 |
| TUC Secretary General Kofi Amponsah with President Mahama |
By
Ebow Mensah
The
applause for organised labour and Government is still ringing loud over the
reduction of electricity tariff by 25 per cent.
The
reality however is that both sides have only conspired to postpone the hardship
which was imposed on the population by the imposition of astronomical tariff
increases.
Organised
labour demanded a staggering of the tariff increase and not a reduction in the
level of tariff.
Government
partially agreed to the demand by allegedly reducing electricity tariffs by 25
per cent an leaving tariffs where they have been.
As
a result both the TUC and the Government are looking good when indeed not much
has changed.
The
policy of recovering cost of production which was embraced under the marching
orders of the world Bank and international Monetary fund in 1983 has not
changed.
The
read cause of high utility tariffs; inefficiency, corruption and a lopsided
generation mix have not been addressed.
The
obvious lie, that the public utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) is an
independent regulator not subject to the decision of Government continues to be
perpetrated.
And
the game of equalisation played by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and
the New Patriotic Party (NPP) over matters of life and death for the Ghanaian
population continues unabated.
The
announcement by Government raises other pertinent issues needing answers.
When
the PURC first announced the tariff increase of 78 percent for electricity to take effect from
November1, simple arithmetic’s revealed that the real level of increase was
more than 300 per cent .
The
question is what is the 25 per cent reduction on ?
Is
it the 78 per cent increase or the 300 per cent ?
When
will the Government and organised labour tackle the real issues?
Perhaps
it is time to remind, Government, the opposition and organised labour that you
can fool all the people sometimes or fool some people all the time but you
cannot fool all the people all the time.
Editorial
DEMOCRACY?
Something interesting is happening around the world and
serious world watchers need to take note.
The
fact is that whatever the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its
allies have gone to introduce or restore democracy, they have only succeeded in
implanting mayhem.
After
dropping tons of bombs on Iraq in the so-called effort to topple Sadam Husseine
and restore democracy, Iraq has become nothing more than a heaven of terrorists
and centre of anarchy.
Sectarian
violence has engulfed Iraq, where citizen can be sure of his or her safety.
In
Afghanistan, the situation is worse. The Taliban has become stronger, and the
country continues the plunge into anarchy.
Libya after Gadafi is nowhere near democracy
and it is being speculated that a second civic war is just around the corner.
Western
intervention in Somalia has led to a massive failure of the governance system
and it may take decades more to restore law and order.
Western
interventions include the Congo, Vietnam and may other countries led to more
violence and in some instances blatant violations of the rights of citizens.
What
is becoming clear is that the west has no interest in promoting democracy.
All
it wants is control over the world’s resources and it is ready to kill and main
for this.
What democracy and whose democracy.
Intra-African trade continues to plummet - says UNCTAD
INTRA-AFRICAN
trade presents opportunities for sustained growth and development in Africa. It
has the potential to reduce vulnerability to global shocks, contribute to
economic diversification, enhance export competitiveness and create employment.
African
governments have made several attempts to exploit this potential of regional
trade for development, the most recent being the decision by African leaders at
the African Union summit in January 2012 to boost intra-African trade and fast
track the establishment of a continental free trade area.
Against
this background, UNCTAD's Economic Development in Africa Report 2013 subtitled
Intra-African Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism focuses on how to
strengthen the private sector to boost intra-African trade.
The
report notes that in recent years the share of intra-African trade in total
African trade fell from 22.4 per cent in 1997 to 11.3 per cent in 2011.
Intra-African trade (both exports and imports) totaled US$130.1 billion in
2011. These statistics may be underestimates, given the prevalence of informal
cross-border trade on the continent, but they are nevertheless low when
compared to other parts of the world.
For
example, over the 2007-2011 period, the average share of intra-regional exports
in total exports was 11 per cent in Africa, compared with 50 per cent in Asia
and 70per cent in Europe.
The
report argues that although the elimination of trade barriers is important, it will
not have the desired impact if it is not complemented by efforts by governments
to increase the variety and sophistication of the goods that their economies
produce - the process that economists call expanding productive capacity. That
involves measures such as upgrading infrastructure, improving the skills of
domestic workforces ,encouraging and enabling entrepreneurship, and increasing
the size of existing manufacturing firms so that they can satisfy larger
markets and produce their goods with greater economies of scale.
Having
cleared the field for increased regional trade - and the economic growth that
it promises - African nations need to provide the goods to sell to each other,
or foreign competitors will fill the vacuum, the Economic Development in Africa
Report contends. It also recommends that African governments strengthen the
private sector by making finance more accessible and less costly, and by
enhancing mechanisms for government consultation with the private sector.
Short-term
unexploited opportunities for regional trade in Africa are to be found
particularly in agriculture, the report says.
Africa
has about 27 per cent of the world's arable land, and that can be used to
expand
agricultural
production. And yet many countries on the continent import food and
agricultural products from countries outside Africa. For the period from 2007
to 2011, the study notes, 37 African countries were net food importers, and 22
were net importers of agricultural raw world trade in food and live animals took
place within Africa. The report argues that a key challenge for African
policymakers is how to exploit these opportunities for regional trade, the
so-called “low-hanging fruit”, and to ensure that the gains accrue
predominantly to Africa.
But
the greater long-term opportunity - and greater challenge - is to improve
industrial capacities to provide the goods for which regional trade typically
increases demand, the report says. The benefits of greatly expanding regional
trade – amply illustrated in Asia - are that selling in nearby markets gives
firms cost advantages through proximity, potentially reduced transport
expenses, better knowledge that allows goods to be fitted to local conditions,
and, if sufficient customers can be found, enough critical mass to justify
expanding industry, the report notes.
Some
of the potential is apparent in existing trade flows: African countries tend to
export a higher percentage of manufactured goods to each other (43 per cent of
all intra-African trade), while manufactured goods account for only 14 per cent
of total African exports to overseas markets.
The
challenge is clear, too. Africa accounts for only 1 per cent of global
manufacturing.
And
manufacturing represents about 10 per cent of African GDP, compared to 35 per
cent for East Asia and the Pacific and 16 per cent for Latin America and the
Caribbean. The low level of manufacturing development in Africa means that
manufactured goods - such as cars, machines, and electronic gadgets - must be
imported from overseas, a problem that is also an opportunity. If various
national markets can be effectively integrated into a larger regional market,
the report says, there should be sufficient numbers of customers to support the
expansion of industry within the region.
An
additional challenge noted by the report is that Africa has some of the highest
costs in the world for transporting goods. In Central Africa, transporting one
ton of goods along the route from Douala in Cameroon to N'Djamena in Chad costs
US$0.11 per kilometre, which is more than twice the cost in Western Europe
($0.05) and more than five times the cost in Pakistan ($0.02).
The
report contends that the nature of the goods produced and exported by African
enterprises matters for the growth and expansion of intra-African trade.
African countries produce and export a narrow range of goods, most of which are
primary commodities such as oil, natural gas, and metals. Over the period from
2007 to 2011, two products accounted for over 80 per cent of exports to other
African countries from Algeria, Angola, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.
Africa's lack of economic diversification and weak manufacturing base inhibit
intraregional trade, the study says.
The
report says that unlocking the trade potential of the private sector requires
the distinctive features of Africa's enterprise structure that inhibit regional
trade to be addressed. For example, African firms tend to be very small, which
makes it difficult for them to operate at the minimum scale necessary in order
to be competitive. The average size of a manufacturing firm in sub-Saharan
Africa is 47 employees, compared with 171 in Malaysia, 195 in Viet Nam, 393 in
Thailand, and 977 in China. There are also weak linkages between small and
large firms in Africa, making it difficult for small firms to benefit from the
skills and innovation capabilities of large firms, with dire consequences for
the growth of small firms.
Other
structural problems of Africa's constellation of enterprises include a high
share of informal firms, low levels of export competitiveness, and a lack of
business innovation capability.
In
addition, it is vitally important for African countries to maintain peace and
stability as a prerequisite for strengthening private-sector development and boosting
intra-African trade, the report says. Recent evidence, for example, has shown
that the political conflict in Côte d'Ivoire that began in the late 1990s
reduced intra-trade within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
by around 60 per cent over the period from 1999 to 2007.
