earlier contacts of Egypt described Egypt as “the gift of the Nile” This hegemonic status enjoyed, since the beginning of earlier civilizations of the ancient kingdoms of Egyptian civilization compelled the ancient philosopher Herodotus to describe this civilization as “Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt.” This again coincides the period of Egyptian economic boom and its political dominion. What has further entrenched Egypt’s position in the past, which ultimately contributed to Egypt’s power over other riparian countries in the Nile river basin is the 1929 water treaty agreement signed between Egypt and Britain2.  Britain, then in charge of many riparian countries as colonies negotiated with Egypt on behalf of its colonies, thereby, giving Egypt an urge over other riparian countries in the use and access to water resources in the river basin.

However, with the attainment of independence by these countries,  high population growth, global warming, global economic crisis natural disasters, political development, pollution and resource depletion, industrialization as well as urbanization, high capital cost of water drilling, poor rural electricity for pumping underground water  have impelled these riparian countries to engage Egypt’s control in order to re-negotiate earlier water treaties and to abrogate all attempt by Egypt to control the use and development of water resources over the Nile3.  Egypt has been in control of the Nile Rivers for a long time and has emerged as the major country that has complete access to the Nile. The shortages of water and water resources in Ethiopia and of course Sudan has prompted those countries to take a second look at Egypt’s access to the Nile, most especially Ethiopia’s attempt to confront Egypt in the Nile river. Berman and Paul concluded that the tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile is likely to escalate to a war in the future. Due to Ethiopia’s rapidly growing population, in consequence, Ethiopia’s water demand has almost doubled in the last decade4.

Nile River Basin and Declining Water Resources

The Nile river basin comprises of ten countries namely, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries are known as the ten riparian countries due to their proximity to the Nile river basin5.  It is the longest river in the world constituting about 6700 km or 4100 miles long and drains almost all ten aforementioned countries. The flow of the Nile as a naturally endowed commodity has benefited North Eastern countries’ economic activities through agricultural and tourism. About 90% of Egypt’s land mark is desert and therefore, many populations have concentrated along the Nile river basin, due the economic opportunities available along the Nile river basin couple with irrigation activity for landscape farming and animal rearing.6

The complete dependence of water resources over the centuries have caused the Nile river basin to deplete, especially of essential material resources causing high rate of unemployment, diseases and hunger in the countries depending on the water resources. Declan et al, argue that the resource depletion in the Nile river basin is due to three spatial factors, namely global green house effect, regional (through land use) and river basin (land management). This assertion is also consistent with Oxfam studies in Askum region and the drought that has engulfed the entire country. In a brief quote Oxfam indicated the situation in Ethiopia and said:

“Climate variability in Ethiopia is not new – but now, in addition to the usual struggles, Ethiopians living in poverty are additionally suffering the effects of climate change – both more variable climate and more extreme weather events. People who are already poor and marginalized are struggling with the added burden of climate variability. For now, this means that the little that they have goes to dealing with the current unpredictable weather because their livelihoods are so dependent on it. When selling off assets becomes a mean to cope, there is little left to plan for the future. Thus, communities are faced with simultaneously increasing climate variability, and with it increasing risk and vulnerability.7”

Global warming due to climatic conditions and green house emission effect according to Declan et al is one of the contributing factors for the recent water resource decline in the Nile river basin8.  They argued that high temperature couple with underground water reduction in the Blue Rivers in Egypt and Sudan is undergoing drastic impact of global warming. As a result, development along the Nile River has led to water resource pollutions by many riparian countries.9

For example, the Ethiopian and Eritrean wars in the late 1990s polluted a substantial part of the river basin with military accoutrements and missile deposits into the Nile Rivers. This pollution activity is further exacerbated by the huge population growth concentrated in the river basin. This populations growth according to the world water council 2006 have double in the last two decades, and continues to rise amidst migrations to the Nile river basins.10

The impact of population pressures and the resource decline in the river basins is also consistent with Aston’s argument that the southern and the northern portions get less rainfall than their equatorial neighboring countries.11  For example the Nile has two confluent tributaries connecting the White Nile and the Blue Nile, the Blue Nile which is considered the most fertile for crop production flows from Lake Tanna in Ethiopia through to Sudan from the South East.12  The Blue and White river basins also coincide with the division of upstream and downstream riparian, and their source of water. While the upstream mainly benefit on water rainfall, the down streams such as the blue river basins enjoys physical flow of water.

