Published on March 26, 2013
Can anyone explain how this
freak accident happened?
Well you may not have to worry
your head too much. Just follow Sir John’s example and blame it all on
President John Dramani Mahama. Finish!
EDITORIAL
One Step Forward
The directive from the
Presidency that the abuse of Police outriders should stop a immediately is most
certainly on step forward.
Two weeks ago, The Insight
drew attention to the chaos on Ghanaian roads being caused by the abuse of
police outriders.
In a front page lead
article, our correspondent Ekow Mensah wrote about school children who are
driven through the busy streets of Accra with sirens blaring because they are
late.
He also wrote about wives of
rich men who drive to the markets with sirens blaring in front of them.
The list of the abusers
included police personnel, priests of all kinds and even associates of
politicians.
The Insight is happy that
finally, The Presidency has taken action and it is our hope that this would not
be a nine- day wonder.
There ought to be sanity on our roads.
|
Corruption in Africa: It
Takes Two to Tango
By Phillippa Lewis |
Speaking at
Transparency International (TI) Annual Anti-Corruption Lecture, John Githongo,
Kenya former anti-corruption tsar, spoke with cautious optimism.
On the one hand, he proclaimed: Today we are witnessing a unique convergence of potentially positive developments in the fight against corruption one that has not existed since the end of the Cold War. Yet at the same time he also emphasised that we are still facing the continuing reality of systemised corruption.
Indeed corruption is a major problem which continues to undermine institutions, economies and societies not least in Africa. In TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 90% of African countries scored below 50, (0 being highly corrupt, and 100 representing a lack of corruption) and Somalia was deemed to be the worst offending African country with a score of just 8, joint with Afghanistan and North Korea.
But despite the picture sometimes painted, corruption is by no means a uniquely African phenomenon. In fact, taking a closer look at corruption and expanding our understanding to beyond just bribes and kickbacks enables us to see that corruption exists across the world and that even in African corruption, developed countries are deeply implicated.
A global phenomenon
Firstly, a closer look at TI’s index shows that 70% of all countries scored less than 50 out of 100, with a global average of just 43. Corruption is a problem with which most of the world is still struggling, developed countries included.
In a telling case in 2008, for example, German multinational Siemens was found to have had a slush fund totalling more than €1.3 billion ($1.7 billion) to help win overseas contracts from 2001 to 2007. The company was investigated for bribe-paying, corruption and falsifying corporate books and, after much plea bargaining and negotiating, was fined a record $800 million.
This kind of corruption can sometimes also be part and parcel of African corruption in that such companies are on the lesser-examined supply side of bribes while African governments are on the demand side. In 2010, for instance, BAE Systems, one of the world’s largest defence contractors, pled guilty to criminal charges regarding contracts won from countries including Tanzania and South Africa. BAE was investigated by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office in a long-running case and ended up paying £286 million ($460 million) in fines.
On the one hand, he proclaimed: Today we are witnessing a unique convergence of potentially positive developments in the fight against corruption one that has not existed since the end of the Cold War. Yet at the same time he also emphasised that we are still facing the continuing reality of systemised corruption.
Indeed corruption is a major problem which continues to undermine institutions, economies and societies not least in Africa. In TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 90% of African countries scored below 50, (0 being highly corrupt, and 100 representing a lack of corruption) and Somalia was deemed to be the worst offending African country with a score of just 8, joint with Afghanistan and North Korea.
But despite the picture sometimes painted, corruption is by no means a uniquely African phenomenon. In fact, taking a closer look at corruption and expanding our understanding to beyond just bribes and kickbacks enables us to see that corruption exists across the world and that even in African corruption, developed countries are deeply implicated.
A global phenomenon
Firstly, a closer look at TI’s index shows that 70% of all countries scored less than 50 out of 100, with a global average of just 43. Corruption is a problem with which most of the world is still struggling, developed countries included.
In a telling case in 2008, for example, German multinational Siemens was found to have had a slush fund totalling more than €1.3 billion ($1.7 billion) to help win overseas contracts from 2001 to 2007. The company was investigated for bribe-paying, corruption and falsifying corporate books and, after much plea bargaining and negotiating, was fined a record $800 million.
This kind of corruption can sometimes also be part and parcel of African corruption in that such companies are on the lesser-examined supply side of bribes while African governments are on the demand side. In 2010, for instance, BAE Systems, one of the world’s largest defence contractors, pled guilty to criminal charges regarding contracts won from countries including Tanzania and South Africa. BAE was investigated by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office in a long-running case and ended up paying £286 million ($460 million) in fines.
The global financial crisis, which was caused in large part by the dubious and
often fraudulent activities of financial corporations, woke us up in Africa to
a new perspective of corruption, explained Githongo in his speech. It became a
matter of concerted interest among Africa chattering classes long accustomed to
Western lectures on corruption that this is not a uniquely African or even a
Third World thing.
A broader conception of corruption
Additionally, if we are to truly understand the challenges of corruption faced by developing countries, we must recognise that the kinds of kickbacks and bribes mentioned above – and measured by TI’s indices – are just one dimension of corruption. Taking a broader perspective, we can see that while many activities may not be corrupt in terms of explicitly contravening specific laws, they may nevertheless undermine human rights, democracy and transparency. And when we recognise this, the extent to which developed countries are implicated in the problems facing Africa is brought into stark relief.
