By José Alvarez
On October 28, 2000, US
President Bill Clinton signed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act (TSRA) which allowed US firms to sell food and agricultural products to
Cuba and other countries. However, the Cuban government did not purchase any of
these products until December of 2001 following the devastating damage caused
by Hurricane Michelle to important agricultural areas in November of that year.
Cuban purchases from US firms
amounted to $4.319 million in 2001, $138.635 million in 2002, and $256.9
million in 2003. Cuba became the 35th most important food and agricultural
export market for the United States in 2003, up from last (226th) in 2000.
Actual purchases and pending contracts in the first-half of 2004 are at a pace
to move Cuba into the top 20 most important markets of US food and agricultural
exports. Furthermore, because current US legislation requires that all Cuban
purchases from the United States must be conducted on a cash basis, the lack of
credit risk associated with these sales makes Cuba one of the most attractive
export markets for US firms.
Anticipating changes in
US–Cuba trade relations, the Food and Resource Economics Department at UF/IFAS
initiated a research initiative on Cuba in 1990, including a 1993 collaborative
agreement with the University of Havana, which has lasted to this day. (Most of
the resulting publications can be found at http://www.cubanag.ifas.ufl.edu). We reiterate that our role as
investigators is to provide the best available information and analyses from
which rational decisions can be made. The reports included in this series
intend to address the increasing level of interest in the Cuban market for food
and agricultural products among US firms and to assist them in becoming more
familiar with that market. The complete list of documents in this series can be
found by conducting a topical search for “Cuba” at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu, or under "Additional Information" at the end
of this document.
The Cuban
government that took power on January 1, 1959, was going to drastically change
rural Cuba. This fact sheet describes the most important agricultural policies
during the 1959–1989 period, although in some instances it is necessary to
mention events and policies before and after that period. A careful examination
of the multitude of policies and agricultural organizations implemented during
those 30 years provides an understanding of the confusion arising from the fact
that Karl Marx did not leave an implementation blueprint to his followers.
It was
evident that, being the most important sector of the Cuban economy, agriculture
was to experience drastic and continuing transformations under the leadership
that took power on January 1, 1959. These transformations originated in the
agrarian struggles that were supported by most sectors of Cuban society before
the revolution.
Although most
authors only cite the two agrarian reform laws of 1959 and 1963, the agrarian
revolution in Cuba originated in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra when Law
No. 3 of the Rebel Army was promulgated in October of 1958. The basic principle
of the law was that the land should be given to those who tilled it. Thus, the
1958 law revolved around the idea of massive land distribution.
Domínguez
(1978) states that prior to 1959, less than one-tenth of the Cuban peasants
lacked legal claim to the land they tilled. These squatters were mainly
concentrated in the province of Oriente, the focal point of Castro's guerrilla
warfare. And Domínguez adds:
This more or
less accidental event brought the leaders of the revolution in contact with
what was essentially an atypical rural dweller. The revolutionary government's
policies in 1959 and thereafter were influenced by this experience, a fact that
explains why so much of their early legislation was devoted to solving the
problems of Cuba's few squatters, while the many more peasants who were not
squatters and the even more numerous agricultural workers received less
government attention (pp. 423–424).
Law No. 3 was
implemented in all territories occupied by the Rebel Army. Although free land
was distributed among farmers who tilled up to 28 hectares, with the right to
purchase up to 67 hectares, it did not proscribe the latifundia,
leaving its elimination to a future government (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 53).
Objectives
and Articles
The first
Agrarian Reform Law was enacted on May 17, 1959, by the revolutionary
government. As a symbolic gesture, it was signed into law in the mountains of
the Sierra Maestra. It proscribed latifundia (defined as estates larger than
402 hectares) and it initially distributed some land and encouraged the
development of cooperatives on larger estates. It did not, however, break up
the large sugarcane plantations and cattle ranches. Thomas (1971, pp.
1216–1217) explains that Castro had already changed his mind regarding
distribution of land by the time of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law. He believed
that, rather than dividing latifundios into small plots (which would decrease
production), they should maintain larger tracts of land under governmental
control.
The 1959
Agrarian Reform Law represented a drastic change from the 1958 Rebel Army's
approach of massive land distribution. The main objectives of the law can be
summarized as follows:
·
to ensure progress
through growth and diversification (eliminating dependence on monoculture).
·
to make full use of
natural and human resources.
·
to diversify
agricultural and livestock production.
·
to stimulate industrial
development through state and private means.