Braune, and Youngxin argue that the demand for allocation of water resources has witnessed several treaties and pointed out that “in the past 60 years there have been over 200 international treaties on water and only 37 cases reported on violence between countries.13.”  These magnitude of the problem resulted in lack of adequate resolution in resource allocation of water resources.

The impact of Industrialization and mechanization has played a significant role as a result of expansion projects along the Nile river basin. In 2004, the Ethiopian minister for trade accused Egypt of using undiplomatic strategies to control Ethiopia’s development projects on the Nile. Said, “Egypt has been pressuring international financial institutions to desist from assisting Ethiopia in carrying out development projects in the Nile basin.14.”

Farming along the Nile is one of the major sources of livelihood for communities living along the concentrated Nile river basins, but the ensuing drought, famine, population growth and land degradation have impacted the water resources in the Nile river basin. The Environmental Protection Agency in its 2010 report also argued that land degradation and deforestation in the river basin due to excessive burning for land cultivation in many parts of the Nile River has virtually eroded the oasis making it extremely tough for cultivation and water conservation.15

Thus before the 1950s, there were fewer resentments on the Nile water resources by riparian countries, however with changing circumstances such as declining water resources, hunger, and diseases, riparian countries have decided to renegotiate themselves in order to access the Nile. Kenya together with Ethiopia are  pioneering this process as seen in the cessionary address to parliament by the Member of Parliament for Kenya Paul Muite in 2004 who remarked “Kenyans are today importing agricultural produce from Egypt as a result of their use of the Nile water.” In a similar statement, Moses Wetangula, the assistant minister for foreign affairs remarked “Kenya will not accept any restriction on use of lake Victoria or the river Nile” and stated  “ it however does not wish to be alone ranger in deciding how to use the waters, and has consequently sought the involvement of involved countries.”16

Methodology

Conflict Theory and the Collier-Hoeffler Model
Kofi Anan reiterated that “Unsustainable practices are woven deeply in to the fabric of modern life. Land degradation threatens food security. Forest destruction threatens biodiversity. Water pollution threatens public health, and fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflicts and wars in the future.’’

This statement by Kofi Anan is buttressed by Amery when he alluded to the Egyptian Member of Parliament’s assertion that Egypt’s “national security should not only be viewed in military terms, but also in terms of wars over waters17.”  The horn of Africa has been bedeviled by conflicts, both interstate and civil wars for several years now. These conflicts are mainly concentrated on the north east and central Africa. While many of these conflicts have been disputes over land occupation in mainly oil rich areas of the Congo, others have been the issue of diverting water resources. This paper examines the water scarcity in the North East with an attempt to focus on Egypt and Ethiopia through the Collier-Hoefer model of theory of civil wars in order to construct the model on water scarcity with an attempt to reconcile the tensions over water resources and its effects on the people of the north East African people.

There have been several applications and interpretations of the earlier conflict theorists propounded by earlier scholars such as Karl Marx, Lenin, and Weber. Collier-Hoeffer, also known as the C-H model is one of such interpretation of recent times. Their analyses on conflict is based on the framework of many variables such as tribes, identities, economics, religion and social status in Africa, and subjecting the data to a regression analysis and concluded that of the many variables identified in Africa and the examination of the 78 five year increments(1960-1999) in which conflicts occur, and of  five year 1, 600 inputs in which no conflicts occur, concluded that based on the data set that economic factors rather than ethnic, or religious, identities are the bane of conflicts in Africa. In complementing this model with the earlier conflict theory propounded by Karl Marx, Marx, recognized the significance of the social and interactions within a given society. These interactions according Karl Max are characterized by conflicts. Hence, the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie of the capitalist system forms a synthesis of the forces of the interaction within the system.18

Marx, again reiterated the fact that these social and human interactions is dialectical in the sense that when a dominant nation seeks to control dependent nations or peripheral countries what yields in consequence is the tension to rebel against the oppressor by dependent states in order to agitate for equitable and fair share of national resources. This point is consistent with the C-H model when they argued with empirical data on the causes of conflicts in Africa, and concluded that economic factors are the significant predictor of conflict in many parts of the African continent. Therefore, according to C-H, economic reasons contributed to a large extent the greater portion of conflicts in Africa19.  While these economic reasons are varied and numerous due to the resources available in a given region and the allocation of resource whether naturally endowed or man-made, any form of competition to control these resources or allocation of resources will naturally generate two outcomes: tension and potential conflict, and cooperation. In this case, Egypt’s sole access to the Nile for centuries now has invariably gratified itself as the sole control of the Nile water resources.