There are many important examples of this, one of which is the role of governmental export credit agencies. Many Western leaders, such as British Prime Minster David Cameron, have emphasized the need to tackle the causes of poverty, not just its symptoms. But despite this, many Western governments through export credit agencies – support projects abroad that not only involve economic corruption but are linked to human rights abuses and the maintenance of inequality. Furthermore, to add insult to injury, they also often generate sovereign debt in the process which then constrains governments capacities domestically.
Funding, fuelling and facilitating corruption
One government heavily implicated in this kind of corruption and accumulation of toxic debt is the UK and its British Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). The ECGD helps exporters invest in high-risk projects many of which allegedly involve corruption, environmental destruction, or arms sales leading to human rights abuses.
A broader conception of corruption
Additionally, if we are to truly understand the challenges of corruption faced by developing countries, we must recognise that the kinds of kickbacks and bribes mentioned above – and measured by TI’s indices – are just one dimension of corruption. Taking a broader perspective, we can see that while many activities may not be corrupt in terms of explicitly contravening specific laws, they may nevertheless undermine human rights, democracy and transparency. And when we recognise this, the extent to which developed countries are implicated in the problems facing Africa is brought into stark relief.
There are many important examples of this, one of which is the role of governmental export credit agencies. Many Western leaders, such as British Prime Minster David Cameron, have emphasized the need to tackle the causes of poverty, not just its symptoms. But despite this, many Western governments through export credit agencies – support projects abroad that not only involve economic corruption but are linked to human rights abuses and the maintenance of inequality. Furthermore, to add insult to injury, they also often generate sovereign debt in the process which then constrains governments capacities domestically.
Funding, fuelling and facilitating corruption
One government heavily implicated in this kind of corruption and accumulation of toxic debt is the UK and its British Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). The ECGD helps exporters invest in high-risk projects many of which allegedly involve corruption, environmental destruction, or arms sales leading to human rights abuses.
 |
| Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi |
The Jubilee Debt Campaign estimates, for example, that around one-quarter of
Egypt's $150 million debt to the UK comes from loans for military equipment
which was used to prop up the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak.
Similarly, 11% of Zimbabwe’s current debt to the UK isowed for the purchasing
of 1,000 police Land-Rovers which were used in internal repression. More
broadly in Zimbabwe, according to Tim Jones, Policy Officer at Jubilee Debt
Campaign, Debt has played a key role in the tragedies that many Zimbabweans
have suffered over the last twenty years. Dodgy projects, debt repayments and
failed economic policies contributed to economic decline.
Indeed, a report by the Jubilee Debt Campaign also suggests that whilst the British government asserts that aid is conditional on the pursuit of anti-corruption measures by the recipient country, they are nevertheless providing financial support (through export credits) for deals which could involve corruption.
Indeed, a report by the Jubilee Debt Campaign also suggests that whilst the British government asserts that aid is conditional on the pursuit of anti-corruption measures by the recipient country, they are nevertheless providing financial support (through export credits) for deals which could involve corruption.
The report explains, for example, that the agreement for the 1986 Turkwel Gorge
Hydro-Electric Power Station in Kenya was alleged to have involved considerable
payments to high-level Kenyan authorities.
These individuals stood to gain
personally from a deal whose shortcomings they were well-aware namely, that the
final contract price was more than double what the government would have had to
pay through a competitive tender process, that the proposed location of the
power station was on dangerous tectonic fault lines, and that the flow of the
Turkwel river from which power was to be generated was unreliable.
 |
| Former Kenya Prime Minister Odinga with Joe Biden of the US |
But
nevertheless, the ECGD issued a multi-million dollar guarantee to a British
consulting firm to work on the doomed project. The Kenyan press has since
dubbed the project a stinking scandal, and nearly 30 years later Kenya still
owes money to the ECGD.
In fact, crucially compounding these problems is the sovereign debt they lead to, often meaning citizens are paying for the very means by which they are oppressed or led to suffer.
In Egypt, for example, $22 million will be spent this year servicing debt accrued by the Mubarak regime for military purchases. Despite a pledge by the Liberal Democrats, the junior party in the ruling coalition government, to invalidate ‘dictator debts, the UK is demanding this debt be repaid despite the fact Mubarak was overthrown and widely condemned by the international community. Elsewhere, some countries including Nigeria, Lesotho and Gabon reportedly owe more than 50% of their national debt to Export Credit Agencies such as the British ECGD. And some studies have suggested that a number of countries are spending more each year on servicing their debt than they do on all public services combined.
While not all of these loans are necessarily economically corrupt, they contribute to a climate of broader corruption in which moral standards are seemingly bypassed in pursuit of economic gain by developed countries.
At the crossroads
Githongo entitled his TI-UK Annual Anti-Corruption Lecture Crossroads in the fight against corruption a poignant reminder that whilst the potential for change is perhaps more prominent than ever, the actions of the international community, governments and corporations can hamper real progress.