Is
Libya ripe for Second civil war?
By
Nile Bowie
The Libyan central government is so far failing to assert its
authority over the country, buried in rampant infighting and lawlessness that
could lead to civil war.
The failed coup that culminated in last month’s kidnapping of
Libyan PM Ali Zeidan demonstrated the central government’s glaring lack of
authority. Lawlessness has become an everyday feature of life; foreign
embassies are targeted and attacked, rival militias and branches of Al-Qaeda
vie for power, and the country’s borders are porous and outside the
government’s control.
In another symbolic blow, a federalist movement in the eastern
Cyrenaica region has declared an autonomous regional government. This region,
known as Barqah, was the cradle of the revolt against Muammar Gaddafi and has
been historically marginalized, despite being a generator of economic activity,
with 80 percent of Libya's proven oil reserves and several strategic ports and
oil refineries within its territory.
The people of Barqah seek autonomy and federalism to combat the
political and administrative marginalization meted out by the central
government in Tripoli, which refuses to recognize the region’s aspirations of
self-rule, and has previously warned that it would forcefully respond over
attempts to break away.
Federalist militias and tribes have blocked activity at ports and
oil fields in the east, demanding a greater share of political power and oil
revenues, and effectively slashing Libya’s crude production to some 10 percent
of its 1.25 million barrel daily capacity. The blockade costs the country
around $130 million per day, further contributing to the post-revolution
economic stagnation. The central government, like the Western-backed transition
government before it, has spectacularly failed to create an inclusive polity
that would give key regional parties involved a representative stake in their
own development.
Divisions between secularists and Islamists are becoming further
entrenched in the Tripoli parliament, the drafting of a post-Gaddafi
constitution has been delayed for months; there is no inquiry into the deaths
of more than 30,000 Libyans during the 2011 conflict and no state-backed
reconciliation process to speak of. In light of these abject failures, leaders
and political movements in the provinces of Cyrenaica and Fezzan see the
hegemony of the incompetent Tripoli-centered political establishment as a
feature of the Gaddafi era that remains unchanged.
Libyans
wave their new national flag and holdismadhafi's downfall. (AFP Photo)
From revolution to
dissolution
In 2011, the United States and its NATO allies saw an opportunity
to unseat Gaddafi in favor of a regime lined with bureaucrats with
European-dual citizenship. NATO members deceitfully played the humanitarian
card by endorsing reports of human rights violations put together by the Libyan
opposition (which became the post-Gaddafi government), most of which remain
heavily redacted and not subject to public scrutiny.
These reports legitimized a UN resolution, which NATO countries
interpreted as carte blanche authority to forcefully change the regime,
culminating in the bombing of populated areas, the wholesale destruction of
infrastructure in some places, and a flood of weaponry into the country that
empowered various militias who have today become the true inheritors of
authority.
After failing to disarm these militias, the Tripoli government has
begun paying the salaries of former rebel groups in an attempt to integrate
them into state security forces. Militias are not made up of trained soldiers
in most cases; they are regular civilians who have taken up arms. Although they
operate in a semi-official capacity, their ambiguous allegiance to the state
suggests that they’re being paid in exchange for not making trouble.
Clearly, trouble is still being sown. Militias and Al-Qaeda-linked
groups have carried out dozens of assassinations targeting high-ranking
military and police figures while thousands of prisoners are held in unofficial
clandestine detention centers throughout the country. Dark-skinned Libyans
native to the south of the country and from cities like Tawargha continue to be
persecuted over suspicions of being loyal to Gaddafi.
British intelligence estimates claim that the Libyan government
controls only 20 out of 400 arms depots in the country, and some 3,000
shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles that can be used to shoot down
civilian airliners remain missing.
Russia has recently highlighted the dangers posed by 6,400 barrels
of badly-guarded yellowcake uranium discovered near the former Gaddafi
stronghold of Sabha, which Al-Qaeda groups have been eyeing.
The parties that most bear responsibility for this situation are
the foreign backers of the Libyan rebels, who opened a Pandora’s box of
extremism by enabling militias to overthrow Gaddafi, contributing to the
further emboldening of terrorist groups in Mali and Nigeria when weapons from Libya bled south.
Is federalism the solution?
Today it would be dangerous for Libyans to
advertise the fact that life was far more stable and safe under Gaddafi – it is
a self-evident truth. During his recent speech to the UN General Assembly,
President Obama claimed that “a tyrant could not kill his way back to power” as
a result of NATO’s operation in Libya. More precisely, one tyrant was replaced
with thousands of terrorists who have no qualms over killing their way to power.
Western corporations and governments overlooked Libya’s complex
tribal and ethnic demographics and believed that by supporting the rebels and
bringing a proxy government to power, this would allow them to gain lucrative
preferential access to the country’s enormous freshwater aquifers and oil
reserves, the largest in Africa.
As Libya’s oil industry has nearly come to a standstill, it is
clear that this plan has backfired completely.
Militias increasingly see the government as a satellite of the
United States following the abduction of Abu Anas al-Liby off the streets of
Tripoli; this has been compounded by PM Ali Zeidan’s pleas of support to
Washington following his abduction and release.
The situation in Libya today can very plausibly deteriorate into a
complicated civil war between dozens of parties trying to implement their
vision of how the country should be run.
Influential tribes that have historically opposed fascism and
Italian colonialism in Cyrenaica have called for readopting and modernizing a
version of the 1951 Constitution that would allow for federalism, and thus,
significantly greater autonomy for each of Libya’s three provinces.
A constituent assembly was formed in October – already several
months behind schedule – charged with drafting a post-Gaddafi
constitution.
In accordance with the transitional roadmap adopted by the
transitional government in May 2011, the mandate of the current government in
Tripoli is set to expire on February 8, 2014.
Failure to implement a new constitution by then would either force
Tripoli into extending its mandate – a move which is seen as highly unpopular –
or a potential power vacuum scenario which could set off a chain of events that
could lead to a civil war or dissolution.
The potential succession of Cyrenaica that would be an economic
disaster for the Tripolitania and Fezzan regions, and would be a precursor to
armed conflict that would allow terrorist militias to embolden their authority
and influence.
Prior to Gaddafi’s coup in 1969, Libya operated on a federal
framework and allowing this system to return in earnest will further empower
the official structures of political authority in each province, which would
allow the regions to consolidate control and work with each other to stymie the
influence of radical militias.
Once an amended constitution is
ratified, Libyans will vote in presidential elections held thereafter, and
restoring the federalized system is the safest means of ensuring a return to
some semblance of order.
Economic Warfare in Venezuela: Government Reforms to
Fight Speculation and Hoarding
 |
| Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro |
Venezuelan
president Nicolas Maduro has announced a slew of policy reforms aimed at
combating speculation and hoarding, along with the creation of new government
institutions to regulate trade and oversee foreign currency exchange.
“We
have to make real decisions for the benefit of the economy and society,
whatever the cost and whatever happens,” Maduro stated from Miraflores Palace
yesterday afternoon.
Describing
the package of reforms as an “economic offensive”, Maduro pledged to “strike
hard” at speculators and hoarders.
He
announced the creation of a new national task-force to inspect businesses
across the country to compliment current efforts by the government’s consumer
protection agency Indepabis to identify hoarders.
Venezuelan
consumers have been hit with shortages of products ranging from milk to toilet
paper in recent months. The opposition has blamed government policy, though
Maduro has pointed to businesses that allegedly hoard goods for political
reasons.
Indepabis
has responded to shortages by launching a nationwide crackdown against hoarders
and speculators earlier this year, with numerous businesses being
slapped with penalties by the consumer watchdog.
“For
the period of November and December we will establish a special operation to
protect and ensure fair price sales for the population of several items that we
consider important,” Maduro said.
“Textiles,
footwear, appliances, vehicles, footwear, toys among others… and we will begin
to apply [these measures] from today,” he said.
“We
are going to review the entire supply chain. We are going to check every
inventory in the country,” he said.
Maduro
also issued new warnings to the head of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers
of Commerce (Fedecamaras), Jorge Roig, who he accused of being involved in an
“economic war”.