As a result of the 1929 mandate that gave Egypt absolute control of water resources in the Nile, she has worked to sabotage many riparian countries through other diplomatic and international treaties. Ethiopia has vowed to engage Egypt over the control of water resources in the Nile valley basin. This is exemplified in many water agreement initiated by Ethiopia and the other riparian countries to abrogate all previous agreement hitherto entered by Egypt. Consequently, Stars argues that the looming tension between Egypt and the riparian countries initiated by Ethiopia is a recipe for conflict in the North Eastern Africa20.  For instance, these tensions are exemplified in Egypt’s response to Kenya’s assistant foreign affairs minister’s  statement when Mohammed Abu Zeid, Egypt’s minister for water resources remarked that Kenya’s statements were a “a declaration of war” against Egypt and subsequently threatened Kenya of economic and political embargo.21

This looming tension among riparian countries is further worsened by Kenya’s continuing threat of engagement. In 2002, a senior Kenyan minister Raila Odinga, called for the review and renegotiation of the 1929 treaty which gave Egypt the right to veto construction projects on the Nile river basin, and said “it was signed on behalf of governments which were not in existence at that time.” This paper’s argument is further rooted in the idea that there are emerging players such as Kenya and Ethiopia in the horn of Africa as major hydro-political powers to engage Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic status. Prior to the Nile basin initiative in February 1999, Wondwosen, argues that there have been several similar water treaties such as the 1993 Technical Committee to promote development cooperation among riparian countries. Also, in 1995 the Nile Basin Action Plan was launched, and in 1997, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) through collaborations with the World Bank attempted to foster cooperation among riparian countries to promote dialogue.22

This initiative including earlier treaties already mentioned shows the magnitude of the problem in the Nile basin, and of course the consensus necessary to equitably allocate water resources and thereby encourage development projects along the Nile. In 2010, for instance, Ethiopia announced that it was initiating a hydro-electric development projects in order to improve its country’s electric and energy needs. This announcement few days later saw resentment by Egypt and Egypt attempt to veto any such policy along the Nile. While Ethiopia is poised to making this project reality, Egypt has begun galvanizing international support in order to prevent Ethiopia from undertaking such projects.

Cascao, argued that the asymmetrical flow of water resources in the Nile river basin and the access to physical flow of the blue Nile by Egypt and Sudan in the downstream has extremely heighten hydro-political tension over the Nile. These tensions have attracted the United Nations organizations interventions and other international organization on matters concerning the distribution and allocation of water resources in the Nile river basin and in which compensation are offered to other riparian countries unequal access to the distribution of water resources, especially those on the upstream who only benefit rainfall.23

Thus in 1999, nine riparian countries met in Dar Es Salem, Tanzania by the Council of Minister of Water Affairs of Nile River Basin Countries and agreed to cooperate in solidarity for equitable allocation of water resources in the Nile basin as well as for economic integration through sustainable development.24

This economic solidarity through cooperation is declared in the Nile Basin Initiative as the shared vision by riparian countries to promote cooperation and economic well being, while at the same time  “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, & benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources25.”  This Nile Basin Initiative is the first attempt by riparian countries to push demand for equal access to the Nile, and  at the time promoting economic cooperation. Egypt’s defiance of the NBI and its lack of participation in the NBI’s initial attempt to convene such a cooperation agreement is a crucial aspect of the NBI’s objective to consolidate through cooperation in the negotiation for equitable distribution. The subsequent institutional mechanism for policy guidelines for riparian countries to agree to follow is set forth by NBI in order to stimulate cooperation rather than intimidation in the allocation of water resources.

The following objectives in February 1999 were set up by the NBI as follows:26

•    To develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure
•    prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples
•    To ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources
•    To ensure cooperation and joint action between the riparian countries, seeking win-win gains
•    To target poverty eradication and promote economic integration
•    To ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action.

Thus among the NBI’s core functions include among others to promote water resource management, water resource development and capacity building enhanced through cooperation. These initiative have proven worthwhile, in preventing a escalating a major conflict in the region, although there are still tensions among riparian countries along the Nile. Egypt still exercises hydro hegemonic powers in the region because of her absolute control of the Nile basin, Egypt has participated and is willing to cooperate with other riparian countries in bringing lasting solutions to the increasing demand of water resources on the Nile river basin. When it comes down to water resource allocation and distribution, it has always been sidelined and not considered a significant issue in the solution to the Nile problem.