·
to augment and diversify
agricultural production to expand exports, supply raw materials for the
national industry, and satisfy domestic consumption.
·
to modify the agrarian
structure by proscribing latifundia, eliminating certain forms of exploitation
(e.g., sharecropping), and granting land ownership to those who worked it to
ensure a greater use of land resources.
·
to substitute latifundia
production with more technical and efficient production forms such as
cooperatives.
·
to establish an
agricultural organization capable of implementing the law and to create
objectives of economic and social development that conform to the law.
·
to prevent future
control by foreigners of the national rural patrimony.
According to Valdés Paz
(1997, p. 63), the previous goals were intended to reconcile the interests of
different social classes and groups interested in change (e.g., the rural and
urban proletariat, the peasantry, the progressive rural and urban bourgeoisie,
and the middle classes, among others). The only ones adversely affected were
the sugar bourgeoisie; the importing bourgeoisie; and the holders of foreign
capital invested in agriculture, sugar, and foreign trade.
The main body of the law
was composed of nine chapters and 77 articles that proclaimed:
·
the proscription of
latifundia (single owners could own up to 402 hectares; large farms with
intensive production could own up to 1,340 hectares).
·
the proscription of
“administration cane” (cane owned by natural or juridical persons for grinding
in their own mill), and the expropriation of land owned by such plantations.
·
compensation for the
properties affected by the law, with payments to be made in 20-year bonds
bearing an annual interest of 4.5%.
·
the proscription of
foreign ownership of rural property.
·
the distribution of land
to those who till it, establishing priorities for the different lands as well
as priorities among the beneficiaries.
·
a “vital minimum” size
of parcels (the minimum amount of land needed for the support of a peasant
family) of up to 27 hectares; parcels of this size were to be distributed to
peasants (the parcels could only be transferred by inheritance and were not
divisible).
·
the prohibition of land
possession other than by ownership.
·
the recuperation of
state lands, especially those that had not been properly registered by 1958.
·
the right to agrarian
cooperation, including agricultural cooperatives, which, in the case of state
lands, would be under the management of the National Institute of Agrarian
Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria,INRA) and, in the case of
private lands, would receive all support needed from INRA.
·
the establishment of
Agricultural Development Zones that would act as administrative units of the
agrarian reform and as centers of social, economic, and agrarian development
activities.
·
the creation of
institutions in charge of implementing the Law of Agrarian Reform (to
incorporate it into the Fundamental Law of the Republic to give it the force of
constitutional law), the establishment of INRA, and the creation of land
tribunals to solve the juridical problems derived from the implementation of
the law.
·
the conservation of
forests and soils.
·
the enumeration of other
dispositions (e.g., prohibiting farmers' evictions, suspending pending trials,
establishing a two-year period to place all private lands into production,
etc.).
Impact
on Land Tenure and Structure
The impact of
the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law on land tenure and structure was significant. All
9.1 million hectares of land in 1958 were in private hands and almost 43% of
the land was in farms over 402 hectares. Two years after the first agrarian
reform law, land in the private sector had declined to 58.4%, with the
remaining 41.6% under state control. Farms over 402 hectares in size (i.e., 300
People's Farms, totaling 2,576,000 hectares) were under state control as
proscribed by the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law. The previous classification by
Mears (1962, p. 13) assumes that the 630 cooperatives established under the law
were under state control and, for that reason, are classified as state-owned
farms.
If the 630
agricultural cooperatives are considered as privately-owned farms, then in
1961, the private sector owned 72% and the state owned 28% of the agricultural
land. This breakdown appears to be more appropriate. As a matter of fact, this
disparity was one of the reasons leading to a second agrarian reform law four
years after the enactment of the first one.
Even by
western standards and despite its impacts on the structure of land tenure,
Cuba's first agrarian reform was not a radical one. According to Thomas (1971,
p. 1217), many of the Eastern European reforms of the 1920s went further than
the Cuban agrarian ideas of 1959. For example, the maximum amount of land
allowed by a single owner in Poland and Bulgaria was 20 hectares and 49
hectares, respectively.
A
Two-Year Evaluation
The President of INRA
conducted an evaluation of the general impact of the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law
and its subsequent legislation at the time of its second anniversary (Núñez
Jiménez, 1961). His findings are as follows:
·
The large sugarcane
estates had been converted into 622 sugarcane cooperatives while the large
cattle ranches and rice plantations had been converted into 263 People's farms.