Former
Fedecamaras president Pedro Carmona declared himself head of state for two days
in 2002 during a coup that temporarily ousted Maduro’s predecessor, the late
Hugo Chavez. Relations between the government and Fedecamaras never recovered.
Just
last week, pro-government trade unions marched through Caracas to
protest against the business federation’s alleged activities.
“I
have evidence; Jorge Roig directs the economic warfare,” he said.
Websites
that publish the bolivar’s black market exchange value were also warned of
repercussions by the president.
Currency
and Trade Reform
Along
with further cracking down on hoarding, Maduro announced the creation of a
National Centre of Exterior Commerce to oversee the government’s various
foreign exchange schemes, along with imports and exports conducted by
state-owned enterprises. The latter task will be managed by the National
Foreign Trade Corporation, which appears to be subject to the National Centre
of Exterior Commerce.
“It’s
a command centre, conducting and planning,” he said.
According
to Maduro, the new agency will “create new mechanisms for the transition to
socialism.”
Amid
complaints from private importers of shortages of US dollars, this year the
government has implemented numerous reforms to Venezuela’s foreign exchange
system, though the value of the bolivar on the black market has more than
halved since the start of the year.
In
March, while acting as interim president Maduro said he would “overcome the parallel market”
by establishing the Complimentary System of Foreign Currency Acquirement
(Sicad).
Sicad
now regularly auctions US dollars to companies and individuals. Then earlier
this month, in a move widely seen as an attempt to coax international visitors
away from the currency black market, he said a new “tourist” exchange rate would
be created by the central bank.
The
government’s primary foreign exchange body, the Commission for the
Administration of Currency Exchange (Cadivi), Sicad and public banking
activities related to foreign exchange now will all be overseen by the National
Centre of Exterior Commerce.
However,
Maduro indicated that his administration is currently focusing on better
allocating foreign currency, rather than increasing supply.
“Venezuela
has the dollars necessary for the functioning of the…entire economy,” Maduro
said.
The
re-organising of the foreign exchange initiatives will also be accompanied by
the establishment of a national foreign currency budget.
“I
establish today the national exchange budget for the proper administration of
the country’s foreign exchange and state government expenditure,” he said.
“We
need to optimise each dollar,” Maduro stated, explaining that the budget will
determine the demand for foreign currency by Venezuela’s economy, and assist in
better allocating money to businesses and government institutions.
Vice
President for the Economic Area Rafael Ramirez was appointed by Maduro to head
the new budget.
Along
with the initiatives intended to streamline access to foreign currency, Maduro
also said his government is seeking to develop incentives for Venezuelans to
save more money.
“This
has to be coordinated with all the banks…to find special measures, with various
actions to encourage the return of foreign capital to Venezuela,” he said.
Other
Announcements
During
the same speech, the president also revealed plans to further expand Mission
Mercal, which sells heavily subsidised food to the Venezuelan public. Maduro
stated that his administration aims to have a Mercal covering every workplace.
Since
the establishment of the mission in 2003, over 16,600 Mercal outlets have
sprouted nationwide. According to government statistics, the state-owned chain
has provided over 12 million tonnes of subsidised food to over 10 million
Venezuelans.
Earlier
this year, the government extended the mission by creating the Workers’ Mercal program,
initially expected to supply 14 basic products to around 23,000 public sector
workers in 32 institutions.
Yesterday,
Mauro also announced the creation of the National Corporation for Domestic
Trade Logistics and Transport Services, which will be tasked with improving
domestic distribution of goods.
He
stated that the corporation will develop a service network for transport
operators across the country, including roadside rest stops and maintenance
facilities. He also announced the import of 5000 new trucks from China and
Brazil.
He
stated the vehicles will be imported by the state to improve “the entire public
and private system”.
Maduro
called on private logistics companies to cooperate with the initiative.
The Chinese Labour
Movement And Political Change in China
 |
| Chinese President Xi Jinping |
By Dr. Gary K. Busch
Over the past decade, the industrial
relations system in China has made the country an attractive destination for
global corporations due to its low wage rates, restrictive labour laws and the
non-recognition of independent trade unions and the right to strike. This has
been the result of a unique industrial legacy of a praetorian political system
coupled with the astigmatic ideology of a highly centralised political system
dominated by a single party. This is all changing and changing quickly. This
will have an important effect on the future stability and cohesion of the
Chinese state and its industrial future as well as in Chinese economic
structures outside of China.
A great deal of the constraints
which have deterred the development of modern industrial relations in the
Chinese workplace derives from China’s unique history, system of governance and
the resulting treatment of China’s working population as without power, value
or legitimacy in national politics. Throughout Chinese political and economic
development the Chinese working class has been seen as an exploitable and
irrelevant consideration by the Chinese political leadership in economic policy
formation a group for whom the term coolie sufficed as descriptor. Chinese
labour has had its periods of improvement but these have almost always been
followed by bitter disappointment at the actions of those who sought to harness
the energies of workers and their organisations for their own particular
agendas.
A Brief Overview of Chinese History
For centuries the peasant farmers of
the vast expanse of the territory now known as China toiled as essentially
feudal labourers; serfs tied to the land by a feudal system and by deep
poverty. The harshness and grinding poverty of their existence became public
knowledge in the West as the result of the 1938 Nobel Prize for
Literature being awarded to the American author, Pearl Sydenstricker Buck (also
known by her Chinese name Sai Zhenzhu) for her novel The Good Earth
(1831). Pearl Buck left her home in West Virginia to travel with her
missionary parents to China where she grew up and lived until 1934. Her graphic
depiction of the harshness and despair of Chinese village life had a profound
effect on the world�s perception of China; especially the position of women
and the effects of the constant civil strife by competing internal and external
military-political forces on the peasantry After centuries of fighting among
feudal Emperors (the Qin and the Han Dynasties) imperial rule in China was
overtaken by the Mongol invasion. In 1271 the Mongols conquered China and
imposed their own, Yuan Dynasty, which lasted until 1368. In 1368 the Ming
Dynasty drove out the Mongols and began the modernisation of China. Peasants
were involved in the restructuring of the agricultural system and a stronger
central government was fortified with a centralised bureaucracy based on
competence and exams. This lasted until 1644 when the Manchu Qing Dynasty drove
out the Ming.
Initially the rationalisations of
the political system were maintained and expanded by the Qing but, by the
beginning of the 19th century the imperial hold on China was
weakened by the discovery of China’s wealth by the European colonial powers and
the Japanese. They soon began making demands on the ruling emperors and were
allowed to impose "unequal treaties" that created foreign concessions
in China's ports. The weakness of the central government structure allowed the
rise of regional warlords whose armies fought with each other for territory and
plunder and were funded in this by foreign powers. The Qing tried to respond by
instituting a number of reforms but the foreign powers refused to allow this.
After a period of ever-increasing presence
of foreign traders, Christian missionaries, foreign troops and British-supplied
opium a violent surge of protest occurred among the Chinese. This included many
of the warlords, the landowners and the newly urbanised poor. Their rebellion
against foreign rule and in support of the Qing reforms led to their capturing
Beijing and attacking the foreign legations - the "Boxer Rebellion".
Initially they were successful but the imperial powers formed an Eight Nation
Alliance (UK, Russia, Japan, France, U.S., Germany, Italy and Austro-Hungary)
against the Chinese. They assembled 50,255 foreign troops (expeditionary
forces) plus 100,000 Russian troops to occupy Manchuria. In addition a portion
of the Imperial Forces led by Yuan Shikai's Division fought with the foreigners
against the Imperial troops. The Imperial troops were defeated, Beijing seized
and these eight foreign powers extracted further concessions from the weakened
Qing government.
On 7 September 1901, the Qing
Empress signed the Boxer Protocol. In addition to a fine imposed on China of
450,000 taels of silver it also ordered the execution of ten high-ranking
officials linked to the outbreak and other officials who were found guilty for
the slaughter of foreigners in China. They imposed Chinese customs duties,
income and salt taxes to guarantee the reparation payments. With interest, the
Chinese paid 668,661,220 taels of silver from 1901 to 1939. The current day
value of this sum is around US$61 billion.