Africa’s interstate conflicts in the past have been on a number of issues such as ethnic and tribal as well as land disputes and acquisitions. The discovery of oil however has proven to be a blessing in disguise in many of the oil regions of Africa. In the Congo for instance, there have been several conflicts with rebels over the control of oil regions of the Brazzaville. This area has not been spared of violence and mayhem for several decades now. In Nigeria for example, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has created havoc and tensions culminating in violence and attacks on oil expatriates in the Niger Delta region. These oil regions in Africa today are bedeviled with conflicts, violent attacks and conflicts in order to control oil resources. The least said about the diamond and gold areas of sub Saharan Africa the better. Similarly, and in consistent with the paradigm this paper takes is the assertion that water conflicts like many of the natural endowed assets bestowed on the African continent is a bane for the continent’s development. In the cases of the Nile, although there is no any imminent conflict, scholars are predicting that the lack of concrete and up-to-date resolution on the water policy regarding the distribution of water resources on the Nile is a recipe for conflict in the region.

Relations of Power
As already mentioned and by extension Herodotus comments on Egypt as “the gift of the Nile,” has been extrapolated by Egypt in order to exercise hydro-political power in the Nile river basin for several decades. This status Egypt has enjoyed for some time now without allowing any riparian countries along the Nile to negotiate any form of control on water resources and development projects such as hydro electric power by neighboring countries. The asymmetrical flow of water resources in the Nile has also afforded Egypt a position of dominance compared to other riparian countries who are situated upstream on the Nile. The Nile’s downstream is currently housed by Egypt and Sudan, consequently, Sudan’s attempt to renegotiate Egypt’s unilateral control on the Nile27.

In 1959, a water agreement signed between Egypt and Sudan gave Egypt 55bcm and 18bcm to Sudan. Again this uneven allocation of resource points to asymmetrical power relations of riparian countries ability to negotiate Egypt to access water resources28.  Cascao, provides a theoretical understanding on this hydro power hegemony of Egypt in controlling water resources. And indicated that the hegemonic power of Egypt is due to many factors in the horn of Africa, but argues that this hegemonic status is about to end as counter hydro hegemonic powers are beginning to emerge in order to contest Egypt’s long standing hegemony in the region. I totally agree with Cascoa, and in fact her analysis is in line with my argument that the position Egypt finds herself is about to change due to first the declining rate of water resources in the Nile.

This is because in the past when life was booming riparian countries made no mention of inequity if water resources however, with the emergence global water crisis due to global warming these riparian countries are beginning to contest power relation on the access to the Nile. Cascao points to “apparent consent” to illustrate the apparent lackadaisical attitudes of consent by riparian countries. This apparent consent, Cascoa argues was latent consents by riparian countries along the Nile on many agreements that were signed as far back in 1902. Ethiopia is a case in point. In many of these water treaties Reginald points to about 60 water agreements since the first one in 1902 which either ignored Ethiopia or Ethiopia decided to apparently consent to by keeping mute to the issue. But what is significant is a looming civil war among riparian countries. There have been scuffles between Sudan and Burundi, also Ethiopia and Eritrea and Rwanda and Somalia in the past several decades without totally engaging Egypt’s hydro-hegemonic power in the region, given the emerging hydro political configuration that is beginning to unravel 29.

In order to understand the relations of power and dominance in regards to the situation in the Nile river basin it is prudent to again invoke Cascao analysis of power and dominance as they significantly hinges on the Ethiopia’s counter hegemonic strategy in the Nile river basin for some time now. Cascao begins by citing Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as “political power that flows from intellectual and moral leadership, authority, or consensus as distinguished from armed force30”  she continues to argue “power is relational and the outcome of hegemonic power relations is determined by the interaction of diverse actors” diverse actors for me seem meaningful and significant here in terms of the power relations here. It can be recalled that there are ten riparian countries each diverse with varied needs and demands in regard to the fair allocation of water resources in the Nile. This diversity is yet galvanized for a common interest as seen in the Nile basin initiative put forth by the nine riparian countries.