In his closing words, Githongo argued that the moment is unique, in part because the wider population, especially the youth, are demanding [reform] already. But local efforts can only be effective if they are not contradicted by wide-scale corruption at the upper echelons of public life, including at the international level. It is important that governments of developed countries recognise this demand for change and implement a real transformation in their support of developing countries.
Corruption, toxic debt and dubious arms deals continue to plague developing countries, but the blame for this cannot be solely placed on those in the developing world. Instead, developed countries must look a little closer to home and realise that true change requires transparency and accountability at all levels and in all
In fact, crucially compounding these problems is the sovereign debt they lead to, often meaning citizens are paying for the very means by which they are oppressed or led to suffer.
In Egypt, for example, $22 million will be spent this year servicing debt accrued by the Mubarak regime for military purchases. Despite a pledge by the Liberal Democrats, the junior party in the ruling coalition government, to invalidate ‘dictator debts, the UK is demanding this debt be repaid despite the fact Mubarak was overthrown and widely condemned by the international community. Elsewhere, some countries including Nigeria, Lesotho and Gabon reportedly owe more than 50% of their national debt to Export Credit Agencies such as the British ECGD. And some studies have suggested that a number of countries are spending more each year on servicing their debt than they do on all public services combined.
While not all of these loans are necessarily economically corrupt, they contribute to a climate of broader corruption in which moral standards are seemingly bypassed in pursuit of economic gain by developed countries.
At the crossroads
Githongo entitled his TI-UK Annual Anti-Corruption Lecture Crossroads in the fight against corruption a poignant reminder that whilst the potential for change is perhaps more prominent than ever, the actions of the international community, governments and corporations can hamper real progress.
In his closing words, Githongo argued that the moment is unique, in part because the wider population, especially the youth, are demanding [reform] already. But local efforts can only be effective if they are not contradicted by wide-scale corruption at the upper echelons of public life, including at the international level. It is important that governments of developed countries recognise this demand for change and implement a real transformation in their support of developing countries.
Corruption, toxic debt and dubious arms deals continue to plague developing countries, but the blame for this cannot be solely placed on those in the developing world. Instead, developed countries must look a little closer to home and realise that true change requires transparency and accountability at all levels and in all
Number of drone strikes is rocketing, but who's
counting
 |
| Hussein Obama has killed too many with drone strikes |
By Michael Evans
The number
of weapons launched by US Air Force drones over Afghanistan has risen so
dramatically in recent months that the Pentagon has decided to stop publishing
the statistics.
American Predator and Reaper drones
have been engaged in many more ground attack missions this year, according to
the most recent figures released by US Air Force Central Command, which
oversees air operations in Afghanistan.
A 68 per cent increase in drone
attacks was recorded in 2012, compared with 2011, and in only one month this
year, January, 44 Hellfire missiles and precision-guided bombs were fired at
Taliban and other militant targets.
The table for February shows only a
blank space, however, as the US Air Force Central Command has decided it is
"disproportionate" to enumerate the weapons dropped by drones
because, it said, the majority of unmanned aircraft missions were for
surveillance.
The latest - and last - figures show
that the number of weapons launched from drones rose from 277 in 2010 to 294 in
2011, then jumped to 494 last year. US Air Force Central Command started to
publish the figures in October following a decision to be more transparent about
drone attacks.
The rise in the number of drone
strikes has coincided with a reduction in manned airstrikes over Afghanistan
following complaints from President Hamid Karzai, the Afghan leader, that bombs
dropped from high altitude, albeit precision-guided, were causing unacceptable
civilian casualties. The number of US manned sorties in which at least one
weapon was launched was cut from 1983 in 2011 to 1579 last year.
US Air Force Central Command said
the decision to stop publishing drone strike statistics was taken in
conjunction with the Nato-run International Security Assistance Force (Isaf),
based in Kabul. But the withdrawal of the figures has also coincided with the
confirmation of John Brennan, who is seen as the architect of an aggressive
drone warfare policy, as CIA director.
As the US and Isaf look to the
December 2014 deadline for withdrawal, every effort is being made to prove that
the campaign has been a success. A dramatic rise in drone attacks could be
viewed as an acknowledgment that the Taliban remains a potent enemy.
 |
| A United States attack drone |
The implicit admission that the
drone strike statistics were becoming too sensitive follows an embarrassing
U-turn by Isaf, which had to admit that figures showing a reduction in Taliban
attacks were false.
Isaf statistics released on January
22 purported to show that the Taliban had launched 7 per cent fewer attacks in
2012 compared with 2011. However, it later emerged that there had been no
reduction. Isaf said there had been a clerical error and has stopped publishing
the number of Taliban attacks.
"At a time when more than 80
per cent of the attacks are happening in areas where less than 20 per cent of
Afghans live, this facet of the campaign is not particularly accurate in
describing the insurgency's violence," Jamie Graybeal, an Isaf spokesman,
said.