By 1911-12 the Chinese military
instigated a series of revolts by reform-minded officers. This led to the
Proclamation of Republic of China under Sun Yat-sen and abdication of last Qing
emperor. Although the Emperor was removed, this change did not lead to
democracy in China as no army was so strong as to affect change in more than
its area. Sun Yat-sen attempted to build national institutions but was unable
to stand up to the growth of warlordism and the rise of the Communist Party in
China after the Russian Revolution of 1917.
Background to Chinese Labour
Chinese workers were first exploited
by the survival of feudal practices in the rural economies which frequently led
to the deaths of millions of Chinese through starvation and ill health; by the
rise of weak imperial dynasty states in which military warlords took over real
power; by the invasions and demands for concessions and reparations by foreign
powers; by the concomitant rise of an urban proletariat in China�s cities
which fell under the influence of parasitical organised criminal Triads; by the
brutal occupation of the country by the Japanese military; by a brutal civil
war which pitted the Kuomintang against the Communist Party; and by the
consistent betrayal of �a long history of peasant revolts which were finally
subsumed by the rise of the Chinese Communist Party.
The Communist Party of China drew
its strength from the urban working class in such large cities as Shanghai and
Canton. In these cities there was an urban proletariat which had settled
permanently and worked in the ports, transport hubs, construction and an
increasing number of administrative jobs. Sun Yat-sen and his troops played an
instrumental role in the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty After the success of the
Double Ten Revolution he became the first president of the Provisional Republic
of China, in 1912 and then founded the Kuomintang, serving as its first leader.
He was succeeded by Chiang Kai-Shek, who led the Kuomintang into a close
relationship with the Bolsheviks.
It was a little ironic that the
first trade union bodies to fall under the almost complete control of the
political forces were the urban unions of China, especially in Shanghai. In
China, after the republican revolution of 191l, trades unions began to form
among the urban masses of China's large cities. With the formation of the
Comintern, numerous unionists were sent to China to help strengthen the nascent
Chinese communist unions and parties. Mikhail Borodin's famous mission was only
one of a large number of Comintern missions. Nonetheless, power still remained
firmly in the hands of the local warlords whose min t'uan (private
armies) controlled much of the rural areas. By far the most important
development emerged in 1923 when the workers, students and peasants began to
form national parties. Among the first was the Kuomintang, or Nationalist
Party. The other major party was the Kung Ch 'antang, the Communist Party.
Interestingly the Kuomintang found a
close ally in the communist party of the Soviet Union which sent down
instructors and advisers to shape the Kuomintang into a disciplined Bolshevik
party. No sooner had the party formed and become organised when the Soviets
demanded that the Kung Ch 'antang merge itself into the Kuomintang.
In the meantime, the Kuomintang
became a model in miniature of the Bolshevik party. The Soviets sent advisers
to instil communism in the military forces and set up the Whampoa Military
Academy. The Russians shipped in arms and instructors to bolster the Kuomintang
forces. The Kung Ch 'antang remained a left faction within Kuomintang and
worked to strengthen the Kuomintang on Moscow's orders. The Chinese communists
were successful in recruiting the urban workers of Canton and Shanghai and were
able to set up communist-led peasant organisations in Hunan. They built strong
unions among the railroad workers and miners in Hunan and, through their
control over the Independent Division of the Fourth Army in Hunan, were able to
control the industrialised areas east of Changsha. The leadership of the
Kuomintang devolved on the director of the Whampoa Military Academy and the
hero of the northern campaign, Chiang Kai-shek.
Having won control of Canton he
began a march on Shanghai. In support of the Kuomintang the workers in the
communist unions of Shanghai began a series of major strikes. At the height of
this demonstration more than half a million workers went out on strike in
Shanghai, backed by an armed workers' militia of more than five thousand.
On 26 March 1927 Chiang Kai-shek
marched into Shanghai, welcomed by the striking workers as their liberator.
Chiang had barely been in the city for a few days when he contacted the leaders
of the compradors and the notorious Green Gang to make a deal with them. Allied
with these forces, Chiang began a purge of all the communists, especially the
unionists. On 12 April 1927 he and the local gangs turned their forces on the
communists in the unions. More than five thousand communists lost their lives.
When the strikes ended in May, communist control had been wrenched from the
unions by the Kuomintang.
A brief attempt at an urban uprising
based on the unions in the 1930s was ruthlessly put down by the Kuomintang. The
Soviets had succeeded in creating a Kuomintang which had devoured the local
communist party. It was Trotsky, in fact, who had warned of the dangers
involved in making the communists join the Kuomintang. He wrote that 'the
policy of a shackled Communist Party serving as a recruiting agent to bring the
workers into the Kuomintang is preparation for the successful establishment of a
Fascist dictatorship in China' He was not wrong. The Kuomintang set about
obliterating the communists, driving them from the cities to their stronghold
in Hunan. The Chinese communists, led by the son of a wealthy Hunanese peasant,
Mao Tse-tung, adopted these lessons to the communist struggle in China. He
decreed that the peasantry (not the workers) should form the basis of the
revolution. Only after the peasant revolution would there be a need for control
of the urban masses.
In addition to making a virtue of
necessity, this line abandoned the unions in the cities to the less than tender
mercies of the Kuomintang. During the civil war with the Kuomintang numerous
workers' units joined Mao's Hunan army and participated in the Nanchang
Uprising. The largest union support came from the iron miners of Hanyehping in
Wuhan. In fact, the First Red Army was largely composed of workers. When these
troops were destroyed in battle with the forces of the Kuomintang the first
generation of trade unionists in China was virtually eliminated. The 1937 start
to the war with the Japanese finished off most of the others; even though the
Kuomintang and the Communists co-operated with each other to battle the
Japanese...
When, after the end of the war,
there was a brief interlude of relative calm in China, the US and the OSS
forces active in China sent in a large number of American unionists and labour
specialists to China in an effort to rebuild a strong Chinese trade union
movement. Dick Deverall of the Free Trade Union Committee attempted to set up
labour programmes in China. John Shulter and his colleagues in the US Labour
Department tried to foster free unionism in Peking, Shanghai and Canton.
But, with the gradual ascendance to
post-war power of the Chinese communists under Mao, the forces of the
Kuomintang were driven from mainland China and the US labour missions were
terminated. The All-China Federation of Trades Unions (a national Chinese
labour federation formed in 1925) was recreated under tight Communist party
control and became similar in function to the AUCCTU of the Soviet Union (the
Soviet central trade union federation). The ACFTU was a founding member of the
WFTU and remained an important member in it after the ICFTU split in 1949.
The ACFTU is the only workers federation
allowed to operate in China, representing 135 million workers in 31 provincial,
autonomous regional and municipal federations and 10 national industrial trade
unions. Any union established must be registered under the ACFTU. It is a part
of the Chinese governmental structure. Any union established must be registered
under the ACFTU.
No independent trade unions are
allowed to operate outside government control. The government considers the
ACFTU to be a quasi-governmental body, indeed, an arm of the government and a
subsidiary organ of the Chinese Communist Party, designed to facilitate and
support government policies within enterprises and to ensure the continued
control of the working population. It has been a conservative force in
industrial relations and is used more to control than to protect and advance
workers rights. There was a modest change in the early 1990s through the
introduction of the comprehensive three-systems reforms in state-owned
enterprises in terms of labour contracts, rewards systems and social insurance.
It has had little beneficial effect in the non-state industrial organisations.
It did nothing to assist the aims of
working people during the two major calamities created by the Chinese Communist
party. Rather than bring social justice and the rise of workers’ rights, the
Chinese Communist Party brought in The Great Leap Forward which introduced a
mandatory system of rural agricultural collectivisation and oppression of the
rural poor. Private farming was outlawed and those who opposed the program were
jailed, robbed of any civil rights and re-educated.
The Great Leap Forward was a catastrophe
on a monumental scale. Estimates of the death toll of the program range from
twenty to forty-five million Chinese deaths; most of whom died of starvation.