Once gain the significant portion Egypt occupies comes under a counter hegemonic truce by riparian countries to renegotiate earlier treaties concerning the Nile river allocation of resource which is consistent with Cascao assertion that “power relations are not static or immutable” and points to a dialectical thesis of challenging the status thereby bringing in new status quo with alternatives. This dialectics is one earlier propounded by Marx and Lenin in their conflict theories regarding the suppression of groups and their simultaneous revolt of the existing status quo. In the case of the river basin, these riparian countries see themselves as having asymmetrical power relations with Egypt, and because Egypt’s consistent dominance in both economic and hegemonic political relations in the sub region, there is an attempt to contest existing status quo as seen in the earlier water treaties and allocation of resources in the Nile basin.

Based on the accusations and counter accusations on the allocation of water resources along the Nile, Ethiopia like Egypt have both galvanized for support in terms of international diplomacy and legitimacy over the use of resources in the Nile. While Egypt continues to maintain its legitimacy based of the earlier water agreements and proclamations that exclusively gave Egypt dominance with right to veto any development projects, Ethiopia has taken its stands to engage Egypt on talks to renegotiate Ethiopia’s position of the Nile resources. When it comes to international funding on the Nile river basin, the IMF and the World Bank has withhold funds for development along the Nile because of the looming tension between the riparian countries and has promised not to get itself tangled on the water crisis along the Nile river basin.31

“Water sharing” or “benefit sharing”
The debate as to whether “water sharing” or “benefit sharing” has dominated many scholarly discourse on the Nile issue. According to Teshome, benefit sharing is “the distribution of benefits through cooperation” and argues furthermore that “benefit sharing gives riparian states the chance to share the benefits derived from the use of water rather than the physical distribution of water itself32.”  Teshome’s analysis regarding benefit sharing through cooperation sounds a laudable alternative to riparian countries capacity to cooperate in order to tap water resources, but this argument is idealistic given the power relations along the Nile, and the asymmetrical flow of water resources in the upstream and downstream countries could be difficult to ascertain. I offer the following reason to buttress my argument.

Most significantly, the lack of political will to cooperate by riparian countries is the number one reason benefit sharing could be difficult to achieve. Several water  agreement have been launched since the 1929 Anglo Egyptian water agreement that gave Egypt the exclusive power to monitor development activities along the Nile. The lack of political will is clearly demonstrated by Ethiopia’s “apparent consent” to many water treaties that has been passed. The most recent treaty the Nile Basin Cooperative Frame Work Agreement launched in (1997-2007) shows the nature of participation by riparian countries to cooperate to achieving common goals and the allocation of water resources. This lack of political will is also consistent with Teshome argument that the lack of political leadership has exacerbated the situation to the extent that at present there is no international treaty or agreement that binds riparian countries together. Although the many cooperative agreements between upstream and downstream riparian have sidelined issues bordering benefit sharing in their agenda33.

In addition, problem in benefit sharing cooperative agreement is the fact that many riparian countries comes from different political and socio-cultural backgrounds and are therefore prone to series of political and civil upheavals that will endanger any attempt by riparian countries to cooperate for mutual benefit sharing. The most significant one is the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict that has rocked the region for several years, also the Somalia civil conflicts, the Rwanda Burundi and many others in Sudan has worked to prevent many cooperative agreement to realize its potential. Although mutual benefit is essential its implementation to a full potential is unattainable.

This argument is also supported by Cascao when she argued that cooperative agreement can be a “battle ground for opposing tendencies” (p24) Not only that but, also Egypt’s power and international diplomacy over the region. It is indeed important to acknowledge the role of Egypt’s diplomatic relations in the past that has ushered its dominance over the Nile. The strategic position of Egypt on the Suez Canal has been a strategic location for British involvement in Egypt and for British access to India through the canal. This important location of Egypt was advanced by British interest in India34.  Benefit sharing or cooperative agreement by upstream and downstream countries have been in opposing terms for quite some time now. The recent National Basin Initiative (NBI) has been used as a platform by Ethiopia to get the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan annulled, since Ethiopia was excluded, and for that matter the other seven riparian countries in order to enact a comprehensive water policy that will promote the advancement of cooperative water sharing without hostilities.

Also, significant factor that hampers any cooperative agreement on benefit sharing is Egypt’s diplomatic influence on the region. If all riparian countries agree to benefit share these cooperative agreement maybe lopsided and for that matter benefit Egypt more than the other riparian because of Egypt diplomacy with Britain and US, and the international organizations including the Arab league. This point is argued in Teshome when he said “Egypt has been pressuring international institutions to desist from assisting Ethiopia in carrying out development projects in the Nile basin …it has used its influence to persuade  the Arab world not to provide Ethiopia with any loans or grants for Nile water development.”