·
31,425 title deeds to
land parcels of 28 hectares or less had been handed over for free to the
poorest peasants.
·
Law No. 851 of 1960
distributed 1,260,000 hectares of nationalized US properties in Cuba among 596
sugarcane farms while Law No. 890 of 1960 expropriated 2,533 sugarcane farms (909,200
hectares) owned by Cuban firms.
·
INRA's rural housing
department built over 500 public buildings (e.g., schools, hospitals, stores,
community centers, and theaters) in only one year.
·
There were 1,996 retail
People's stores (selling a variety of items at subsidized prices), 25 large
warehouses, and 58 subsidiary warehouses.
·
A variety of productive,
social, and cultural services had been increased or had reached the peasants
for the first time, including credit, machinery, schools, cultural centers, housing,
medical services, and rural electrification.
A
Four-Year Evaluation
This evaluation was
conducted by the new President of INRA, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (1963). Not
much is contained in this new assessment. Rodríguez repeats many of the success
stories and background material of the first evaluation.
Of particular interest,
however, is his explanation of the circumstances causing the food shortage in
1962, leading to the establishment of a rationing system (EDIS FE482) that still exists today. Despite the
explanations given, he also states that, “as Fidel Castro has said, this is the
only agrarian reform in which production did not drop with the reform. This is
true until the end of 1961, and it is true for agricultural-livestock
production as a whole, except for sugarcane, until 1962” (1963, p. 26).
On August 6, 1960,
President Dorticós and Premier Castro signed Resolution No. 1 which, in
retaliation for the suspension of the US Cuban sugar quota, expropriated US
enterprises, including 21 sugar mills and their lands. On October 13, 1960, Law
No. 890 responded to the US embargo by expropriating, among others, the
remaining 105 sugar mills and 16 rice mills with their lands. On October 24,
1960, Resolution No. 3, signed by President Dorticós and Premier Castro,
nationalized the remaining US enterprises (Alvarez, 1990, pp. 103, 121).
Numerous resolutions, signed by the Ministry for the Recovery of Misappropriated
Property since early January of 1959, had confiscated the assets (including
numerous farms) of members of the previous government (who had acquired them
with public funds). Total land affected under the different measures amounted
to over 4.4 million hectares (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 81). The nationalization of
US properties eliminated the foreign presence in Cuba's countryside, consistent
with the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law.
The process of reform and
power consolidation in the rural areas continued with the establishment of the
National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores
Pequeños, ANAP) in May of 1961, with membership restricted to farmers with
fewer than 67 hectares and to larger farmers who had demonstrated allegiance to
the revolution. Its membership surpassed 200,000, accounting for almost
one-third of the economically-active rural population.
Aranda (1968) reports
that the results of the (July) 1965 Agricultural Census found around 2.7
million hectares among 200,000 farms in what he calls the private sector
(nonstate sector). The labor force in this sector included 290,000 men and
women and their family members plus 36,000 permanent workers and seasonal
workers (pp. 147–148). These figures changed afterwards, however. Agricultural
Production Cooperatives (CPAs) were established 10 years after the 1965
Agricultural Census and became part of what was called the socialist sector.
Meanwhile, the number of peasants with small parcels (conucos) producing for
family consumption, bartering, or sales in the black market is not known. Deere
et al. (1995) acknowledge that the 1987 Census of private sector land revealed
that the amount of land held by the non-peasant sector was not insignificant
and that it had been previously underestimated in official data.
At the same time that the
ANAP was established, the Cuban government began a widespread campaign to
encourage “agricultural associations” (Asociaciones Campesinas) in the nonstate
sector. Small farmers not in the vicinity of large farms and cooperatives were
urged to pool their land and other resources with their neighbors to form
agricultural associations. Some of these units were to be small (in the range
of 40 to 53.6 hectares). Apparently, the term "association" was used
instead of cooperative because of the farmers' reluctance to become cooperative
members (Mears, 1962, p. 13). Castro reported that nearly 300 of these
associations had been created by 1963 (Castro, 1963, p. 12).
Also, by 1963, the armed
struggle initiated in the rural areas in 1959 had been reduced to a minimum. It
was time to continue with the process of socialization in the countryside. The
government was ready for its second agrarian reform law.
A second Agrarian Reform
Law was enacted in October of 1963. It expropriated the land of most farmers
with more than 67 hectares, bringing 70% of the lands under government control.
The only exceptions on the limit were farms worked by several brothers
together, each with a per capita area below the 67 hectare limit, and cases
considered by INRA as exceptional (high productivity and a willingness to
cooperate with the state agricultural plans).