After the Second World War and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party to power
the Chinese peasantry formed into villages in which peasants owned their
small-holdings. The Communists imposed a hukou system of internal passports in
1956 which restricted movements within the country. Then they ordered that
these agricultural properties be collectivised. Not only did agricultural
productivity decline but strange schemes, like backyard steel mills, were
enforced and encouraged which further diverted rural labour from farming. Those
who opposed were labelled rightists and punished. It was an unqualified
disaster. Although the harvest of 1958 was very productive the diversion of
labour to the alternative projects like steel-making meant that a great deal of
the harvest was never gathered from the fields. Then a giant storm of locusts
attacked the food stock and grain stores. The Great Sparrow Campaign of the
Communists had destroyed the birds which were the predators of the locusts so
the locusts destroyed the crops without control. This was followed soon after
by the Cultural Revolution where young activists purged the dangerous
intellectuals and dissidents from the cities and sent them to re-education
camps� in the provinces. A new system was introduced for the use of Chinese
labour, the Lao Gai which means "reform through labour". This is the
system of large prison camps where non-criminals were sent to be re-educated
through hard labour. It is estimated that in the last fifty years, more than
fifty million people have been sent to lao gai camps.
An important point to be noted is
that these labour initiatives and systems were, until recently, populated by
state workers, not employed by private industry. The Chinese system has made
use of a system called danwei. This became an extended Chinese welfare state
whose benefits were heavily concentrated within the state workforce and
delivered through the workplace. In China the collectivization of industry and
agriculture in the 1950s brought with them a set of seemingly new institutional
arrangements through which the average citizen interacted with the state. Among
these was the �work unit� or danwei, to which virtually all urban residents
belonged by the 1950s.
Within China's industrial sector,
employment in state enterprises by the early 1960s had the following general
characteristics:
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Employees and
managers viewed the workplace as a source of cradle-to- grave welfare
benefits, including but not limited to housing, food, health care, pensions,
insurance, child care, primary education, cultural activities, and more.
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Membership in
this enterprise community was considered more or less permanent, and access
to it was tightly restricted. Labour mobility even within the state sector
was rare.
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New employees
were assigned to state enterprises through comprehensive state labour r
allocation plans, and new workers generally underwent an apprenticeship
before attaining the complete benefits of state employment.
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In theory, wage
determination was based on a national wage scale that offered higher pay as a
worker acquired greater technical skills. However, by the early 1960s this
had evolved into a de facto seniority wage system, in which differences in
pay reflected the sequence of entry into the state labour force.
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As physically
walled compounds, work units were literally compartmentalized from the outside
world, though the state had a number of �ports of entry� to them.
Enterprises were the primary units of political communication and
participation, with frequent meetings and political movements or
�campaigns� that attempted to mobilize the workforce to raise production
or to attack political targets.
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At the
individual level, enterprises exerted political controls through a
�dossier� system in which personnel departments maintained individual
employee files that recorded extensive personal data � including political
transgressions.
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The enterprise
branch committee of the Communist Party exercised authority over labour r
issues, personnel appointments, and at times even day-to-day administrative
matters. Party committees could also dictate to managers and factory
directors how they should resolve broader questions such as the use of
incentive bonuses and overtime pay.
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Labour
supervisors served as critical intermediaries between enterprise directors
and workers by using their dual powers as administrative and political
authorities at the basic level. Expressions of personal and political loyalty
by workers to their supervisors could strongly influence decisions on which
workers would be approved for promotions or wage increases.[i]
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This system prevails although there
has been an increasing shift of workers out of purely state employment into the
private sector. Danwei is not universal anymore and many of the social,
housing, wage and job security issues which were formerly the preserve of the
state have become the responsibility of private companies. As a result of the
1994 Labour Law the ACFTU has been given limited autonomy, collective
bargaining status and limited participation in state corporation
decision-making. As part of the policy of opening the Chinese market to a
limited form of private capital there are many workers who are no longer in the
danwei system and reliant on the companies which employ them. However, these
companies are far different forms of enterprise than those normally confronted
by workers in the private sector.
The Unique Development of Chinese
Industrial Conglomerates
There seems to be a great
misunderstanding of the nature of Chinese capitalism; the great engine of
modernisation which is hailed as leading to the restructuring of the Chinese
State and towards its eventual democratisation. The misunderstanding arises
because there is only a dim perception in the international community that the
large bulk of these Chinese companies are owned and operated by the Chinese
military. They are corporations created in a similar structure to what might be
called zaibatsu in Japan or chaebol in Korea. These zaibatsu were large
centrally-controlled vertical monopolies consisting of a holding company on top
with a wholly-owned banking subsidiary providing finance, and several
industrial and trading subsidiaries dominating specific sectors of a market,
either solely, or through a number of sub-subsidiary companies. These are now
international in scale.
The influence of the Chinese
military in the economic affairs of China has been extensive for the last three
thousand years. Despite the fact that China has been primarily a poor,
fragmented subsistence agricultural economy it was still under military rule.
The military have always dominated the agricultural sector and, after the death
of Mao Tse-tung, they have been the dominant force in Chinese industry and
politics as well...
There has been a long tradition of
warlords in China especially from 1916 to the late-1930s, when the country was
divided among military cliques, a division that continued until the fall of the
Nationalist government in the mainland China regions of Sichuan, Shanxi,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangdong, Guangxi, Gansu, Yunnan, and Xinjiang. In this
period a warlord maintained his own troops loyal to him, dominated and
controlled the agriculture and mining in his area or region; and acted as the
de facto political power in that region. To maintain themselves they often
fought with their neighbouring warlords and against any attempt by the Emperor
or central government to control them. Some of the most notable warlord wars,
post 1928, included the Central Plains War, which involved nearly a million
soldiers. The central government was weak and relied on the power and support
of these fractious warlords to remain in power. The central government did,
however, provide a national civil service and a national administrative regime
but these, too, were uniformly weak.
The defeat of the Kuomintang
leadership of the ex-warlord Chiang Kai-shek in the wake of the Second World
War left the ravaged China in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party led by
Mao Tse-tung. Mao was both the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party as well
as the Chairman of the Central Military Committee. His rule was personal,
direct and disastrous. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution led
to the virtual self-destruction of China. Millions starved to death; many more
were exiled or driven away from the cities. He was succeeded by Hue Guofeng who
attempted to keep a tight control over the power structures of China, including
the Central Military Committee. However, his power waned and control was
transferred to the reformer Deng Xiaoping, who revolutionised the economy of
China. Deng never held office as the head of state or the head of government,
but served as the de facto leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978
to the early 1990s as the leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Deng represented the second
generation Chinese leadership and was instrumental in introducing Chinese
economic reform, also known as the socialist market economy and partially
opened China to the global market. He is generally credited with pushing China
into becoming one of the fastest growing economies in the world and by raising
the standard of living. Deng Xiaoping's ouster of Hue Guofeng was the moment
when the market policies of economic reform began. This reform was carried on
primarily by the military companies created in the various regions by the
armies which controlled them.
It is not difficult to see why. The
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) controlled the security situation in its region.
That meant it issued permits to enter or leave the region; it controlled the
communications network in the region; it had the trucks and other transport
under its control; and it was charged with maintaining order. It was, in fact,
in charge of almost everything but the civil administration... This was not
controlled by one central PLA group but was under the control of the individual
armies for each region. There are seven military regions in China, each with
its complement of armies which control the security, transportation and
industrial resources within their regions, although the Sate and Communist Party
supply the civil administration
Regular
Army Order of Battle
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Beijing Military Region
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27th Group Army
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38th Group Army
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65th Group Army
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Beijing Garrison
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Shenyang Military Region
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16th Group Army
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39th Group Army
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40th Group Army
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Lanzhou Military Region
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21st Group Army
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47th Group Army
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Xinjiang Military District
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Jinan Military Region
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20th Group Army
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26th Group Army
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54th Group Army
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Nanjing Military Region
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1st Group Army
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12th Group Army
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31st Group Army
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Guangzhou Military Region
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41st Group Army
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42nd Group Army
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Chengdu Military Region
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13th Group Army
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14th Group Army
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Tibet Military District
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Some, like the 27th Army
and the 38th Army were in economic hotspots and were able to
thrive quickly. The Northern Army was quick to exploit its opportunities.