My final alternative is that several water sharing agreements have been adopted by riparian countries at least since the 1959 between Sudan and Egypt in terms of allocation of water resources. This allocation which earmarked 18 BCM to Sudan and 55BCM to Egypt is seen by Sudan as an unfair deal and have since pushed forward for renegotiation on the allocation of water resources that has given Egypt an unfair proportional distribution of resources and for development projects on the Nile. This last alternative could be dangerous in if physical allocation of water resources are to be shared among riparian countries through demarcation, this is because land demarcation and allocation of resources have been one of the dangerous recipe for conflicts currently ongoing on the continent, to physically allocate recourses is nothing but to add more insult to injuries. With emerging hydro-political powers in the region, Ethiopia and Egypt could dominate other countries and for that matter wage physical wars in order to control water resources.

On the basis of the above discussions, it can be safely concluded that the nature of tension in North Eastern Africa most, especially the Nile riparian countries are on a brink of conflict over the control and use of Nile water resources. As already pointed out, and by extension Collier-Hoeffler’s economic analysis of conflicts in Africa did not cite the potential trigger of conflict as a result of the Nile, what is significant about his model is the paradigmatic nature upon which his theory of analysis are based. And since water is a vital part of the economic resources of Africa, this papers concludes that the water resources just as any other economic resource has a full potential of tension and conflict over the Nile river basin by riparian states.

Notes

1.Wonddwossen Teshome B. “Transboundary Water cooperation in Africa: The case of the Nile Basin Initiative.” Turkish Journal of International Relations winter Vol. 7.4 2008 pp34-43
Also see Flintan, F. & Tamarat,I  Spilling Blood Over Water? The case of Ethiopia, in Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa’s Conflict. Lind &J.& Sturman K.(eds)  Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg (2002)
2.Ibid
3.Ashton, Peter J.  “Avoiding Conflicts over Africa’s Resources” Royal Swedish Academy of Science. Vol.31.3, 2002 pp236-242
4.Berman and Paul, “The New Water Politics of the Middle East. Strategic Review, Summer 1999. 21-28
5.Wonddwossen Teshome B. “Transboundary Water cooperation in Africa: The case of the Nile Basin Initiative.” Turkish Journal of International Relations winter 2008 Vol. 7.4 pp34-43
6.Alcamo, J., Hulme, M., Conway, D., & Krol, M. “Future availability of water in Egypt: The interaction of global, regional and basin scale driving forces in the Nile basin”. AMBIO – A Journal of the Human Environment, 25(5), (1996). 336.
7.Oxfam 2009 report
8.Kim, U., & Kaluarachchi, J. J. “Climate change impacts on water resources in the upper Blue Nile river basin, Ethiopia.” Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 45(6), (2009). 1361-1378.
9. ibid
10.World Water Council Report 2006
11.ibid
12.Wonddwossen Teshome B. “Transboundary Water cooperation in Africa: The case of the Nile Basin Initiative.” Turkish Journal of International Relations winter 2008 Vol. 7.4 pp34-43
14.Braune, Eberhard and Youngxin Xu2. “The role of Ground Water in the Sub Saharan Africa.” Vol. 48.2 March 2010, pp229-238
16.Cam McGrath and Sonny Baraj “Water Wars  Loom along the Nile” 2004 news 24.com
17.EPA North East Africa 2010 report
18.Ibid
19.UN Secretary General Kofi Anan
20.Karl Marx. “Capital” A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Avelling Ed.  F.Engels 1887
21.Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers Vol50.4 1998, pp563-573. Also in Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank Policy Research—Working papers number 2355 May 2000
22.J.R. Stars “Water Wars” Foreign Policy  Issue 82 991pp17-20
BBC 12 DEC 2003 also see AL-Ahram, 26 February 2004
23.Ibid also see Ana Elisa Cascao “Ethiopia- Challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin” Water Policy 10 supplement 2 (2008)
24.Ana Elisa Cascao “Ethiopia- Challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin” Water Policy 10 supplement 2 (2008)
25.Ana Elisa Cascao “Ethiopia- Challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin” Water Policy 10 supplement 2 (2008)
26.The Nile Basin Initiative NBI
27.Ibid NBI
28.ibid
29.ibid
30.ibid
31.Gramci 1971 cite in Cascao (2008) p.18
32.World water council report 2009
33.ibid
34.ibid
35.Cascao “water policy” document No. 10