THE TIMES
1) US Drone Strike Statistics
estimate according to the New America Foundation.[25]
(As of 8 February 2013)
(As of 8 February 2013)
|
Year
|
Number
of
Attacks |
Number
Killed
|
|
|
Min.
|
Max.
|
||
|
2004
|
1
|
5
|
8
|
|
2005
|
3
|
12
|
13
|
|
2006
|
2
|
90
|
102
|
|
2007
|
4
|
48
|
77
|
|
2008
|
36
|
219
|
344
|
|
2009
|
54
|
350
|
721
|
|
2010
|
122
|
608
|
1,028
|
|
2011
|
72
|
366
|
599
|
|
2012
|
48
|
222
|
349
|
|
2013
|
8
|
47
|
58
|
|
Total
|
350
|
1,967
|
3,299
|
2) The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates the following cumulative statistics about US
drone strikes:[2][17]
(As of January 2013)
(As of January 2013)
- Total strikes: 362
- Total reported killed: 2,629 – 3,461
- Civilians reported killed: 475 – 891
- Children reported killed: 176
- Total reported injured: 1,267 – 1,431
- Strikes under the Bush Administration: 52
- Strikes under the Obama Administration: 310
2004
June
18. Wana. Nek Muhammad Wazir is killed in a suspected drone strike. PBC lists 1
Al-Qaeda and 4 civilian casualties. Accurate according to reports.
2005
May
14. Toorikhel, NWA. 2 including Al-Qaeda leader Haitham al-Yemeni are killed.
PBC does not list strike.
November
30. Asoray, NWA. PBC reports 1 Al-Qaeda and 5 civilian casualties. NYT reports
death of High Value Target and 3rd in command of Al-Qaeda Abu Hamza Rabia. No
details of collateral damage are provided. Somewhat accurate report.
2006
January
13. Damadola. Al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zwahiri escapes drone
strike. Eighteen dead were locals. PBC reports 18 civilians. Accurate.
October
26. Bajaur. Gunship helicopter attack by Pakistan Army (officially claimed
although doubt remains) that killed 80 suspected militants is included as a US
drone strike by PBC.
November
2. Danday Darphakhel, NWA. Five people are killed. No claims of Al-Qaeda or
militant linkages by NYT or CNN. Should be assumed to be civilians. Not
reported by PBC.
2007
January
16. Salamat Kelay, NWA. Suspected drone strike kills 20-30 militants according
to BBC and Reuters. Locals claim at least 8 were wood-cutters. Being officially
opposed to foreign presence in Pakistan, Army spokesman claims it was a
Pakistan Army helicopter gunship. PBC lists 30 civlians.
April
28. Danda Saidgai, NWA. Daily Times reports three civilian deaths. Dawn reports
four. PBC lists 3 civilian casualties. Accurate.
June
19. Mami Rogha, NWA. PBC lists 20 civilian casualties (date erroneously
mentioned as May 20). Reuters lists 32 militant deaths. Army claims it wasn’t
an aerial attack but an explosion (denying foreign involvement to save face).
Ambiguity over claims.
November
2. Miram Shah. NYT reports 5 militant casualties as attack was on a Haqqani
Madrassa. PBC lists 5 civilians.
2008
January
9. Mir Ali. PBC lists 6 civilian casualties. No mention in Af-Pak or any other
listing.
January
29. Mir Ali. Al-Qaeda leader and spokesman Abu Laith al-Libi is killed in the
strike. BBC reports death of seven Arab and six Central Asian militants. PBC
lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 11 civilian casualties.
February
28. Azam Warsak, SWA. Dawn, citing AFP, reports death of 13 Al-Qaeda and Afghan
Taliban militants. PBC lists 12 civilian casualties.
March
12. Lwara Mundi, NWA. AFP reports 4 civilian casualties. PBC does not list
strike.
March
16. Dhook Pir Bagh, SWA. AFP and Telegraph report 16 militant casualties.
Ambiguity whether they were militants. PBC lists 16 civilian casualties
(erroneous date of March 19). Accurate.
May
14. Damadola. PBC lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 11 civilian casualties. High Value
Target Abu Sulayman Jazairi is killed. Lack of claim over rest of the people
should allow ambiguity. Accurate to a certain extent.
June
13. Makeen, SWA. Geo reports casualty of one person after drone was fired at
with a RPG. Ambiguity over claim whether casualty was a militant or civilian.
Not listed by PBC.
July
28. Azam Warsak, SWA. Abu Khabab Al Masri is killed alongwith 3 other
militants. 3 civilian deaths reported as well. Reuters reports 5 Al-Qaeda
militant deaths. PBC lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 5 civilian casualties.
August
6. PBC lists 13 civilian casualties in NWA. No link/source provided as usual.
Possible August 12 drone strike listed on a Vietnamese news archive. Af-Pak
does not list.
August
13. Bhagar/Angor Adda, SWA. 9-25 militants including commander Abdul Rehman and
Islam Wazir. Geo reports death of three Turk and several Arab militants as
well. PBC lists 22 civilian casualties.
August
20. Wana. 8 militants killed according to AFP. PBC does not report event (there
is a August 28, 4 civilian injuries listing for Gangikhel that does not
correlate with any other archive).
August
30. Korzai, SWA. Daily Times reports five militant deaths possibly including
two foreigners.
August
31. Rappi, NWA. Geo reports death of 6 including a women and a child. PBC lists
same. Accurate.