The Military-Industrial Complex:
The
military opportunity for expanding its power arose in the wake of the civil
disturbances of the Tiananmen Square uprising, when the Chinese Communist
Party, under Li Peng, cracked down on China's democracy movement, ordering in
the troops to battle the students. The PLA was ambivalent about this and seven
retired senior military officers openly criticized the martial law order
imposed by the Beijing government and called for the ouster of Premier Li Peng.
In the march towards the capital at a village five miles southwest of Beijing,
soldiers and peasants engaged in a brick- and rock-throwing brawl that injured
as many as forty people. The general in charge of the 38th Army
refused to attack the demonstrators in Tienamen Square. Others were less
squeamish and the PLA did its duty. The populace was outraged and the authority
of the Communist Party waned. The PLA realised it was free from the controlling
hand of the Party and became agents of change; primarily corporate change,
encouraged by Deng Xiaoping (retired but active).
They
already had numerous companies under PLA control, manufacturing goods for the
defence sector. During Mao Tse-tung’s rule and the era of Sino-Soviet tensions,
the military moved many of its factories inland in case of a possible attack on
China. Manufacturing purely military products, such as arms, ammunition, as
well as electronics, plastics and metals for military applications, these
so-called "third-line" factories were built in remote mountain
regions, far away from transportation routes and power sources. The factories
bought supplies at subsidized costs from other factories, manufactured the
weaponry and related products -- generally low-tech and low-quality -- and then
sold them to the military at subsidized prices.
After
Mao's death in 1976, the new Party leadership encouraged the military plants to
begin exploring civilian uses for their products and to engage in the broader
liberalizing economy. The most nimble managers were free to exploit new markets
for their goods. During the early 1980s, the PLA's share of the national budget
declined, spurring it to look to other sources for cash, especially hard
currency. The higher organizational levels of the PLA created trading companies
like China Xinxing, China Poly and China Songhai to take advantage of the
opening of China's economy to the international market.
They
formed banks, holding companies and international trading companies like
Everbright to market these goods worldwide. Now the PLA runs farms, factories,
mines, hotels, brothels, paging and telephone companies, banks, stock brokers
and airlines, as well as major trading companies.
The
number of military-run businesses exploded during the boom of the late 1980s.
The "third line" factories opened branches in the coastal areas,
earning increasingly high profits from the manufacture of consumer goods. Even
the lowest levels of the PLA set up production units. In fact the PLA had a
largely captive audience of Chinese who had never really had the chance to
acquire personal consumer goods produced in China before. In addition to their
international arms sales, their production of consumer goods for the domestic
market soared.
The
government first attempted to regulate PLA business activities in 1989 with a
series of decrees; among them a prohibition on active military personnel
concurrently holding positions at commercial enterprises. The reforms were
intended to keep management of PLA enterprises under the control of senior
military leaders and prevent lower-ranking officers from becoming involved in
the daily functioning of the military companies. In the wake of the rejection
of the Party in 1989 these government strictures fell away. The government
tried again the early 1990s, when the central leadership of the military took
steps to coordinate the production of the vast number of military factories by
tying the plants together under "group companies." The groups, acting
like conglomerates, have been fairly successful in centralizing management and
production, running the trading companies and expanding the groups' business
operations. The PLA now acts as a state within a state, with its power growing
substantially in the latest wave of Chinese economic growth. In fact China is a
praetorian state where the army is the true power and the Communist Party
desperately seeking to exert its control.
Chinese International Companies:
Many
of the PLA companies are now industrial giants with investments all over the
world; especially in Africa. Many of the companies have listed themselves on
capital markets in Hong Kong and elsewhere, opened representative offices in
overseas markets, solicited foreign companies for joint ventures and
partnerships in China and concentrated on exports. The so-called red chips,
companies listed on the Hong Kong exchange but which are in fact mainland
Chinese firms, are the hottest stocks on the market. Hong Kong is the PLA's
favoured stock exchange because of its loose disclosure guidelines. China Poly
Group has two listed companies: Continental Mariner Company Ltd. and Poly
Investments Holdings Ltd. Both Continental Mariner and Poly Investments have a
large number of subsidiary companies in mainland China, Hong Kong and tax
havens like Liberia, the British Virgin Islands and Panama. China Carrie's
listed company in Hong Kong is Hongkong Macau Holdings Ltd. China Carrie also
owns HMH China Investments Ltd. on the Toronto Stock Exchange and HMH Gold
Mining on the Australian Stock Exchange. 999 Enterprise Group, another company
controlled by the PLA General Logistics Department, operates Sanjiu
Pharmaceuticals Group, the largest pharmaceuticals manufacturer in China.
Smaller military enterprises, like the Songliao Automobile Company owned by the
PLA Shenyang Military Region, have also listed in the domestic Chinese markets.
China
Poly Group is a commercial arm of the PLA General Staff Department. The PLA
General Logistics Department operates China Xinxing. The PLA General Political
Department owns and operates China Carrie; and the PLA Navy runs China Songhai.
These
are not small operations. As early as 1994, with $382 million worth of
import-export trade, China Poly Group was the fifty-ninth largest import-export
company in China, according to China State Statistical Bureau. China Xinxing
ranked 170th with $159 million, China Carrie ranked 203rd with $137 million,
and China Songhai ranked 395th with $71 million.
Foreign
companies looking for a foothold in China like partnering with the PLA because
of the stability it can offer to any long-term project. Companies with military
partners get the added security of knowing that the top "management"
of many of the PLA companies are from the ranks of the "princelings,"
the children and relatives of senior Chinese Communist Party officials. These
influential princelings assure that the business operations of the PLA will
have the government connections that are so important in China's corrupt
system. In the case of China Poly, chair Wang Jun and president He Ping act as
brokers between the government and the military. Wang Jun is the eldest son of
the late Vice-President Wang Zhen. He Ping is the son-in-law of the late Deng Xiaoping.
Wang Jun's brother, Wang Bing, is the chair of the PLA Navy Helicopter Company.
China Carrie's president is Ye Xuanning, the second son of late PLA Marshal Ye
Jianying.
These
international Chinese military companies are very rich and powerful. Some have
entered into very controversial projects. A good example is the
Hutchison-Whampoa, Hutchison Port Holding (HPH). HPH is a huge,
multibillion-dollar company which has set up operations in ports all around the
world. From Panama to the Philippines, an arm of Hutchison-Whampoa, Hutchison
Port Holding (HPH), has become the world’s largest seaport operator, embedding
itself in strategic seaports all across the globe. In fact now Hutchison holds
the exclusive contract to operate the Panama Canal.
These
companies are not only involved in commercial expansion. Because of their ties
to the PLA they are deeply involved in the business of cyber espionage. In
October 2-12 the U.S. House of Representatives published a report U.S. National
Security Issues Posed by the Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and
ZTE. The report stated that Huawei did not disclose its close relationship with
the PLA and the Chinese Government and posed a cyber-security risk to the U.S.
Huawei maintains close ties to the Third Department of the General Staff
Headquarters. This department is responsible for monitoring the
telecommunications of foreign armies and producing finished intelligence based
on the military information collected.
With
offices in Cuba, Iran, and Burma, Huawei has been a major supplier of dual-use
telecom equipment. In 2001, its Indian subsidiary was accused of tailoring a
commercial order for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Also in 2001, Huawei
supplied Iraq with fibre optics to link its radar and anti-aircraft systems,
triggering U.S. and U.K. bombings. Private defence firms often also enjoy the
shielding of powerful patrons. Huawei was founded by a former PLA officer, and
benefitted from early sales to the PLA. But it also receives state support in
the form of tax privileges and state-sponsored credit because it has been
designated a national champion of new technology. Its supporters have included
top general Yang Shangkun and head of the China International Trade and
Investment Corporation, Wang Jun (also president of Poly).