The reasons behind this
new law were twofold: (1) socialist property ownership had advanced farther in
other sectors of the economy, although limits on land ownership were considered
unacceptable; and (2) the rural bourgeoisie was in conflict with the
revolutionary process, helping armed groups fighting the government (Aranda,
1968, p. 189).
The first drastic measure
of the agrarian revolution (1959 Agrarian Reform Law) only affected land
belonging to foreign companies and large Cuban owners while the 1963 Agrarian
Reform Law only impacted medium-size Cuban farmers.
Farmers anticipated the
1963 law and “distributed” their lands among members of their immediate and
extended families (a process whereby the peasant economy is a “refuge” whereby
common law anticipates statute law). Forster (1989) described this attitude in
the following way:
During the early years of
the revolution as they faced expropriation, large farmers decapitalized their
holdings, failed to maintain irrigation and machinery, slaughtered their animal
herds, and otherwise adversely affected production for years to come. Even
after the 1963 Agrarian Reform, it is likely that farmers in the remaining
private sector were hesitant to invest heavily until they were sure that they,
too, would not be expropriated (p. 239).
After the 1963 Agrarian
Reform Law, the Cuban leadership was in a constant search for the best ways to
organize production along socialist lines and the type of incentive system that
would better correspond to each type of organization. The following sections
describe that process for the period ending in 1993.
Agricultural
Production Cooperatives (CPAs)
During the 1960s and
early 1970s, the Cuban leadership did not emphasize the establishment of
agricultural cooperatives. On May 17, 1974, during his speech on the 15th
anniversary of the 1959 (first) Agrarian Reform Law, Castro expressed the view
that it was about time for private farmers to put their 1.5 million hectares
into superior forms of production for land socialization (Pampín Balado and
Trujillo Rodríguez, n.d.). He also stated that the process of socializing the
lands of independent farmers would be a long one, culminating in the day when
there would no longer be any independent peasants.
The Agricultural
Production Cooperatives (CPA) are defined as “a superior form of collective
production of social property which were started after the farmers' decision to
join their lands and other fundamental means of production” (CEE, 1989, p.
178).
Although Agricultural
Production Cooperatives (CPAs) began in 1975, Law No. 36 of Agricultural
Cooperatives was not enacted until August 24, 1982. It is important to point
out that the law referred to two types of cooperatives: Agricultural Production
Cooperatives (CPAs) and Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCSs), which are
discussed below. Pollitt explains the reasons for the establishment of CPAs in
the following manner:
The CPAs had come about
for reasons familiar to historians of socialist agriculture. By pooling their
holdings in larger enterprises, it was argued that individual farmers achieved
economies of scale through rational, specialized use of land and labor combined
with modern means and methods of production. Socially, the concentration of
dispersed peasant households simplified the provision of electricity;
sanitation; and better housing, schools and medical care (1996, p. 23).
In terms of the CPAs, the
law described the main goals of this type of organization as follows:
·
to develop agricultural
and livestock production within the social goals and interests of the
cooperative.
·
to consolidate and
increase the social exploitation of the cooperative's assets.
·
to increase labor
productivity and the efficiency of social production.
·
to increase production
and sales of agricultural products to the state.
·
to foster the best
application of technology and science within a socialist form of production.
·
to help in the
fulfillment of the growing material and cultural needs of the cooperatives and
their families, to stimulate their participation in the different aspects of
social life, and to contribute to increase the standard of living and the
establishment of socialist living relations among its members.
·
to advance socialist
emulation.
·
to develop the
participation of the cooperative members and their families in the economic,
political, and social tasks of the country.
Material incentives for
CPA members involved profit sharing of net returns (Meurs, 1990, p. 120):
·
40–50%: distributed at
the end of the year among members according to the amount of work performed.
·
25–30%: paid to members
for the land and equipment contributed when the cooperative was created.
·
10%: placed in a
investment fund.
·
5%: put into
"cultural” development (e.g., establishing daycare facilities).
The 1,378 CPAs that were
established by 1985, including 63% of independent farmers, controlled slightly
over one million hectares. Also, by 1985, about 19,156 individual houses had
been built and 882 cooperatives had received electricity. As a result, the
agricultural associations disappeared.
In 1993, the number of
CPAs had decreased to 1,219 and their area to 772,500 hectares. There were
60,266 cooperative members, with an average of 50 members per cooperative (CEE,
1998, p. 179).