September
4. Chaar Khel, NWA. Dawn lists death of 10 militants including Al-Qaeda leader
Abu Wafa Al Saudi. Possibly 4 civilian casualties.
September
5. Goroverk, NWA. Geo reports deaths of 7 including 4 children. PBC lists
6 civilian casualties on September 5 and another 6 for September 6. September 4
strike has a Qaeda leader and militants amongst dead. Error in one report at
least.
September
8. Danday Darpakhel. PBC reports 23 civilian casualties. CNN reports death of
Al-Qaeda’s Pakistan chief Abu Haris and another three Arab fighters amongst 25.
September
12. Tol Khel, NWA. AFP reports 12 Al-Badr militant casualties. Dawn lists
casualties as associated with Qari Imam group. PBC lists 12 civilians.
September
17. Baghar Cheena, SWA. Al-Qaeda leader Abu Ubaydah Al-Tunisi an 5 other
operatives are killed. PBC lists 7 civilians.
October
1. Khushali Toorikhel, NWA. Geo reports 4 casualties possibly militants who
fired at the drone. PBC lists 6 civilian casualties.
October
3. Datta Khel, NWA. Two strikes (one possibly jets not drones) kill 21
militants including 16 foreigners according to Geo and another four in the
jet/drone strike according to Reuters (identity ambiguous). PBC lists 18
civilians.
October
9. Reuters reports deaths of 6 militants including three Arabs. PBC lists 9
civilians.
October
11. Miramshah. Geo reports 5 casualties. AFP reports target was a Qaeda/Taliban
meeting. Ambiguous reports whether dead were militants. PBC lists 5 civilians.
Accurate.
October
16. Taparghai, SWA. NYT and CNN report Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Habib and 4 other
casualties, possibly civilian or Arab. PBC lists 2 Al-Qaeda and 4 civilian
casualties.
October
22. Danda Darpa Khel, NWA. NYT reports 4 civilian casualties. Reuters reports
“scores”. PBC lists 10 civilians.
October
26. Shakai, SWA. CNN reports 7 and Geo reports 8 casualties. Ambiguity over
claims over militants. PBC lists 20 civilians casualties.
October
31. Wana and Mir Ali. Geo reports 6 militants, all foreigners killed in Wana
strike. BBC reports 20 including an al-Qaeda leaders Abu Akash and Abu Jihad
Al-Masri in Mir Ali strike/ PBC lists 2 Al-Qaeda and 13 civilian casualties as
one.
November
7. Kumsham, NWA. AFP reports 11-14 militants, mostly foreigners being killed.
PBC lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 12 civilian casualties.
November
14. Garyom, NWA. Geo reports 11 casualties. No claims they were militants.
Reuters says 5 were foreigners. PBC lists 12 civilians.
November
19. Bannu. Al-Qaeda leader Abdullah Azzam al Saudi is killed. CNN reports local
confirming three foreigners being killed. Reuters reports. PBC does not list
strike.
November
22. Ali Khel, NWA. Al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubair Al-Masri and terrorist at large
Rashid Rauf alongwith 3 others killed. PBC lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 4 civilians.
November
29. Chashma, NWA. CNN reports 3 casualties. No claims they were civilians. PBC
lists 3 civilians. Accurate.
December
6. PBC lists 3 civilian casualties in Mir Ali Strike. Express News reports 6 as
militants.
December
11. Azam Warsak, SWA. Reuters reports 7 militant casualties, possibly
foreigners as well (Geo reports 3 foreigners). PBC lists 12 civilian
casualties.
December
15. Miramshah, NWA. Geo reports 3 casualties. PBC lists 2 civilian casualties.
December
22. Karikot, SWA. ToI and VoA report 8 militant casualties. PBC lists 7
civilians.
2009
January
1. Karikot, SWA. PBC report 2 Al-Qaeda and 2 civilian casualties. Al-Qaed’s
chief in Pakistan, Osama al Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan are killed. The
Nation reports 5 Taliban deaths.
January
2. Laddha, SWA. Geo reports 4 casualties. No claims they were militants. PBC
lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 4 civilian casualties. Inaccurate about Qaeda death.
January
23. Mir Ali, SWA and Zera, NWA. 20 militants, including four foreigners are
killed according to Geo. Washington Post reports 10 insurgent casualties. PBC
lists 13 civilian deaths.
February
14. Laddha, SWA. Daily Times reports 28 militant casualties including two
Arabs, several Uzbeks. Paper quotes Taliban spokesman as accepting 28 were
“mujahideen”. PBC lists 30 civilian casualties.
February
16. Sur Pul, Kurram. This paper reports 30 casualties. Attack targeted an
Afghan refugee camp, specifically meeting of Taliban. PBC lists 30 civilian
casualties. Ambiguity over claims of being militants. Somewhat accurate.
March
1. Sararogha, SWA. NYT reports death of 8 militants. This paper reports 5 Taliban
casualties. PBC lists 12 civilian casualties.
March
12. Barjo, Kurram. Dawn reports 25 casualties. Conflicting reports as it cites
a security official stating some injured were foreign militants but rest were
locals. PBC lists 14 civilian casualties. Somewhat accurate (should have listed
more civilians).