The
Canadians highlighted their experiences with these corporations in their
Commentary No. 84: Weapons Proliferation and the Military-Industrial Complex of
the PRC produced by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 2003. They concentrated
on NORINCO, the corporation formed out of the former ordinance ministry (Fifth
Ministry of Machine Building). On 23 May 2003, the U.S. State Department issued
a two-year ban on imports of products from NORINCO and subsidiaries to the
United States, charging that the entity had sold rocket fuel and missile
components to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Iranian government agency
in charge of developing and producing ballistic missiles. The ban covered at
least US$200 million in goods, and, according to CIA estimates, as much as five
times that figure if U.S. customs can identify all of NORINCO subsidiaries,
which export everything from toys and shoes (Wal-Mart is a major purchaser) to
auto parts and aluminium heat sinks for computers. Other firms in this
category, such as China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, and
China Great Wall Industrial Corporation, are among those currently sanctioned
by the U.S. for illegal transfers of weapons, dual-use material and technology
to Iran.
The
important point to be made about these major military-industrial combines and
trading companies is that they are some of the major employers of labour in
China, either directly or as suppliers of parts and components to these
companies. It is not possible to discuss industrial relations in China as if
these companies were ordinary capitalist private employers who compete for
labour in a pool of possible workers. They have immense political power,
regional power and, even when they act as suppliers to Western corporate
investors in China, they are not governed by the usual constraints on employers
elsewhere in the world.
The Third Force In
Chinese Corporations: The Triads
One
aspect of the development of Chinese enterprise is its close interaction with
organised crime. These Chinese criminals aren’t just private sector
entrepreneurs seeking to earn a quick, if dishonest, buck. They are part of
ancient and well organised criminal groups with a fierce internal discipline.
There are two distinct types of Chinese organised criminal gangs. The most
ancient and well-established are the Triads. Their origins stretch back to the
fight against the Qing Dynasty in the 1760s when the Han Chinese fought against
the reigning Manchus. They developed a set of rituals and practices to preserve
their anonymity and to bind each member to the society; a lot like the
Freemasons. They set up a triangle of power which reflected the Heavens, the
Earth and Man. Things were explained as variations on the triangular theme.
However, power was vertical as in a pyramid; the Shan Chu (Mountain Master) was
the overall leader responsible for making the final decision on all matters.
The Fu Shan Chu (Deputy Mountain Master), when appointed, was the deputy leader
and directly assisted the leader. The Heung Chu (Incense Master) was
responsible for all ceremonies of initiation and promotion. The Sin Fung
(Vanguard) was responsible for recruitment, and organising and assisting in
ceremonies. The Hung Kwan (Red Pole) was the fighter rank of the society. The
Pak Tsz Sin (White Paper Fan) was responsible for the general administration of
the society. The Cho Hai (Straw Sandal) was the liaison officer for the
society. The 49 Chai was the ordinary member usually recruited to follow a
particular office-bearer.[ii]
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Triads
also use numeric codes to distinguish between ranks and positions within the
gang. For example, "426" refers to "fighter" while
"49" denotes a rank-and-file member. "489" refers to the
"mountain master" while 438 is used for the "deputy mountain
master", 415 for "white paper fan" and 432 for the "straw
sandal". "25" refers to an undercover law enforcement agent or
spy from another triad, and has become popularly used in Hong Kong as a slang
for "traitor".[iii]
These
triads (as well as local city-wide gangs) flourished across China. However,
they were not immune from the conflicts and struggles which changed China’s
political structure. The triads functioned well under Chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang (KMT) and supported Chiang in his battle with the Chinese communists
after 1945. Indeed, it was Chiangi’s alliance with Shanghai’s notorious Green
Gang which helped finance the KMT. The Green Gang controlled organised crime in
Shanghai and, under Du Yuesheng, specialised in opium (which was supported by
local warlords), gambling, and prostitution. Shanghai was the vice capital of
the world at that time. The Green Gang was often hired to break up union
meetings and labour strikes, and was also involved in the Chinese Civil War.
Carrying the name of the Society for Common Progress, it was responsible for
the White Terror massacre of approximately 5,000 pro-Communist strikers in the
City of Shanghai in April 1927, which was ordered by Nationalist leader General
Chiang Kai-Shek, who granted Du Yuesheng the rank of General in the Nationalist
army as a reward for conducting the massacre. [iv]
When
the KMT was driven south by the communists, many fled to Taiwan. Others were
trapped in South China. Among them was the 997th Brigade of the KMT which
settled in northern Burma. There they promoted the production of opium and
began its export to the rest of the world, including the use of US aircraft
sent in to deliver supplies to the 997th and with nothing to take back. This
became a thriving business. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s,
notable warlords with fuzzy motivations arose in the Shan State. It was often
unclear whether they were ethno-nationalists or communists, drug lords, cronies
of Rangoon, or a combination of these.The most predominant such leaders were:
General Li of the KMT (commanding groups in Burma from Thailand), Li Hsing Ho
of the Rangoon-supported home guard, also known as the Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), Kyi
Myint (Zhang Zhiming) of the CBP, and the infamous Khun Sa of the Shan United
Army (SUA).[v]
The
refining of this morphine base was undertaken by the Union Corse (the Corsican
Mafia) operating in French Indo-China as anti-communist allies of the French
Colonial Government up until Dien Bien Phu. When the French and the Corsicans
were driven out of Indo-China the drug business reverted to the triads and
gangs who had stayed loyal to the KMT and who had taken up residence in Taiwan,
along with local nationalist Burmese and Vietnamese. For a long time the drug
business was dominated by the Taiwanese gangs (United Bamboo, Four Seas, Hung
Mun , Hip Shing, Hop Shing, On Leong, Three Mountains, Tsung Tsin, Ying Ong,
Suey Sing). However, by 1954 power had passed from Taiwan to the relocated Triads
on Hong Kong (including the KMT drug trade). This was largely because the KMT
Government in Taipei was becoming increasingly concerned with the rise of
Communist China and its attempts to impose a One China policy, especially in
the UN.
In
the mid-1950s the triads established themselves permanently in Hong Kong. There
were several smaller triad organisations but they were overshadowed by the big
four groups: the Chiu-Chow/Hoklo Group (including subgroups Sun Yee On, Fuk Yee
Hing, King Yee, Yee Kwan and Tai Ho Choi); the 14-K Group (including subgroups
Hau, Tak, Ngai, Yee, 14K Tai, Huen, Baai Lo Wo and Lee Kwan); the House of Wo
(including subgroups Wo Shing Wo, Wo Hop To, Wo On Lok, Wo Shing Tong, Wo Yee
Tong, Wo Shing Yee; and the Luen Group (including subgroups Luen Ying Sh'e,
Luen Lok Tong, Luen Fei Ying, Luen To Ying).[vi]
These
four groups, and two of the larger Tongs from Taiwan, spread across the globe.
They became involved in illegal immigration in North America and Europe; drugs
and prostitution in Europe and Africa; and shylocking and extortion from
overseas Chinese everywhere. Most importantly, as Communist China began to
expand its influence and operations around the globe, the Chinese triads were
ready, willing and able to assist. They had ways of bringing people in to work
on Chinese installations like railroads or ports. They could access cheap gold
and cheap resources. That made them very attractive to the Chinese military
companies spreading their wings across the globe. Dealing with the Triads as
well as the military-industrial conglomerates has made the task of creating a
strong independent labour movement quite complicated.
The Current State of
Chinese Labour
In
recent years there has been an increased level of frustration among Chinese
workers; especially among those employed in State-Owned Enterprises (SOE).
Their principal complaints derive from three major problems. The first, and
perhaps the most irritating, is that the workers have often not been paid for
months at a time. In the late 1990s the ACFTU estimated that almost twenty per
cent of the workforce had not been paid for over five or six months. This is
compounded by the large numbers of workers which have been laid off
from their jobs as part of the optimisation of work (yohua zue)
reforms started in 1987. In 1995 the system of permanent employment was removed
and by 1998 over ten million state workers had lost their jobs. In a recent
study, researchers found that sixty-seven per cent of these laid-off workers
lived in debt (largely to the local money-lenders) and thirty-one per cent were
totally destitute.
This
has led to waves of strikes and demonstrations across China as workers demand
their unpaid salaries and pensions. The laid-off demand their unpaid social
benefits.