CPAs were praised by the
government as examples of “good management” until the advent of Cuba's economic
crisis in the 1990s. A summary report (ISCAH, n.d.) shows sugarcane and
non-sugarcane cooperatives with positive returns over long periods of time. The
report also exhibits a decreasing number of CPAs until the 1990s.
Cooperatives
of Credit and Services (CCSs)
The Cooperatives of
Credit and Services (CCSs) are “primary organizations of a collective nature
that allow the public use of irrigation, some facilities, services and other
means, as well as the transacting of their credits although the property of
each farm, its equipment and resulting production remains private” (CEE, 1989,
p. 178).
Although this type of
agricultural organization was part of the law that established the CPAs, some
had already been created, mainly in the tobacco region of the Pinar del Río
province, after the enactment of the first Agrarian Reform Law in 1959 and the
creation of ANAP in 1961. In fact, by mid-1963, there were 527 CCSs with over
46,000 members and 433,000 hectares. Just one year later, their number had
grown to 899 cooperatives with close to 56,000 members and 527,000 hectares. By
1967, the numbers had increased to 1,119 cooperatives with almost 78,000
members and 697,000 hectares. Until 1976, ANAP devoted most of its efforts to
the consolidation of the CCS movement and subsequently shifted its emphasis to
the CPAs. As a result, the CCSs lost momentum. By1982, their number had
declined to 2,181. In 1998, there were 2,781 cooperatives with 163,800 members and
962,300 hectares (CEE, 1998).
CCSs are mainly
established to share the use of credit and some inputs and services (e.g.,
seed, fertilizer, and chemical products). Occasionally, they also acquire
tractors, trucks, pumps, and other types of machinery and equipment. They can
also devote themselves to the building of collective projects such as dams and
warehouses.
The demise of the old
agricultural production model at the end of 1993 prevented CCSs from continuing
to obtain the services frequently offered by state enterprises. New means to
guarantee their existence had to be found. The CCSs were authorized to purchase
the means of production for collective use and to hire permanent laborers for
the benefit of the collective. Their organization was later changed to adapt to
the strict scarcity situation that developed at the beginning of the 1990s
(Arias Guevara and Hernández Benítez, 1998, p. 30).
Independent
(Dispersed)Farmers
Independent (dispersed)
small private producers are those who farm their own land with family labor and
establish commitments with the state to sell their agricultural products to the
state collection agency, Acopio. In return, the state sells them
agricultural inputs. Although there were more than 200,000 independent farmers
in the mid-1960s (Aranda, 1968), their numbers declined after the establishment
of the CPAs in the mid-1970s and, by the time the reform process started in
1993, they only controlled 9% of the agricultural land.
There are numerous
examples that reflect the doctrinal preference of the Cuban leadership for
collective farms (state control) over cooperative farms (social or community
control) or private ownership of the agricultural means of production. That
preference appeared in the early 1960s and was not based on relative
performance efficiency by types of enterprises but on purely ideological
grounds (Dumont, 1971, pp. 29–31, 50–51). Research has shown that the relative
order of priorities to receive inputs and assistance from the state was state
farms, CPAs, CCSs, and finally independent farmers (Alvarez and Puerta, 1994).
It should be noted that
state farms, CPAs, and CCSs, let alone independent (dispersed) farmers, have
not typically had the freedom to select what crops or commodities to produce.
Consistent with Cuba's centrally planned economic system such decisions are
made by government bureaucrats after discussions with the interested party.
Also, the government establishes production quotas that each farm is obligated
to sell to the state collection agency, Acopio (EDIS FE484), at prices established by the
government, which are typically quite low. It is readily apparent that such a
system provided little incentive for expanded agricultural production
throughout the first 30 years following the revolution.
Another fact sheet in
this series entitled, Antecedents of the Cuban Agricultural Policies of the
1990s (EDIS FE485),
discusses more recent and, in some cases, significant modifications to the form
and function of Cuba's agricultural organizations.
Alvarez, José. 1990. A
Chronology of Three Decades of Centralized Economic Planning in
Cuba." Communist Economies 2: 101–125.
Alvarez, José.
2004. Cuba's Agricultural Sector. Gainesville, FL: University Press of
Florida.
Alvarez, José, and
Ricardo A. Puerta. 1994. State Intervention in Cuban Agriculture: Impact on
Organization and Performance. World Development 12 (11): 1663–1675.
Aranda, Sergio.