March
15. Jani Khel, Bannu.Target is local militant commander Taj Ali Khan according
to NYT. BBC quotes a local saying all were militants, including two Arabs. PBC
lists 5 civilian casualties.
March
25. Makeen, SWA. Dawn reports death of 7 Arab militants in an attack on a
vehicle. Tis paper reports eight Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives. PBC lists 7
civilian casualties.
March
25. Esokhel, NWA. AFP reports 4 casualties and that target was local pro-militant
elder Malik Ghulab Khan. PBC lists 4 civilian casualties. Ambiguity over
affiliation of the dead. Somewhat accurate.
April
1. Drone Strike in Khadezai, Orakzai. PBC reports 12 civlian deaths. Dawn and a
host of international news agencies report 12-14 militant deaths.
April
4. Miramshah. PBC tells us 13 civilians died. Geo TV report says 3 foreigners
amongst dead. Reuters and AFP report anywhere between 4 and 10 militants
killed. Ambiguosness is reported as civilian casualty because of some unknown reason.
April
8. Gangikhel, SWA. Four militants who opened fire at a low flying drone killed.
Reported by Reuters, Dawn and Geo. PBC lists all four as civilians.
April
19. Gangikhel, SWA. PBC lists 3 civilian casualties. International wire
agencies report suspected militants.
April
29. Kani Garam, SWA. Dawn reports 6 militants including 2 foreigners dead in
drone strike. All six listed as civilians in PBC data.
May
9. Sararogha. Daily Times reports anywhere between 5 to 10 Taliban militants
dead. 10 civlian casualties in PBC data.
May
12. Sra Khawra, SWA. Dawn and a host of international wires report 6-9
militants possibly Al-Qaeda killed. PBC lists 8 civilian casualties.
May
16. Khesoor, NWA. PBC lists 2 Al-Qaeda and 23 civilian casualties. Target
assumed to be a seminary may have killed upto 23 Al-Qaeda militants according
to NYT. Al-Jazeera reports 10 militants including 2 Arabs. This paper reported
25-28 local militants leaving for fighting in Afghanistan.
June
14. Laddah, SWA. Dawn reports 3 Taliban killed in their vehicle. International
agencies report 5. PBC lists 5 civilians.
June
18. Shah Alam, SWA. PBC lists 11 civilian deaths. This paper report 12 Taliban
casualties and Al Jazeera reports five deaths targeting house of militant
commander Malang Wazir.
June
23. Makeen, SWA. Two drones strikes in one day including one on the funeral of
Niaz Wali kills 51 Taliban according to Daily Times. Other reports list
anywhere between 45 and 83. Dr Usmani’s data shows a total of 91 civilians and
only 6 Al-Qaeda deaths.
July
8. Laddah. Two strikes leave 45 militants dead according to Dawn. Geo reports
convoy of militants’ vehicles being targeted. PBC reports 50 civilian
casualties.
October
24. Damma Dola. Daily Times report 22 terrorists being killed in a drone strike.
Taliban commander Maulvi Faqir left minuted before strike. PBC lists 18
civilian casualties.
December
8. Aspala, NWA. 2-3 militants including Al-Qaeda leader Saleh al-Somali are
kiilled. PBC does not list this strike.
Decemeber
17. Datta Khel. 10-15 militants including Al-Qaeda leader Zuhaib al-Zahibi. PBC
reports 17 civilians.
December
31. Machhikhel. Dawn reports six including three militants who security
officials suggested maybe Al-Qaeda. Geo reports three militant casualties. PBC
lists 33 civilian casualties.
2010
Januray
1, Ghundikala village, NWA- DAWN reports that three militants in a
vehicle were killed. PBC claims three death of three civilians quoting the news
story from BBC Urdu which does not make any claim regarding the identity of
those killed.
Januray
3, residential compound of Jehan Roze in Mosaki village of Mirali tehsil, NWA,
destroying its guesthouse. DAWN reprots five killed, three of them Arabs.
According to AFP:“There may have been an important figure hiding in the house,”
a security official in Miramshah said. “Five militants have been killed Two are
local and three are foreigners. One among the foreigners is an Arab”. PBC
reports 5 civilian deaths.
January
6, NY times reports 20 to 25 dead in two strikes in NWA. DAWN reports that
17 were dead in an attack on a militants training camp(fort). “It was a huge,
fort-like mud-house. They were using it as a training centre and the training
centre belonged to Hafiz Gul Bahadur,” a Pakistani intelligence official said.
PBC claims 20 civilian deaths.
January
8, Tappi Village NWA, kills 5. PBC reports 5 civilians. Accurate
January
9, Ismail Khan village NWA, PBC claims that 4 civilians were killed and two
injured. Associated Press (Washington Times January 14, 2010, p. 7) reports
that Mahmoud Mahdi Zeidan, bodyguard for al Qaeda leaderSayeed al-Masri,
was reported killed in either the January 8 or 9 airstrike. LA Times claims
that Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim who was allegedly involved in hijacking ofPan Am
Flight 73 in 1986 was also reported killed in this strike.