The
second complaint is that the management of these state enterprises are corrupt
and inefficient. In another study conducted by the ACFTU researcher found that
the workers feel that over eighty-five per cent of the value of entering the
market system has been for the benefit of and the pocket books of state
enterprise managers and the Communist local and regional officials. The workers
say that the autonomous power granted by the management reforms (zizhuquan)
has become self-enriching power (zifuquan). These managers steal from
their enterprises; hive off parts of the enterprise to their own personal
private companies; and use the unpaid or delayed wages of the employees as
their private piggybanks.
The
third complaint has been that the cost-shaving of these managers has led them
to flout the laws on worker safety and mines, mills and factories have become
death traps for the workers. Hundreds of miners have died in explosions or
cave-ins in Chinese mines. Buildings under construction have collapsed as a
result of shoddy materials being supplied and safety precautions ignored.
Unpaid or extra work shifts have left the workers exhausted and despondent.
Suicides of workers are not uncommon.[vii] There are
regularly strikes across China. The China Labour Bulletin (http://www.clb.org.hk/en/) monitors these. Their
latest graphic of current strikes show the prevalence of these strikes.
|
|
The
situation inside these factories is tempered by the fact that these protests
are carried out without the structure of an organised labour union which can
stand up for workers rights, safety and working conditions. The ACFTU is part
of the government and has been able to make any changes although their reports
and pronouncements indicate that they know what they should do... The workers
are doing it for themselves.
Following
a series of scandals surrounding unfair dismissal (particularly by
foreign-owned firms such as Walmart), and the negative publicity
which these attracted, in January 2008 the Chinese government passed The
Labour Contract Law of the Peoples Republic of China, one of the most
far-reaching labour laws in the world according to The Economist. The 2008
reforms allowed ACFTU, which had previously been focused on state owned
enterprises (SOEs), into the private sector. The union has said that it intends
to unionise over 90 per cent of workers in China, and by law any company with
more than 25 employees must allow the formation of an ACFTU-approved union.
The
Hong Kong-based charity Human Rights in China says of the ACFTU: When workers
organize work stoppages, strikes or demonstrations, the ACFTU is at best an
observer and at worst a co-instrument in putting down labour unrest. In some
cases, the ACFTU is known to have directly restrained or detained workers
representatives. As well as helping the state punish workers who engage in
strikes (of which the right to do so was removed from the Constitution in
1982), ACFTU also collaborates with business owners, allowing firms to
influence who their union chairperson will be and helping them head off unrest
or worker dissatisfaction before it affects their bottom line. Indeed, the
Trade Union Law, which governs ACFTU, states: [When] a work stoppage or go slow
occurs in an enterprise or institution, the trade union shall assist the
enterprise or institution in its work so as to enable the normal production
process to be resumed as quickly as possible.
Chinese workers are all too aware of the uselessness of their official trade union. While in the past workers largely sought to greater democratise ACFTU, increasingly they are looking outside the organisation. In most workplace disputes, particularly strikes, workers forgo ACFTU procedures and elect their own representatives for the duration. These informal and illegal strikes have proved successful: in 2010 workers in Foshan were able to attain a wage increase from management despite having no support from ACFTU - government approved union representatives even allegedly attacked striking workers who tried to talk to reporters. Foxconn, the Taiwanese firm which has become the unwilling face of workers rights in China, approved numerous pay increases and other improvements after a spate of suicides at its plants in Guangdong. [viii]
Chinese workers are all too aware of the uselessness of their official trade union. While in the past workers largely sought to greater democratise ACFTU, increasingly they are looking outside the organisation. In most workplace disputes, particularly strikes, workers forgo ACFTU procedures and elect their own representatives for the duration. These informal and illegal strikes have proved successful: in 2010 workers in Foshan were able to attain a wage increase from management despite having no support from ACFTU - government approved union representatives even allegedly attacked striking workers who tried to talk to reporters. Foxconn, the Taiwanese firm which has become the unwilling face of workers rights in China, approved numerous pay increases and other improvements after a spate of suicides at its plants in Guangdong. [viii]
The
latest problem for Chinese industry and the best opportunity for trade unions
is the shortage of skilled labour willing to work for the low wages offered by
the companies. The workers are using job fairs to take bids from employers
looking to hire labour and the scarcity of skilled labour is both driving up
wages, forcing an improved work environment and changing the power balance in
the employment relationship. Now, with the push against petty corruption in the
regions, cities and plants there is movement towards institutionalising the
interchange into a trade union movement. The Chinese Communist Party,
essentially a praetorian guard in charge of a country, is not sympathetic to
such a development but recognises that Chinese prosperity increasingly depends
on the co-operation of the working classes.
After
all, the preamble to the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China states
that: The people's democratic dictatorship [is] led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants. Perhaps the leadership will read
that again.
What
is also important is that Chinese companies across the globe, but especially in
Africa, have always demonstrated the same unwillingness of Chinese managers to
deal fairly and correctly with their labour forces. Africa is scarred by
explosions, fires, collapses of buildings and poor health and safety practice
conducted by the Chinese in their enterprises. They treat Africans as badly as
they treat the Chinese. However, Africans have the means to resist and often
the support of their governments in requiring the Chinese businesses to behave
properly. Perhaps as the Chinese learn to respect labour and working people in
Africa they will be able to conduct their industrial relationships in China a
bit better.
[i] Filtzer,
Mark, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State,
Revolution, and Labor Management, Cambridge University Press 2002
[ii] Peter
Gastrow, Triad Societies and Chinese Organised Crime in South Africa,
ISS No.48, 2001
[iii]Yiu Kong Chu,: The
Triads as Business., Routledge 2000
[iv] Brian G. Martin,
The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937
[v] Andrew A.
Merz, Coercian, Cash Crops and Culture, US Naval Academy 6/08
[vi] HK Police
[vii] Feng Chen, Subsistence
Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labour Protests in China, China Journal,
Univ. Chicago No. 44 (Jul., 2000)
[viii] China Labour
Bulletin, �How the All-China Federation of Trade Unions helps business
screw Chinese workers� June 2010
Snowden ready to testify in
Merkel tapping case
 |
| Edward Snowden |
Whistleblower
Edward Snowden has met with a German MP in Moscow. He passed a letter addressed
to the German government and federal public prosecutor where he allegedly said
he is ready to testify over Washington's probable wiretapping of Merkel’s
phone.
During
the meeting, Snowden made it “clear that he knows a lot,” Greens
lawmaker Hans-Christian Stroebele told ARD channel.
“He
expressed his principle readiness to help clarify the situation. Basis for this
is what we must create. That’s what we discussed for a long time and from all
angles,” the MP said. "He is essentially prepared to come to
Germany and give testimony, but the conditions must be discussed."
Stroebele,
74, is a member of the German parliament's control committee which is
responsible for monitoring the work of intelligence agencies.
Snowden
was told that he could potentially give evidence from Moscow. More details
about the meeting are expected on Friday.
German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has dispatched the country’s top foreign affairs
and intelligence advisers to Washington this week to further investigate the
allegations that her cell phone was tappedby
the NSA, the report which caused fierce outrage in German.
The
scandal initially broke when journalists working with Snowden’s leaked
documents contacted the German government for clarification. German politicians
subsequently suggested involving Snowden as a witness in the wiretapping case.
The
German Federal Prosecutor’s Office may summon Snowden to be a witness in the
case, German justice minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger told
Deutschlandfunk radio on Sunday.
“If
our suspicions prove correct and a case is opened, the German Federal
Prosecutor’s Office will have to consider the possibility of interrogating
Snowden as a witness,” she said.
If
Snowden were to come to Germany for the case, the EU country could breach US’
requests for extradition, the minister added.
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
also said that the phone tapping is illegal and constitutes a crime,
therefore those responsible should be held accountable.
A
parliamentary session will be held on November 18 to discuss the phone tapping.
The Greens, along with the far-left Die Linke party, previously asked for a
public inquiry into the matter. They were the ones to call on witnesses,
including Snowden.
In
June, Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor who disclosed secret
US surveillance programs, fled to Hong Kong and then to Russia.
President
Vladimir Putin rejected US demands to extradite Snowden to face charges
including espionage.
In
early August, Snowden was granted temporary asylum, which can be extended
annually.
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