1968. La Revolución Agraria en Cuba. Mexico, DF: Editorial Siglo XXI.
Arias Guevara, María de
los A. and Raciel Hernández Benítez. 1998. "Tendencias Actuales en las
CCS. Visión Desde un Estudio de Caso (CCS "Pedro Blanco" Holguín)."
In Campesinado y Participación Social, complied by Niurka Pérez Rojas,
Ernel González Mastrapa and Miriam García Aguiar, pp. 30–38. La Habana:
Universidad de la Habana.
Castro,
Fidel.1963. Cuba's Agrarian Reform: A Speech by Dr. Fidel Castro. Toronto,
Canada: Fair Play for Cuba Committee (January).
CEE. Comité Estatal de
Estadística. Annual Issues. Anuario Estadístico de Cuba. La Habana:
Editorial Estadística.
Deere, Carmen Diana,
Ernel González, Niurka Pérez, and Gustavo Rodríguez.1995. The View From Below:
Cuban Agriculture in the 'Special Period in Peacetime.' Journal of Peasant
Studies 21 (2, January): 194–234.
Domínguez, Jorge I.
1978. Cuba - Order and Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Dumont, Rene.
1971. Cuba, ¿Es Socialista?, 2d edition. Caracas, Venezuela: Editorial
Tiempo Nuevo.
Forster, Nancy. 1989.
Cuban Agricultural Productivity. In Cuban Communism, edited by I.L.
Horowitz, pp. 235–255. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
ISCAH. Instituto Superior
de Ciencias Agropecuarias de la Habana. n.d. Informe Sobre Cooperativas y sus
Resultados Económicos. Polo Científico de Humanidades, Grupo de Estudios
Socio-económicos de Producción Cooperativa y Campesina. La Habana.
Mears, Leon G.
1962. Agriculture and Food Situation in Cuba. ERS-Foreign 28, Economic
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
(May).
Meurs, Mieke.1990.
Agricultural Production Cooperatives and Cuban Socialism: New Approaches to
Agricultural Development. In Transformation and Struggle - Cuba Faces the
1990s, edited by Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk, pp. 115–130. New York, NY:
Praeger.
Núñez Jiménez, Antonio.
1961. In the 2nd Year of the Cuban Agrarian Reform. La Habana: Editorial
En Marcha.
Pampín Balado, Blanca
Rosa and Clara María Trujillo Rodríguez. n.d. Los Cambios Estructurales en
la Agricultura Cubana. La Habana: Asociación Nacional de Economistas de Cuba.
Pollit, Brian H. 1996.
Collapse, Reform and Recovery Prospects of the Cuban Sugar Economy. Occasional
Paper No. 62–1996, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow.
Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael.
1963. Four Years of Agrarian Reform. La Habana: Ministry of Foreign
Relations.
Thomas, Hugh.
1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Valdés Paz, Juan.
1997. Procesos Agrarios en Cuba, 1959-1995. La Habana: Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales.
Below is a list of the
fact sheets in this series on Cuban Agriculture. They can be accessed by
clicking on the highlighted links:
FE479 —
Cuban Agriculture Before 1959: The Political and Economic Situations
FE480 —
Cuban Agriculture Before 1959: The Social Situation
FE481 —
Transformations in Cuban Agriculture After 1959
FE482 —
Overview of Cuba's Food Rationing System
FE483 —
The Issue of Food Security in Cuba
FE484 — Acopio:
Cuba's State Procurement and Distribution Agency
FE485 —
Antecedents of the Cuban Agricultural Policies of the 1990s
FE486 —
Chronology of Cuban Reform Policies with Emphasis on Agriculture, 1993-1995
FE487 —
Cuba's Basic Units of Cooperative Production
FE488 —
Cuba's Agricultural Markets
FE489 —
Environmental Deterioration and Conservation in Cuban Agriculture
FE490 —
The Potential Correlation between Natural Disasters and Cuba's Agricultural
Performance
This is EDIS document
FE481, a publication of the Department of Food and Resource Economics, UF/IFAS
Extension. Published July 2004. Reviewed August 2009, June 2013 and April 2016.
Please visit the EDIS website at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu.
José Alvarez, Professor,
Department of Food and Resource Economics, Everglades Research and Education
Center, Belle Glade, FL, UF/IFAS Extension, Gainesville, FL 32611.
The author would like to
thank the University Press of Florida (http://www.upf.com) for permission to reproduce material
from the book Cuba's Agricultural Sector (Alvarez, 2004).