January
13, Pasalkot village, NWA. DAWN reports 12 dead in attack on militant hideout
in Skaktoi area, SWA adjacent to North Waziristan. Reports rumours that Hamik
ullah Mehsud was target and the rumours that he died in the attack. PBC reports
15 civilian deaths.
January
15. Zanini, NWA and Shaktoi. 7-12 militants killed including militant commander
Azmatuallah Muawiya as per reports from Dawn, AP and Reuters. PBC lists 22
civilians casualties.
January
16/17, Shakoi, NWA, PBC claims 22 civilians dead and 12 injured. BBC Urdu
reports 15 militants killed in the attack.
January
29, Mohammad Khel, NWA. DAWN reports that 9 militants were killed when three
missiles hit a compund and a bunker. NY Times reports 15 killed including four
Arab and two ethnic Uzbek fighters were killed, along with local militants. PBC
reports 6 civilians dead.
February
2. Geo reports target was a militant compound and Dawn reports 16 militant
casualties. PBC lists 29 civilian deaths.
February
14, Mir Ali, NWA,.DAWN reports 4 foreigners (reportedly Uzbek) and three
militants killed. Compund was used for training insurgents. Reuters claim 5
deaths. CNN reports 6 dead. PBC does not mention the attack.
February
15, Miram Shah, NWA. Geo reports AlQaeda linked leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani,
leader of a group called the Turkistani Islamic Party killed. DAwn reports him
being killed among three militants. PBC claims four civilian deaths and 1
civilian injured. Quotes Express (Urdu newspaper) story as reference.
February
17, Tappi, NWA. DAWN reports top al-Qaeda leader of Egyptian origin
Sheikh Mansoor killed. Geo reports 4 killed. PBC claims 4 civilains dead and 2
injured
February
18, Dandey Darpa Khel, near Miram Shah, NWA. DAWn reports son of Jalaluddin
Haqqani was killed among three other militants. PBC lists 4 civilian deaths and
5 civilians wounded.
February
24. Dargi Mandi, 2.5 miles north of Miram Shah, North Waziristan. Mohammad Qari
Zafar killed. PBC lists 13 civilians dead and 10 injured.
May
11. Datta Khel and Gorwek, NWA. Geo reports 24 militant casualties, NYT reports
14 in two strikes. PBC lists 30 civilians.
June
19. Enzer Kali, NWA. PBC lists 1 Al-Qaeda and 15 civilian casualties. Dawn, The
News and all major news sources report at least 16 militants including Al-Qaeda
leader Abu Ahmed Tarkash.
June
29. Karikot. Drone strike on house of local commander Halimullah leaves 6 dead
as per international news wire reports. PBC reports only 1 Al-Qaeda dn 9
civilian casualties.
September
3. Two drone strikes kill 12-15 militants. Dawn reports 6 local militants being
killed in first strike. Samaa reports death of Taliban commander Inayatllah in
second strike. PBC reports 13 civilian deaths.
North Cornering of Oil Blocs
By Anthony A. Kila
By Anthony A. Kila
 |
| Map of Nigeria |
The title of this piece could have
well been: Northern control of oil bloc: daddy not our brothers cornered our
meat. Elsewhere a title of such would be unfamiliar if not completely surreal
to an average citizen for it is not common for people in modern countries to
use family terms when talking about politico-economic relations of a country.
That, however, is not the case in Nigeria where we have developed a modern
state in which those in charge of public affairs are by virtue of their offices
considered and regarded as fathers and mothers rather than mere servants and
representatives of the country, or at most accountable leaders.
There are times when one struggles to keep a straight face when confronted with the spectacle of fathers of families thumping the chests over their potbellies as someone else's boys and proclaiming allegiance to their public father, in his presence of course. Amusing scenes apart, one of the dangerous consequences of this mode of conceiving power is that those that get into office are then easily tempted and allowed to exercise power in an arbitrary way up to the point of abusing their roles and positions.
It is in line with this dangerously absurd mode of conceiving power that I suggest we examine the bombshell recently dropped by Senator Ita Enang that 83 percent of oil blocs in the country are owned by northerners. We should, however, hasten to note that the main problem and the ultimate responsibility of such lopsided distribution are not of our northern brothers, but that of those that ruled the country.
Before then, we all, northerners in primis, however, have a duty to understand the deep sense of grievance that this kind of information can provoke in those that come from the oil producing areas and those from other parts of the country that feel shortchanged by this askew distribution. Understanding these grievances needs just a bit of common sense, goodwill or empathy. Those who readily discard these grievances are either in bad faith or lack these basic elements.
Still harmed with our common sense, goodwill and empathy, it is easy to understand that any Nigerian that knows what an oil bloc is will want one, understandably not every Nigerian can get one. The question then is: In a country of millions, who gets the limited oil blocs that all want? The answers to this question from those that have ruled the country are already in front of us.
If those in charge of public affairs in Nigeria were filled with enough republican ethos and devotion to merit the status of leaders or had enough care to deserve the title of fathers or godfathers, they would have before answering such question added more questions and factored in some considerations crucial to the wellbeing of the people and country on whose behalf they profess to rule and manage power. They would have asked themselves why do we need to allocate oil blocs? What do we, as a country, want from this oil? How do we do this allocation in a way that reflects its nature of being a commonwealth? The same people that fill their mouths with the importance of a united Nigeria and introduced the concept of federal character should have remembered and considered that this is a country of different cultures, nations and ethnic groups. They should have remembered that their main duties as rulers are to ensure security, justice and to aid development.
It is obvious our leaders have clearly neither asked themselves these questions nor considered these crucial elements. They have instead resorted to allocating what they should be managing for all to themselves and their friends. To compound matters, the country and the people they rule have little or nothing to show for it. Children are starving and their parents are obese.
The worst offenders in this case are those that had state power and then proceeded to help themselves with what they should be managing and regulating for the common good. Regardless of how common this malpractice is and how many people engage in it, we must say shame on them. Regardless of their performance in office or their method of gaining entry into office, once in power, every dullard, every lackey in Nigeria is guaranteed a place in history textbooks. They are given one of the highest salaries in the world and offered lifelong deference and opportunities in the country, but no, that is not enough. They want economic in addition to political power.
With their greedy and corrupt actions, these people are not only guilty of abusing power, they are also responsible for the desire of many to go into politics to loot rather than serve. They are killing diversity of ideas and aspirations, elements necessary for a dynamic and prosperous country. It is because of the way they manage power that we have a weak middle class have fewer professionals proud of their skills and confident that with their ability and hard work they can make it in Nigeria without connections or godfather.
We shall be deceiving and destroying ourselves if we limit this to a North vs. South matter. What have they done for the North in whose name they loot? Everywhere in the country people are feeling the same pains. It is a matter of leadership and accountability not geography or ethnicity. Today it is oil, tomorrow it may be contracts, electricity or nominations. These rulers called fathers are the ones cornering our meat.
There are times when one struggles to keep a straight face when confronted with the spectacle of fathers of families thumping the chests over their potbellies as someone else's boys and proclaiming allegiance to their public father, in his presence of course. Amusing scenes apart, one of the dangerous consequences of this mode of conceiving power is that those that get into office are then easily tempted and allowed to exercise power in an arbitrary way up to the point of abusing their roles and positions.
It is in line with this dangerously absurd mode of conceiving power that I suggest we examine the bombshell recently dropped by Senator Ita Enang that 83 percent of oil blocs in the country are owned by northerners. We should, however, hasten to note that the main problem and the ultimate responsibility of such lopsided distribution are not of our northern brothers, but that of those that ruled the country.
Before then, we all, northerners in primis, however, have a duty to understand the deep sense of grievance that this kind of information can provoke in those that come from the oil producing areas and those from other parts of the country that feel shortchanged by this askew distribution. Understanding these grievances needs just a bit of common sense, goodwill or empathy. Those who readily discard these grievances are either in bad faith or lack these basic elements.
Still harmed with our common sense, goodwill and empathy, it is easy to understand that any Nigerian that knows what an oil bloc is will want one, understandably not every Nigerian can get one. The question then is: In a country of millions, who gets the limited oil blocs that all want? The answers to this question from those that have ruled the country are already in front of us.
If those in charge of public affairs in Nigeria were filled with enough republican ethos and devotion to merit the status of leaders or had enough care to deserve the title of fathers or godfathers, they would have before answering such question added more questions and factored in some considerations crucial to the wellbeing of the people and country on whose behalf they profess to rule and manage power. They would have asked themselves why do we need to allocate oil blocs? What do we, as a country, want from this oil? How do we do this allocation in a way that reflects its nature of being a commonwealth? The same people that fill their mouths with the importance of a united Nigeria and introduced the concept of federal character should have remembered and considered that this is a country of different cultures, nations and ethnic groups. They should have remembered that their main duties as rulers are to ensure security, justice and to aid development.
It is obvious our leaders have clearly neither asked themselves these questions nor considered these crucial elements. They have instead resorted to allocating what they should be managing for all to themselves and their friends. To compound matters, the country and the people they rule have little or nothing to show for it. Children are starving and their parents are obese.
The worst offenders in this case are those that had state power and then proceeded to help themselves with what they should be managing and regulating for the common good. Regardless of how common this malpractice is and how many people engage in it, we must say shame on them. Regardless of their performance in office or their method of gaining entry into office, once in power, every dullard, every lackey in Nigeria is guaranteed a place in history textbooks. They are given one of the highest salaries in the world and offered lifelong deference and opportunities in the country, but no, that is not enough. They want economic in addition to political power.
With their greedy and corrupt actions, these people are not only guilty of abusing power, they are also responsible for the desire of many to go into politics to loot rather than serve. They are killing diversity of ideas and aspirations, elements necessary for a dynamic and prosperous country. It is because of the way they manage power that we have a weak middle class have fewer professionals proud of their skills and confident that with their ability and hard work they can make it in Nigeria without connections or godfather.
We shall be deceiving and destroying ourselves if we limit this to a North vs. South matter. What have they done for the North in whose name they loot? Everywhere in the country people are feeling the same pains. It is a matter of leadership and accountability not geography or ethnicity. Today it is oil, tomorrow it may be contracts, electricity or nominations. These rulers called fathers are the ones cornering our meat.
Source:Ocnus.net 2013
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